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Information from the Human Genome Project is being integrated into the drug discovery and 
development process to permit novel drug targets to be identified, clinical trial testing to be 
made more efficient, and efficacious therapeutics to be approved and made widely available. 
Knowledge of the genome will allow for the description and quantification of disease and 
susceptibility to disease as informational errors or deficits.  
 
The creation and application of knowledge occur through cooperative or competitive 
interactions, often reflecting the perceived value of the knowledge. The public or private 
value of the knowledge, both for itself and for potential applications, can be determined 
through an understanding of the classification and characterization of this knowledge, as well 
as the position of the knowledge within the drug discovery and development pipeline.  
 
The transformation of knowledge from a purely public good to a quasi-private good has 
highlighted the need for balance between incentives for the market provision of scientific and 
technological knowledge by an innovator and incentives for the market provision of 
incremental knowledge by a follow-on developer. It has been suggested that a patent system 
developed for a discrete model of innovation may no longer be optimal for an information-
based, cumulative model of innovation. Consequently, it is necessary to reanalyze models of 
intellectual property protection and strategies of knowledge sharing in biopharmaceutical 
discovery research.  
 
Under certain conditions, the biotech commons is an efficient institution that can preserve 
downstream opportunities for multiple researchers fairly and efficiently.  A framework for 
classifying and characterizing discovery knowledge is developed in this research and the role 
of research consortia in preserving the biotech commons is analyzed. This study also 
addresses the value of pooling versus unilaterally holding knowledge, the benefits associated 
with appropriating from the commons, the role of knowledge characteristics in bargaining 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Medicine in the Post-Human Genome Era 
It is anticipated that the genomic information revealed from the Human Genome Project 
will revolutionize the diagnosis and treatment of countless diseases. Individuals will be 
diagnosed and treated based on their genotype, not simply on their clinical symptoms. 
Currently, information from the Human Genome Project is being integrated into the drug 
discovery and development process to permit novel drug targets to be identified, clinical 
trial testing to be made more efficient, and efficacious therapeutics to be approved and 
made widely available. 
 
The Human Genome Project has advanced the view that biology is an information 
science. Biological knowledge operates on multiple hierarchical levels and is processed 
in complex networks [Ideker et al., 2001]. Information storage, information processing, 
and the execution of various cellular programs occurs at the level of the cell‘s genome 
(the complete set of genetic information for an organism), transcriptome (the complete set 
of gene expression profiles for an organism), proteome (the complete set of proteins 
encoded by the genome for an organism), and metabolome (the set of all small molecular 
weight metabolites inside a cell). These building blocks organize themselves into 
recurrent patterns call pathways. Genes and proteins are interconnected along these 
informational pathways [Oltvai and Barabási, 2002]. These pathways form functional 
modules or groups of nodes that are responsible for cellular function. The modules are 
themselves nested in a hierarchical fashion to define the cell‘s large scale functional 
organization including tissue networks and organ structure [Oltvai and Barabási, 2002].  
 
Pharmacogenomics is the study of the genetic variations or single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNP) between individuals that are associated with common diseases and 
linked to drug responses [Akhtar, 2002]. Pharmacogenomics will identify candidate 
genes and polymorphisms, predict drug responses and clinical outcomes with the 
objectives to reduce adverse reaction events and enable for dosing of therapeutic drugs on 
the basis of a patient‘s genotype [Akhtar, 2002]. Pharmacogenomics will change the 
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current drug discovery and development process as customized drugs are developed for 
defined sub-populations of patients and perhaps even tailored for specific individuals. 
Clinical trials will target specific genetic population groups. Advanced screening for 
disease susceptibility based on a patient‘s genotype will also become possible [Akhtar, 
2002]. With the accumulation of genomic data, proteomic data, transcriptome data, 
pathway information, and a variety of other biological data, the task now is to integrate 
and analyze these data for the purpose of biological and pharmacological discoveries. 
 
The creation and application of discovery and development knowledge occur through 
cooperative or competitive interactions, often reflecting the perceived value of the 
knowledge. The public or private value of the knowledge both for itself and for potential 
applications can be determined through an understanding of the classification and 
characterization of this knowledge as well as the position of the knowledge within the 
drug discovery and development pipeline. The biopharmaceutical industry must 
differentiate knowledge as it progresses from the gene sequence, to gene products and 
modification of gene products, to the development of therapeutics and diagnostics, as 
knowledge that is discovered versus knowledge that is created and applied through an 
invention. It is this distinction that will enable biopharmaceutical industry participants to 
interact fairly and efficiently with other players in the industry. 
 
 
1.2 The Scale of Research and Strategic Alliances 
Given the broad scope of the current systems biology paradigm, collective effort is 
required from multiple research arenas including: molecular biology, cell biology, 
physiology, mathematics, physics and chemistry, computer science, electrical, 
mechanical, and biological engineering. Life sciences research has long been dominated 
by a culture of independent laboratories organized around single principal investigators. 
However, the need in systems biology for diverse skills and the complexity of the 
experimental technologies require the formation of interdisciplinary research teams 
[Kitano, 2001]. Teams of biologists, engineers, and computational scientists from the 
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public and private sectors, will increasingly collaborate to handle the iterative and multi-
dimensional aspects of systems biology [Ideker al el., 2001]. 
 
Although strategic alliances such as joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions are used 
to gain access to both tacit and codified molecular knowledge, these alliances tend to be 
associated with downstream knowledge—knowledge that is used for the purpose of 
medical application development [Greis et al., 1995; Das and Teng, 2000]. Upstream 
knowledge that is far removed from commercial application is typically developed 
through research-based partnerships between universities, biotechnology, and 
pharmaceutical companies [Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Blumenthal, 1992; Senker and 
Sharp, 1997]. Furthermore, the era of the Human Genome has highlighted the need for 
partnerships that are broad and not only cross institutional boundaries, but also cross 
regional boundaries. The breadth of upstream research to be conducted to ensure 
successful downstream drug development, particularly in a decade marked by shrinking 
pipelines and blockbuster drug patent expirations, has reinforced the need for knowledge-
based networks. 
 
Networks of collaboration allow multiple institutions and systems biology researchers to 
collaborate despite their geographic distance [Foray, 2004]. The creation of a virtual 
knowledge environment will enable scientists to make new connections between 
information from diverse sources, and to support educational, collaborative, and 
community-building efforts. Knowledge production and dissemination in this paradigm 
will require the development of common data standards for representing complex 
biological information, and the establishment of efficient communication and knowledge 
sharing mechanisms across disciplines and geographies [Foray, 2004]. The ability to 
generate new wealth depends on the capacity of researchers to learn from other 
researchers in a knowledge network or alliance. The structure of the network mechanisms 
used to enable knowledge transfer and transparency with respect to knowledge 
production and dissemination, are critical to ensure that collective learning occurs 




1.3 Complex Intellectual Property Issues 
Existing patent law allows a researcher who has discovered a new, nonobvious, and 
useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter to receive a 
patent [Kieff, 2003; Foray 2004; USPTO, 2007]. Consider the example of Tagamet, a 
breakthrough drug in antiulcer therapies that was introduced in 1977. Tagamet was the 
first drug to relieve ulcers by blocking the histamine 2 (H2) receptors in the lining of the 
stomach from stimulating acid production by the parietal cells [Berndt et al., 1994]. Six 
years after Tagamet became available, a second H2 antagonist, Zantac, was approved; it 
eventually became the largest-selling drug in both the United States and the world 
[Berndt et al., 1994]. By 1989, two additional H2 antagonists, Pepcid and Axid, were 
available. Thus, four slightly different drugs using the same therapeutic mechanism 
(blocking the H2 receptor) were all patentable, with the breakthrough drug having only 
six years of market exclusivity before being challenged by a competitor compound 
[Berndt et al., 1994]. 
 
Currently, under existing patent law, biological information is considered a new article of 
manufacture or composition of matter.  However, patent examiners are increasingly 
finding it difficult to apply the chemical patent law doctrines to biological information 
[Drew, 1998]. The consequence of this has been the granting of and enforcement of broad 
patents on biotechnological entities that perhaps should not be enclosed with serious 
negative consequences for subsequent research and development activities. 
 
For example, the OncoMouse or Harvard mouse is a type of laboratory mouse that has 
been genetically modified by researchers at Harvard University and DuPont to carry an 
activated oncogene. The activated oncogene significantly increases the mouse‘s 
susceptibility to cancer, and thus makes the mouse suitable for cancer research [WIPO 
Magazine, 2006; Wikipedia, 2007]. 
  
Patent applications on this upstream research tool were filed in the mid-1980s in 
numerous countries including the United States, Canada, Europe, and Japan. Two 
separate patents were issued to Harvard College covering methods for providing a cell 
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culture from a transgenic non-human animal (U.S. 5,087,571) and testing methods using 
transgenic mice expressing an oncogene (U.S. 5,925,803) [Wikipedia, 2007]. 
  
In 2002, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected the patent in Harvard College v. Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents), overturning a Federal Court of Appeal verdict which ruled in 
favour of the patent by overturning a lower court‘s rejection. However, on October 7th 
2003, Canadian patent 1,341,442 CA was granted to Harvard College. The patent was 
amended to omit the ―composition of matter‖ claims on the transgenic mice. The 
Supreme Court had rejected the entire patent application on the basis of these claims, but 
Canadian patent law allowed the amended claims to grant under pre-GATT rules [WIPO 
Magazine, 2006; Wikipedia, 2007]. This notion of biological entities as being 
composition of matter from the chemistry perspective tends to support the view that 
extending patent protection to biotechnological inventions is nothing new but simply a 
matter of expanding an existing logical patent category.   
 
In the systems biology paradigm, the focus of intellectual property rights should 
gradually shift to the patenting of information. This information perspective must 
incorporate an understanding of the impact of enclosing hierarchical and complementary, 
basic biological knowledge, on the technological opportunities available for the 
development of novel medical products [Hood, 2000]. Systems biology does not focus on 
individual genes and proteins one at a time, but focuses on the behaviour and 
relationships of all elements in a particular biological system from a functional 
perspective [Ideker et al., 2001]. Targets that function across diseases, playing a central 
role in these diseases, will be chosen to develop drugs that either augment or suppress the 
associated biological systems, enabling for better disease intervention, and blockbuster 
status on the market.  Blockbuster drugs will not simply target one system, but will 
eventually target multiple systems at a common intervention point.    
 
As an example of the complexities associated with systems biology patents, is U.S. Patent 
No. 6,410,516 filed on the NF-κB cell signaling system. This patent was assigned to 
Harvard College (Cambridge, MA), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
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(Cambridge, MA), and the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research (Cambridge, 
MA). The patent claims cover methods of treating human disease by regulating NF-κB 
activity, methods of treating disease by inhibiting NF-κB, and methods useful for treating 
various disease conditions through modulation of NF-κB activity. The associated patent 
on the upstream system itself was awarded in 2002, with claims that may cover almost 
every putative downstream application of this fundamental signaling pathway. Licensed 
to Ariad Pharmaceuticals in 2002, Ariad sued Eli Lilly, arguing that Lilly‘s Evista and 
Xigris products for osteoporosis and sepsis, approved in 1997 and 2001 respectively, 
infringe upon their patent since the drugs work via the NF-ĸB pathway [Rai and 
Eisenberg, 2003]. 
 
The current patent system is thought to fit a model of research and development where 
knowledge is discrete and the result of a linear research process. In contrast, for many 
industries, concern has been expressed where the research process is primarily knowledge 
based, the process of invention may be cumulative and iterative, with downstream 
knowledge dependent on upstream knowledge. Therefore, a patent system that was 
developed for a discrete model of innovation may no longer be optimal for an 
information-based, cumulative model of innovation [Dalrymple, 2003]. With the reforms 
outlined in the U.S. Patent Reform Act of 2007, it is hoped that the U.S. system will 
incorporate some of the processes that have worked well in other patent systems 
including a post-grant review process to challenge and resolve patent issues immediately 
after the granting of a patent application; the involvement of the public sector to assist 
with the search for prior art with respect to patent applications; and raising the 
obviousness standard associated with derivative innovation.  
 
It is worthwhile to note that, in this thesis, the majority of the issues discussed revolve 
around the U.S. patent system. While innovators seeking protection for their inventions in 
Canada, the U.S., Europe, and Japan must file for a patent in each place, most companies 
are likely to first patent inventions in the much larger U.S. market. It is also assumed that 
policy changes with respect to encouraging innovation and protecting intellectual 
property rights initiated in the U.S., such as the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, are likely to be 
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emulated in some form in other markets. Hence, we focus our attention on patent and 
policy issues stemming from the U.S. market.  
 
The complexities associated with intellectual property will be further exacerbated as 
multiple disciplines increasingly work together in the systems biology paradigm. Each 
discipline will have its own priorities and conventions regarding knowledge 
dissemination and knowledge appropriation. One discipline may signal its success during 
knowledge generation through enclosure and the sale of disembodied knowledge. 
Another discipline may measure its success exclusively by the embodiment of knowledge 
in medical products. As collaborations cross institutional boundaries, the parceling out of 
intellectual property rights may be too difficult a task. With the assignment of property 
rights, the role of the patent holder in providing broad versus narrow access to the 
knowledge will then depend on the original incentives for producing the knowledge. We 
contend therefore, that it is necessary to reanalyze models of intellectual property 
protection and strategies of knowledge sharing in biopharmaceutical discovery research.  
 
In this thesis, the role of the biotech commons (the public domain for biotechnology 
knowledge) is investigated as an efficient institution for preserving downstream 
development opportunities for multiple researchers.  Identifying the boundary (―the 
transition point‖) between the commons and the private realm is important during this 
investigation. The transition point can be defined as the moment in discovery research 
when the characteristics associated with knowledge change so that privatization of the 
knowledge is critical for downstream research and the development of medical products. 
In this thesis, we assume that patents protect the future right to pursue downstream 
development in a technological arena. The complexities of knowledge discussed in this 
thesis tend to be associated with upstream research; hence we assume that should patents 
be filed, the intent is to protect the right to downstream research and/or product 
development—in some cases through internal development and in other cases (including 
jointly) through licensing agreements. As products are developed, patents can protect 
against future loss of profit through imitation and can be used to prevent competitors 
from entering the market.  
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1.4 Understanding the Structure of and Management of Knowledge Assets 
It is important to determine during the drug discovery and development process whether 
knowledge should be deposited into the biotech commons or should be privatized and 
assigned property rights.  Cooperative interactions during discovery research can ensure 
that knowledge is generated for the purpose of disclosure and deposit into the biotech 
commons. Alternatively, the ability to appropriate knowledge will preserve the incentive 
to progress further downstream into development work—work that is very costly and 
risky in the biopharmaceutical industry. Knowledge that belongs in the public domain is 
unique and can be distinguished from knowledge that is privatized to appropriate its full 
value. A framework for classifying and characterizing discovery knowledge is developed 
in this thesis (Chapters 3, 4, 5) and the role of pre-competitive research consortia 
(Chapter 6) in preserving the biotech commons is analyzed. Researchers will face many 
decisions in the biotech commons including the decision to participate in the biotech 
commons by pooling resources or knowledge, the decision to pursue a cooperative versus 
competitive strategy within the commons, the decision to bargain for and license 
privatized knowledge, and the decision to develop rules to ensure cooperation and 
maintain the commons.  
 
We first conduct a patent analysis on key biological systems to determine if and where 
problems will potentially occur in the current systems paradigm (Chapter 4) and use a 
historical analysis of upstream research-based alliances across drug discovery paradigms 
(Chapter 5) to understand the objective of such alliances and the focus of (including 
evolution of) intellectual property strategies. By then studying various pre-competitive 
research consortia (Chapter 6), established primarily after the completion of the Human 
Genome Project, we determine how this specific alliance model has enabled for the 
management of complex knowledge assets including knowledge production, knowledge 
appropriation, and knowledge dissemination. Based on this understanding, we develop 
game models to determine the impact of knowledge characteristics on the decision to 
participate in pre-competitive research consortia (Chapter 7), the decision to appropriate 
knowledge developed within such consortia (Chapter 8), and the impact of knowledge 
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characteristics on strategies used during the bargaining process involving a licensor and 
licensee (Chapter 9).  
 
 
1.5 The Game Models  
Game models are mathematical models of interactive decision problems. In these models, 
two or more players or decision makers make choices that determine an outcome. 
Player‘s choices are assumed to reflect their preferences and their understanding of how 
their choices are converted into outcomes [Kilgour, 2006]. Each player is assumed to act 
in his or her own best interest. The Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a game 
involving two or more players, in which no player has anything to gain by unilaterally 
changing only his or her own strategy. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player 
can benefit by unilaterally changing his or her strategy, then the current set of strategy 
choices and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium and a solution to the 
game [Kilgour, 2006]. A game can have more than one pure Nash equilibrium. Pure 
strategy Nash equilibria are Nash equilibria where all players are playing single strategies 
with probability one [Kilgour, 2006]. Alternatively, a mixed strategy is a probability 
distribution over strategies [Kilgour, 2006]. Strategies can also be dominated by other 
strategies. Dominance occurs when one strategy is better than another strategy for one 
player, no matter what the other player chooses. A strategy can be strictly dominated if 
and only if it always dominates other strategies i.e., always give a better outcome no 
matter what the other player chooses. Once a strictly dominated strategy is found, it is 
this strategy that will always be chosen by a player [Kilgour, 2006]. In game models, is it 
assumed that the players are ―rational,‖ which means that they always make choices that 
maximize their own interests.  For example, a rational player will always select a 
dominant strategy (if one exists). 
 
In this thesis, we use game models to represent and analyze interactions between partners 
in collaborative alliances. Our contention is that a researcher‘s ―freedom to operate‖ 
downstream is determined by cooperate-versus-defect decisions upstream, as discovery 
knowledge is being produced and subsequently disseminated. These decisions therefore 
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determine whether researchers can equitably pursue downstream opportunities for 
medical application development. 
 
In a basic model, two researchers can either cooperate (C) in knowledge production or 
dissemination, or defect (D) by generating knowledge privately and/or making their 
knowledge private. The outcomes are the four cells shown Table 1.1. Preferences over 
outcomes are given ordinally; each player‘s most preferred outcome is assigned payoff 
(―utility‖) 4, the next most preferred outcome is assigned 3, and so on down to 1 for the 
least preferred outcome. In this simple game, communication is not permitted.   
 
 C22 D2 
C1 3, 3 1, 4 
D1 4, 1 2, 2 
Table 1.1: Game Model of Discovery Research Interaction 
Researcher 1 chooses C1 or D1; the first number in each cell is Researcher 1‘s ordinal payoff. 
Researcher 2 chooses C2 or D2; the second number in each cell is Researcher 2‘s ordinal payoff. 
C=Cooperate; D=Defect 
 
In the model of Table 1.1, mutual cooperation (C1, C2) is the next-best outcome for both 
players, reflecting that cooperation during knowledge production will increase the 
probability of success, bring success more quickly, and help contain costs. A player who 
chooses D rather than C is choosing unilateral research, under which any discovery is 
private. Despite the higher costs of unilateral action and the greater risk of failure, the 
benefits from unilateral defection are often very high, especially if the defector can 
establish ownership of knowledge. The mutual defection outcome, (D1, D2), represents a 
race for discovery. Because discovery research in the systems biology paradigm is 
extremely complex, players who choose to race will likely face higher costs and greater 
risks of failure, making this outcome inferior to the mutual cooperation outcome, in the 
sense that both players are worse off.  This game is commonly known as Prisoners‘ 




We see from the above example that Prisoner‘s Dilemma has several applications beyond 
being used as a parlor game played for money. The monetary gains and losses can be 
replaced by other kinds of rewards and punishments and interpretations. The two players 
for example can be asked to imagine that they are two firms in competition. Each firm 
has a choice of selling a product at one of two price levels. If one firm sells at a high level 
while the other sells at a low level, the second firm will attain the profits by capturing the 
market. If both sell at a high level, both profit, but not as much as when competition does 
not exist. If both firms sell at the low level, both will lose money. In another scenario, the 
players can imagine that they are rival power blocs who have made a disarmament 
agreement. The cooperative choice is keeping the agreement; the defecting choice is to 
break the agreement. There may also be some advantage accruing to the bloc that breaks 
the agreement unilaterally. Therefore, by using the Prisoner‘s Dilemma as a framework, 
various games (experimental or real) can test the ethical convictions of players or their 
cognitive sets on various matters. 
 
A crucial feature of PD is that the players‘ incentives drive them toward mutual 
defection. As is easy to verify in Table 1.1, either player achieves a preferred outcome by 
defecting, no matter what choice the opponent makes. In game-theoretic terms, defection 
(D) strictly dominates cooperation (C); any rational player who recognizes the situation 
will defect immediately. The reason that PD has attracted so much interest is that mutual 
defection, (D1, D2), is the only possible outcome according to a very convincing criterion 
of individual rationality, and at the same time it is ―collectively irrational‖ in that both 
players are better off at mutual cooperation, (C1, C2).   
 
In the discovery research context, the incentive to defect may be strong if a researcher 
fears being left behind, spending time and money on research but receiving no benefits or 
accolades.  (In Table 1.1, for example, if Researcher 1 is the sole cooperator, the outcome 
is (C1, D2), which is Researcher 1‘s least preferred outcome.)  In fact, it is the 
characteristics of the players that determine the appeal of defection. Players from the 
private sector are generally motivated to obtain patents, and are therefore more likely to 
engage in unilateralism, secrecy, and competition. The same phenomenon is likely if only 
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one researcher is from the private sector; the players could quickly become direct 
competitors, as scientists in public institutions are increasingly business-oriented, 
targeting their research toward applications and patents. There are even incentives for 
public-sector researchers to defect—they seek credit, priority in discovery, and patent 
priority, reflecting that the line between basic and applied research is often blurred in 
biotechnology [Blumenthal, 1992; Atkinson et al., 1998]. 
 
Using the above game model as a framework including game concepts and perceptions 
associated with the Prisoner‘s Dilemma game, we develop our game models as outlined 
in section 1.4. The objective of these models is to understand under what circumstances 
cooperation dominates unilateral and mutual defection. If however, the decision is made 
to defect and unilaterally produce and hold knowledge, we analyze the various licensing 
scenarios available to the defector or licensor (with defection occurring through the 
appropriation of knowledge via the filing of patents).    
 
 
1.6 Implications of Research 
The transformation of knowledge from a purely public good to a quasi-private good has 
highlighted the need for balance between incentives for the market provision of scientific 
and technological knowledge by an innovator and incentives for the market provision of 
incremental knowledge by a follow-on developer.  Without this balance in incentives for 
the upstream innovator and downstream developer, tragedies are possible.  
 
The tragedy of the biotech commons is a result of free riding by other users and the 
inability of the original inventor to appropriate knowledge. Property rights can ensure that 
knowledge is indeed produced and diffused for others to use, avoiding the tragedy where 
innovative knowledge is not generated [Hardin, 1968]. 
 
On the other hand, a tragedy of the anticommons can occur in which follow-on 
developers underuse a scarce resource because too many owners can block these 
innovators and no one has effective privilege of use.  The possibility exists then that 
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critical technological opportunities will not be exploited in downstream development 
activities.   
 
Both of these tragedies, where knowledge is not discovered or created and then exploited 
in the development of therapeutics and diagnostics, are problems for the corresponding 
innovators as the potential to enjoy profits in the resulting markets may be diminished.  
However, the ultimate tragedy occurs when the patient is not provided with the choice of 
new or improved medical treatment options.  Therefore, the role of the proposed biotech 
commons is to encourage drug discovery research and development with private benefits 





Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives of the Economics of Knowledge and 
Strategic Alliances 
 
2.1 Characterizing Knowledge: Public Good vs. Quasi-Private Good 
Kenneth Arrow and Richard Nelson have long shaped the discussion about knowledge 
and its supply [Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962]. Technological knowledge has traditionally 
been classified as a public good associated with the properties of non-rivalry, non-
excludability hence non-appropriability, and indivisibility [Antonelli, 2003]. (Table 2.1) 
 
Non-rivalry implies that there is a zero marginal cost from an additional individual using 
the knowledge [Foray, 2004]. Even if one could exclude another user from using the 
knowledge, it would be undesirable to do so because there are no marginal costs to 
sharing the benefits associated with the knowledge. Non-subtractability also used in the 
literature, means that usage by one firm or individual does not reduce the availability of 
that information for use by others [Foray, 2004]. Knowledge is not destroyed or altered 
by use. Often, increased usage of the knowledge can enhance its value and applicability, 
thereby exhibiting positive externalities [Antonelli, 2003].  
 
Free-rider problems are traditionally associated with the provision of public goods—as 
the producer of knowledge cannot easily exclude others from using the knowledge. Free- 
riders do not need to reveal their preferences concerning which public goods should be 
provided. These individuals will understate their true preferences in the hope that others 
will bear the burden of the cost of producing the good. However, with individuals acting 
in their own self-interest, resources may be under-allocated to the provision of such 
goods [Nicholson, 1985].  
 
Knowledge is also indivisible as the utility of this good cannot be parceled out among 
different individuals. Instead, value may be created through the collective use of the 




In the Arrowian tradition of classifying knowledge as a public good, markets are not able 
to provide appropriate levels of knowledge because of the lack of incentives associated 
with non-excludability and non-appropriability. The public provision of scientific 
knowledge became a long regarded basic remedy to the problem of under-provision of 
knowledge and under-allocation of resources to knowledge production. Accelerating the 
introduction of new technology stemming from scientific discoveries became the domain 
of large corporations that could fund new technical knowledge production. Ex-ante 
monopolistic market power based on barriers to entry in existing product markets would 
provide the financial resources to fund new knowledge production [Antonelli, 2003]. 
Appropriability would then be ensured by barriers to entry based on cost rather than 
barriers to entry based on imitation [Antonelli, 2003]. With the creation of intellectual 
property rights and the ability to trade knowledge, incentives to produce both scientific 
and technological knowledge could be ensured by the market.  
 
The transformation of knowledge from a purely public good to a ―quasi-private good‖ has 
highlighted the need for balance between incentives for the market provision of scientific 
and technological knowledge by a first innovator and incentives for the market provision 
of incremental knowledge by a follow-on developer [Scotchmer, 1991; 2004]. The 
possibilities for holdouts and high transaction costs associated with gaining the right to 
use knowledge in downstream activities, increase as a function of the complementarity, 
non-substitutability, and applicability of the knowledge. Holdouts occur when buyers 
need to acquire complementary assets from sellers and sellers raise their prices to capture 
some of the value the buyer attributes to collectively holding the assets [Merges, 1994]. 
Holdouts can also occur when owners control blocking patents, requiring the follow-on 
developer to license the knowledge for downstream research or to sell a product that 
embodies the knowledge. In this case, the first innovator will try to garner as much of the 
value of improvements or of the downstream product as possible [Merges, 1994]. 
Licensing can involve fixed-fees, royalties, and reach-through claims on future 
knowledge [Burk and Lemley, 2003]. Hence, bargaining failures occur when the first 
innovator and follow-on developer are unable to reach an agreement regarding the license 
to knowledge and the rights to future developments. 
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Upstream complementarity occurs among research inputs during the generation of new 
knowledge while downstream complementarity occurs in the development phase during 
the application of new knowledge [Antonelli, 2003]. Complementary knowledge can be 
used to generate new knowledge in the same specific context or in other adjacent ones. 
Knowledge will be pooled from the public domain or from owners of the knowledge 
willing to trade at a reasonable cost. Knowledge may also be lacking in direct substitutes. 
Others may not be able to substitute for or ―invent around‖ the knowledge and may 
require varying degrees of access for new knowledge creation. Without the availability of 
substitute knowledge, the owner can extract high rents from potential users. Finally, 
knowledge can be applied to a variety of new products and processes. Both the owner and 
downstream user of knowledge will treat knowledge that applies to a narrow and specific 
range of activities differently than knowledge that has important applications to a great 






Zero marginal cost from an additional individual using the knowledge. 
Non-subtractable Use of knowledge does not reduce the availability of that knowledge for use 
by others. 
Non-excludable One cannot easily exclude others from using the knowledge; 
Free riding occurs. 
Indivisible Utility of knowledge cannot be parceled out among different individuals; 
Value created through the collective use of knowledge. 
Complementarity New knowledge production is conditional on the identification and 
integration of diverse and dispersed units acting as inputs. 
Non-substitutable Knowledge may be lacking in direct substitutes; 
One may not be able to ―invent around‖ the knowledge. 
Applicability Knowledge can vary in terms of applicability in downstream use—from 
narrow to wide-ranging application. 
Embodiment Knowledge may serve as inputs into downstream use 
or as part of final embodiment. 
Table 2.1: The Properties of Knowledge 
 
Knowledge first begins as an idea or concept. Knowledge may therefore, serve as an 
input into further development and the creation of new knowledge or serve as 
components of the final embodiment of research and development activities. (Figure 2.1) 
From purely public knowledge, to quasi-private knowledge, to private knowledge 
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embodied in products or processes, knowledge moves into the market with varying 
degrees of power provided to the owner [Dalrymple, 2003]. Figure 2.1 graphically 














      
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Links between Upstream and Downstream Knowledge 
Adopted from Chuck Eesly: ―Hear No Evil Patents, See No Evil Patents, Speak of No Evil Patents: 




2.2 A Knowledge Perspective of the Drug Discovery and Development Cycle  
The upstream (discovery or research) phase involves discovering human drug targets, 
screening targets, screening new chemical entities (NCE) or new biological entities 
(NBE) against a target for therapeutic activity, and optimizing chemical or biological 
entities.  Preclinical testing involves the testing of NCEs/NBEs in vitro (within the glass) 
Knowledge of research inputs via 
tools used to understand 
biological processes and targets. 
Research Inputs:  
Genes, Proteins, Networks, 
Biomarkers, Single Nucleotide 
Polymorphisms (SNPs), Metabolites, 
DNA Libraries, Combinatorial 
Chemistry Libraries 
 
 Tools:  
Databases, Analytical Tools, 
Equipment, Reagents, Assays, Cells 










Small Molecule-Chemical Therapeutics, 
Large Molecule-Biological 
Therapeutics, Gene-Based Therapy 
 
Biological Model, 
System, Pathway,  
Drug Target  
 
Knowledge of research inputs 
used to understand biological 
processes and targets. 
Upstream knowledge of 
biological models, systems, 
pathways, and targets used to 
develop diagnostics and/or 
therapeutics. 
In some cases, multiple products 
are developed for a 
system/disease; in other cases, a 
product may be developed to 
treat multiple systems/diseases.  
18 
 
and in vivo (inside) in animal models. Upstream research inputs include: genes and their 
associated regulatory components, single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), gene 
transcripts, proteins and their associated networks, drug targets, and metabolites. Tools 
that aid discovery activities include: analytical tools, assays, reagents, biological 
materials such as cells, tissue samples and model organisms, databases, algorithms, 
techniques including the use of combinatorial chemistry to rapidly generate drug leads, 
other protocols, and equipment. 
 
As we move downstream (into product development), chemical based libraries (relying 
on traditional chemical processes) from which drugs are sought, or biological 
therapeutics (developed through the use of biological processes) such as recombinant 
proteins, monoclonal antibodies, and even gene delivery, are developed to correct 
malfunctioning processes, the informational errors, or deficits in a system. Alternatively, 
diagnostics use research inputs such as genes, proteins, biomarkers, and SNPs to detect 
disease susceptibility, disease progression, and predict therapeutic response. (Figure 2.2) 
 
Phase I Trials include initial studies to determine the metabolic and pharmacological 
action of the drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and the 
effectiveness of the drug [PhRMA, 2007]. These trials may include healthy participants 
and patients. Phase II Trials include controlled clinical studies conducted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication in patients with the disease or 
condition under study [PhRMA, 2007]. Phase II Trials are also conducted to determine 
the common short-term side effects and risks associated with the drug [PhRMA, 2007]. 
Phase III Trials include expanded, long-term, controlled, and uncontrolled trials. These 
trials are conducted to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of the drug and to 
provide an adequate basis for labeling [PhRMA, 2007]. Once clinical trials are completed 
and FDA approval is received, manufacturing can commence. The drug is then 
introduced to the market and adverse reaction events in consumers (Phase IV trials) are 
monitored. Additionally, approval and marketing can be further expanded to meet global 












Figure 2.2: Classes of Knowledge  
 
Complementary types of data are clustered to provide for the basis of understanding 
biological systems under normal conditions and diseased states. Platform technologies 
that take advantage of central intervention nodes or pathways, found in multiple systems, 
are being developed as part of the blockbuster strategy. These technologies are based on 
an understanding of the organizational levels of biological knowledge [Oltvai and 
Barabási, 2002]. Genes can be categorized by location, structure, and function. Proteins 
can also be clustered into families based on structural and functional characteristics. 
Proteins interact with one another in various pathways and biochemical networks and as 
such, can be classified by these pathways and networks [Oltvai and Barabási, 2002].   
From these proteins, the search for targets or points of drug intervention is conducted. 
Target families are clustered into families that function across biological systems. With 
the availability of target proteins, new medicinal entities are designed to interact with 
these targets and their associated pathways [Oltvai and Barabási, 2002]. These entities 
can also be grouped on the basis of their structural properties and mechanisms of action.  
 
The clustering of data for biological analysis can have a profound technological impact 
when property rights are sought. Specifically, intellectual property rights are increasingly 
sought for gene families, target families, and biological pathways. By staking out claims 
to such families and pathways, if the claims in a patent cover more than the territory of 
innovation of a first innovator, subsequent innovations by other innovators, based on the 
first innovation, can be blocked [Scherer, 2000]. If the first innovator cannot or chooses 


























costs exist for those follow-on innovators who cannot ―get around‖ such patents 
[Scotchmer, 1991; Merges, 1994].  
 
In Figure 2.3, we show two different knowledge units with varied characteristics and the 
impact on downstream product development. Knowledge unit A is high in 
complementarity, high in applicability, but also high in substitutability. The products 
developed from knowledge unit A are represented by the inner circle. The outer circle 
encloses substitute products that are supplied by competitors (targeting the same market) 
with noninfringing knowledge, thereby constraining the profits earned by the owner of 
knowledge unit A.  Knowledge unit B is high in complementarity, high in applicability, 
but low in substitutability. The products developed from knowledge unit B are 
represented by the inner circle. In this case, a patent on knowledge unit B is a blocking 
patent. Other firms will have to acquire a license from the owner of knowledge unit B in 
order to develop products that embody this knowledge; these infringing products are 
represented by the outer circle. It is possible that firms may develop products that will 
target the same market. The decision therefore to license knowledge unit B will have to 
consider the increase in revenue from licensing versus the loss in revenue from 









Figure 2.3: Comparing Knowledge Characteristics and the Impact on Downstream 
Development 
 
As the degree of complementarity, non-substitutability, and applicability of upstream 
knowledge increases, excessive privatization will increase the transactions costs 
associated with procuring licenses to the required knowledge and the possibility of 









these transaction costs will complicate the bargaining process. Large corporations with 
substantial resources will be in a better position to negotiate licenses on a case-by-case 
basis than public sector institutions or small startup firms. This asymmetry may make it 




2.3 Changing Paradigms and Knowledge Structures 
The pharmaceutical industry arose as a result of the aniline dye industry (a byproduct of 
gas derived from the carbonization of coal for commercial and residential use) and the 
institution known as the apothecary used to fill prescriptions written by physicians 
[Drews, 1998]. Dyes became the basis for the manufacture of medicines containing ring 
and chain carbon compounds that could serve as starting material for synthetic chemistry. 
As other sources for medicine were discovered, the need to make these substances 
available in larger quantities required large-scale, quality-controlled production. 
Consequently, several apothecaries evolved into industrial apothecaries or pharmaceutical 
companies [Drews, 1998].  
 
Chemical compounds were isolated from living organisms or could be synthesized. In 
addition to methodologically assured means of production, compounds that were isolated 
or synthesized needed to be tested for effectiveness. The measurement and classification 
of the effectiveness of drugs became part of the domain of pharmacology. Pharmacology 
evolved from a focus on physiology and an understanding of normal body functions into 
the correction of malfunctioning processes through the use of pharmaceuticals. Animal 
models exhibiting disease symptoms were used to test the effectiveness and safety of new 
compounds [Drews, 1998; Dutfield, 2003]. Hence, medicine oriented itself toward 
experimentation and observation, paying less attention to abstract theories and 
speculation [Drews, 1998; Dutfield, 2003]. From the notion of treating diseases evolved 
the desire to quantify the dosage and bodily effects of new compounds as well as the need 
to characterize the toxicity of drugs. This research into drug metabolism is thought to 




Dyes that preferentially stained tissues led to the birth of chemotherapy [Drews, 1998; 
Dutfield, 2003]. Chemical affinities between dyes and tissues—cells or cellular 
components, led to the exploration of the binding properties of biological structures and 
chemical compounds in living organisms [Drews, 1998; Dutfield, 2003]. Researchers 
postulated that cells carry on their surfaces and then eventually in their interior, receptors 
that preferentially bind to certain chemical compounds. The challenge for chemotherapy 
would be to find chemical compounds that would only bind to cells that a therapist would 
hope to eliminate from the body of a diseased patient [Drews, 1998; Dutfield, 2003].  
 
From the perspective of pharmacology, receptors are viewed as signal receivers. These 
targets interact selectively with a signal and transmit the signal information to 
intracellular effector organelles—a process known as signal transduction [Drews, 1998; 
Dutfield, 2003; PhRMA, 2007].  It is this biochemical understanding of receptors, 
enzymes, and even ion channels (all targets for intervention by pharmaceuticals) that was 
responsible for the drug revolution in the 1950s and 1960s, resulting in the production of 
numerous medicines [Drews, 1998; Dutfield, 2003]. 
  
Dye chemistry, synthetic chemistry, pharmacology, and biochemistry have therefore, 
collectively influenced the development of the pharmaceutical industry. In this chemical 
paradigm for drug discovery and development, vital body processes are described in 
chemical terms and diseases are described as measurable deviations from normal 
chemical processes. From this perspective, drug intervention is merely an attempt to 
normalize this dynamic equilibrium through the use of chemical substances [Drews, 
1998; Dutfield, 2003; PhRMA 2007]. 
 
Alongside the emergence of the pharmaceutical industry and chemical paradigm for drug 
discovery and development, the discovery of the Double Helix by Francis Crick and 
James Watson has been one of the major scientific events of the last century [Watson, 
1968; Crick, 1988]. The pathway from the discovery of the double helix to the 
completion of the Human Genome project (HGP) has been marked by an explosion of 
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research in a number of areas in molecular biology. Molecular biology is the study of 
biology at a molecular level. The field overlaps with other areas of biology and 
chemistry, including genetics and biochemistry [Drews, 1998]. Molecular biology has as 
its objective the understanding of the interactions between the various components of a 
cell, including the interrelationship of and regulation of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), 
ribonucleic acid (RNA), and protein synthesis [Drews, 1998; BIO.org, 2007]. 
 
By the turn of the century, it was known that nucleic acids were present in all cells.  Also 
established were the three essential features of nucleic acids: a sugar, a phosphate, and 
the various bases (made for the most part from nitrogen and carbon).  By the early 
1920‘s, it had also been proven that there were actually two nucleic acids—RNA and 
DNA [Watson, 1968]. Then in 1944, Oswald Avery showed that purified DNA was the 
primary carrier of genetic information [Watson, 1968].  As such, the stage was set for 
Watson and Crick to investigate the role of DNA in the gene.  The specific role of DNA 
would only be elucidated once the structure of the DNA molecule was solved in 1953 
[Watson, 1968].  
 
Once the structural simplicity of the DNA molecule was indeed grasped, and the pairing 
of bases understood, the mechanism of heredity via the molecular replication of DNA 
became apparent i.e., the passage of information from generation to generation [Watson, 
1968; Crick, 1988]. Each of the two strands of the double helix, upon separation, could 
serve as a template for the synthesis of a new complementary strand to create two new 
strands, each a replica of an original, to be separated into two daughter cells [Watson, 
1968; Crick, 1988].  
 
Molecular biology has introduced a new paradigm [Schadt et al., 2003]. The genome 
consists of all the directions for the development and function for an organism via RNA 
and protein synthesis. Genetic changes lead to functional loss or alteration of these 
instructions. Disease results from such genetic changes. Knowledge of the genome will 
allow for the description and quantification of disease and susceptibility to disease as 
informational deficits or errors [Drew, 1998]. The treatment of disease from this 
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perspective involves the replacement of information that has been lost or the correction of 
information that is erroneous in the form of DNA, RNA, or protein.  
 
The biotechnology industry originated in the 1970s, based largely on new recombinant 
DNA techniques developed by Stanley Cohen of Stanford University and Herbert Boyer 
of the University of California, San Francisco [BIO.org, 2007]. Recombinant DNA is a 
method of making proteins in cultured cells under controlled manufacturing conditions 
[BIO.org, 2007]. The understanding of disease from a molecular perspective and the use 
of molecular techniques to create recombinant DNA has produced a vast number of drugs 
such as vaccines, monoclonal antibodies, recombinant products, and gene-based drugs 
[BIO.org, 2007]. 
   
With the completion of the Human Genome Project, discovery research no longer simply 
focuses on individual units of knowledge, but considers the behaviour and relationships 
of all units of knowledge in a particular biological system from a functional perspective 
[Kitano, 2001; 2002]. Genomes are now being described as consisting of complex, 
intersecting systems rather than unitary collections of separately functioning structures 
[Hood, 2000; Dutfield, 2003]. The assumption that these structures have independent 
functions has proven to be too simplistic in the post Human Genome era. In light of this 
new information paradigm, many biopharmaceutical companies are reconsidering their 
competitive strategies with respect to upstream genomic discovery research [Eisenberg, 




2.4 Evolving Models of Innovation 
It is anticipated that the genomic information revealed from the Human Genome Project 
will revolutionize the diagnosis and treatment of countless diseases. Individuals will be 
diagnosed and treated based on their genotype, not simply their clinical symptoms. By 
sequencing an individual‘s genome, analysis of disease risks, life expectancy, and the 
ability to customize drug treatment based on individual‘s unique genetic profile will 
25 
 
become possible [Akhtar, 2002].  The successful forward integration of genomics-based 
information into the drug discovery paradigm is central to the identification of novel drug 
targets, the development of therapeutics, and for the development of diagnostics.    
 
New knowledge components of a changing genomics driven drug discovery paradigm 
include the genome—the study of the complete set of genetic information contained 
within a cell or an organism including the assignment of function to the genes within this 
set;  genome maps that allow for a more rapid identification of genes of interest based on 
physical location and relative position of genes on a chromosome; the proteome—the 
study of proteins encoded by the genome including the assignment of function to such 
proteins and the understanding of protein-protein interactions within biological pathways; 
gene expression information including patterns of gene expression as a function of cell 
type, disease state, therapeutic intervention; single nucleotide polymorphism—single 
base pair changes in DNA located either outside the coding region of the gene or located 
within the coding region of the gene, often having a functional significance in terms of 
disease susceptibility and/or drug response; pharmacogenomics—the use of genetic 
variations to design drugs keeping in mind the influence of an individual‘s genetic 
makeup on variability of therapeutic response; biomarkers—factors that are objectively 
measured and evaluated as indicators of normal biological processes or pathogenic 
processes and/or as indicators or pharmacological responses to therapeutic intervention 
[BIO.org, 2007; Akhtar, 2002; Colburn, 2003; PhRMA, 2007].   
 
Target identification will link genes to diseases and will seek out targets for therapeutic 
intervention based on an understanding of gene transcripts (mRNA) or proteins encoded 
by the genome [PhRMA, 2007]. Target validation will verify that the gene of interest 
and/or its products are an appropriate therapeutic target, lying within a control point of a 
disease pathway and that a therapeutic will interact with the target in a beneficial manner. 
During lead generation, drug targets are then screened against large numbers of small or 
large molecule compounds to identify those that indeed interact with the target and result 
in the desired outcome [PhRMA, 2007]. Expression profiling can be used to assess the 
response of a gene to exposure to a drug [PhRMA, 2007]. Through the identification of 
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genes involved in drug metabolism and drug efficacy, companies will be able to screen 
compounds at the preclinical stages of development for efficacy, toxicity, and/or likely 
adverse reactions [PhRMA, 2007]. Pharmacogenomics technology can be used to 
correlate drug response to individual genotypes and the variations found in genes known 
to contribute to either mechanism of action or metabolism of a drug [Akhtar, 2002]. 
 
Drug discovery and development has traditionally been a linear process with little 
feedback from the later stages of drug development. However, the adoption of a 
personalized medicine strategy that includes an understanding of SNPs, disease 
susceptibility variations, and drug response variations, has transformed the linear process 
of discovery and development, involving little feedback, to one that involves a series of 
research feedback loops [Ideker et al., 2001; Kitano, 2002]. In this feedback-based 
paradigm, the early stages of discovery, including the selection and validation of drug 
targets, small-molecule screening and chemistry or biologics development, as well as the 
preclinical assessment of such compounds in animal models, will be linked with the later 
stages of clinical development [Ideker et al., 2001; Kitano, 2002]. 
 
As the industry evolves to incorporate the systems paradigm, it is anticipated that the 
drug discovery and development feedback cycle will incorporate novel technologies and 
disciplines. Global observations made during discovery research are matched to model 
predictions or hypotheses in an iterative manner, leading to new patient models, 
predictions, and methods of patient experimentation [Ideker et al., 2001]. Computational 
experiments will identify and virtually screen lead compounds. Successful leads will be 
synthesized and then tested via in vitro and in vivo experiments as well as clinical studies 
[Kitano, 2002]. The systems biology research cycle and drug discovery and development 
cycle will be linked to each other through feedback processes that update biological, 
physiological, system, and patient model information. In silico (computer simulation) 
experiments of drug systems and the screening of lead candidates will play a central role 
in upstream biopharmaceutical research, with the joint objectives of reducing costs and 


























Figure 2.4: Linking Systems Biology Research with Drug Discovery Research
 
Adopted from Kitano, H.: ―Computational systems biology‖, Nature 420(6912), 207, 2002. 
 
 
2.5 Changing Incentives for Research 
The tradition of open science and basic research with a quest for fundamental knowledge, 
often associated with public institutions, has increasingly evolved into secrecy and a 
quest for intellectual property. Furthermore, the gap between fundamental research and 
commercial application has become narrower in the biomedical arena [Rai and Eisenberg, 
2003].  
 
Traditionally, priority and the claim to be the first discoverer to gain recognition by peers, 
in the form of paper citations and even prizes, were norms associated with the public 
sector [Merton and Lewis, 1971]. Merton has discussed the idea that the annals of science 
are lined with cases of scientists who were spurred on to more intense effort by the 
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circumstances, scientists engaged in a race, with quick publications used to ensure 
priority, sometimes at the expense of other scientists wanting to do a more thorough job 
before publishing their findings [Merton and Lewis, 1971]. As early as the discovery of 
the double helix, ―aggressive, prize-seeking and competitive behaviour‖ is evident. 
However, once a scientist makes his/her contribution, the scientist no longer has 
exclusive rights of access to it. In this sense, the tradition of open science could be 
preserved.  
 
Biotechnology is an area that has often been termed a ―hot field‖ dealing with ―hot 
subjects‖ [Merton and Lewis, 1971; Allarakhia, 2001]. Merton also explains that the 
decisive characteristic of a hot field seems to be the high rate of significant discoveries, 
with a lower ratio of routine to highly consequential ideas and findings [Merton and 
Lewis, 1971]. Hot fields are not only more active than cold ones, but their results also 
have implications beyond the borders of the specialty. Rivalry and the race for priority 
are all associated with such fields and can be noted for example, by the number of articles 
published in the field over a period of time [Merton and Lewis, 1971]. 
 
With the blurring of the line between basic research and applied research in the 
biomedical arena, new norms have become central to the scientist and his/her claim for 
priority. These norms revolve around the priority for intellectual property—enabling a 
researcher to secure royalties on an invention and funding from a possible private sector 
collaborator for future work. Powell and Owen-Smith (1998) argue that the separation of 
the scientist in the academic world and the technologist in the private arena no longer 
holds in the life sciences. Universities have become much more oriented to the 
commercialization of research [Powell and Owen-Smith, 1998]. The shift is argued to be 
a result of changing incentives favouring the commercialization of research. With the 
1980 Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, also known as the Bayh-Dole Act, 
universities were given the right to retain property rights to inventions derived from 
federally funded research [Powell and Owen-Smith, 1998]. The intent of Congress was to 
promote collaboration between commercial enterprise and academic institutions. In 1984, 
the rights of universities were more broadly expanded to permit universities to assign 
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their property rights to others [Powell and Owen-Smith, 1998]. Powell and Owen-Smith 
(1998) explain that many of the legislative changes of the 1980s and 1990s sparked a 
considerable upsurge in licensing, as well as the growth in the number of university-
industry research centres, consortia, and agreements. Universities are now in the position 
to grant licenses including exclusive licenses to their inventions to private firms. It was 
anticipated that such licenses were necessary to provide private firms the incentive to 
invest in the downstream development of commercial products [Rai and Eisenberg, 
2003]. However, no distinction has been made between downstream knowledge that leads 
directly to commercial products and fundamental knowledge that serves as an input into 
downstream research that is far removed from commercial product development. 
Universities have therefore, filed applications on knowledge such as DNA sequences, 
protein structures, and protein pathways. Even when universities do not file patents, 
restrictions are placed on the dissemination of biomedical research materials and reagents 
that might have future commercial value. Secrecy, restrictions, and patents are therefore, 
enclosing the scientific commons [Merges, 1996]. 
 
Adding to this situation, the explosion of new scientific insights and ideas generated by 
the Human Genome Project is largely occurring outside the walls of major drug 
companies. Consequently, companies are increasingly entering into mission-driven 
partnerships with biotechnology companies and academic institutions [Bower and 
Whittaker, 1992; Powell et al., 1996; Blumenthal et al., 1997]. By collaborating with 
institutions on the cutting edge of this research, pharmaceutical companies can access 
knowledge that can be the basis for successful discovery and development projects. In 
return, these partnerships provide for alternative funding mechanisms for small 
biotechnology companies and academic institutions [Bower and Whittaker, 1992; Powell 
et al., 1996; Blumenthal et al., 1997]. Problems however arise when intellectual property 
rights and exclusive licenses are assigned to partner companies, as fewer technological 
opportunities remain open for other industry participants. Secrecy, the inability to share 
biological materials resulting from the partnership, and exclusivity with respect to 
downstream research, are transforming not only the size of the public domain of 
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knowledge, but also the interactions that are typically associated with participation in the 
public commons [Maurer, 2003]. 
 
 
2.6 Appropriating Research  
Patents confer upon an inventor the ownership right to a product or process for a 
designated number of years and thereby permit collection of a reward for invention 
[Kamien and Schwartz, 1974]. Justification for patents is often based on the fact that the 
cost of the discovery or downstream development is high relative to the cost of imitation. 
If the discovery can quickly be imitated, the economic gains to the inventor will be 
reduced, as will be the incentive to invest in inventive activity. Patents are therefore, 
thought to enable the inventor to appropriate the monetary benefits of his/her contribution 
over a limited period of time, thereby counteracting the tendency toward underinvestment 
[Kamien and Schwartz, 1974].  
 
In the winner take all situation, the incentive to race to achieve patent priority is strong 
[Kamien and Schwartz, 1974; Lerner, 1995]. Two firms would be better off by 
cooperating in their research and development activities—keeping costs low and 
increasing the likelihood of success, but the incentive to defect and race is too strong, 
particularly in the first-to-invent patent granting scenario. If one researcher defects and is 
first to reduce the invention to practice, the patent payoff can grant the defector a 
monopoly over the invention for several years. The payoff for being left behind, by being 
the second-in-time, is lost investment in research and development. If the patent is 
granted to the defector, this may also present an effective obstacle for future development 
for the laggard firm [Scotchmer, 1991; Merges, 1994]. 
 
Although patents are thought to encourage disclosure, the granting of rights to exclude 
others from using the patented inventions can threaten downstream research. Property 
rights have become the means to generate the resources required to finance research and 
development activities.  Small biotechnology companies, including those that are spin-
offs from academic institutions, use their patent portfolios as a signal of their value for 
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the purpose of attracting investment. The system is however thought to fit a model of 
research and development where patented knowledge is discrete and the result of a linear 
research process. In contrast, for many industries, concern has been expressed where the 
research process is primarily knowledge based, the process of invention may be 
cumulative and iterative, with downstream knowledge dependent on upstream knowledge 
[Scotchmer, 2001; Foray, 2002; Antonelli, 2003; Dalrymple, 2003; Scotchmer, 2004]. A 
patent system that was developed for a discrete model of innovation may no longer be 
optimal for an information-based, cumulative model of innovation [Dalrymple, 2003]. 
Consequently, it is necessary to reanalyze models of intellectual property protection and 
strategies of knowledge sharing in biopharmaceutical discovery research. 
 
In the sections that follow, we provide an overview of both ex-post and ex-ante 
perspectives including new models of intellectual property.  
 
2.6.1 The Ex-Post View  
Roberto and Nelson discuss four different broad theories about the principal objectives of 
patents. These theories include providing motivation for innovation called the ―invention 
motivation‖ theory; providing an incentive to disclose inventions (instead of relying on 
secrecy) thereby enabling the dissemination of knowledge about inventions, known as the 
―invention dissemination‖ theory; enabling innovators to secure the needed investments 
to develop and commercialize these inventions, known as the ―induce commercialization‖ 
theory; and enabling the orderly exploration of broad prospects, i.e., opening up a whole 
range of follow-on developments or inventions based on a broad patent, known as the 
―exploration control‖ theory [Roberto and Nelson, 1998]. 
 
Invention Motivation Theory: The invention motivation theory assumes that the social 
benefits of patent protection stem from the additional invention induced by the prospect 
of a patent. Roberto and Nelson discuss that this theory should naturally lead to the 
analysis of the optimal patent strength i.e., from the perspective of duration [Nordhaus 
1969, Scherer et al., 1990] or breadth [Klemperer, 1990], and in terms of a tradeoff 
between the increased invention induced by greater patent strength and the increased cost 
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to society associated with the stronger monopoly position of the patent holder [Gilbert 
and Shapiro, 1990]. The notion of inventive races also needs to be considered when 
multiple firms end up focusing on a common research strategy or inventive goal 
[Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980a]. When competitive R&D is allowed, duplication of 
research may occur i.e., more inventing does not imply more useful inventing.  If the 
common focus is on a broader but still limited pool of invention possibilities, one might 
consider instead overfishing models [Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980b].  In this case, 
although patents could strengthen the incentive to invent to receive a patent, with the 
anticipation that a patent will be awarded to the inventor that gets there first, the problem 
of racing could worsen with the awarding of a broad patent covering many claims, 
research arenas, and downstream product markets [Roberto and Nelson, 1998]. If an 
inventor perceives that other inventors are in the race, the inventor may see that the 
returns are dependent not simply on whether the inventor achieves an invention, but on 
whether the inventor achieves it first. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) argue that in this 
case, patent protection will result in a competitive R&D market where firms invest their 
resources at a faster rate and too many firms race toward the same invention goal. The 
tradeoff between the benefits and costs of patenting may then favour the latter. Roberto 
and Nelson state that perhaps society should opt for stronger patents in fields where 
stronger intellectual property protection yields a larger flow of valuable inventions, than 
in fields where stronger patents lead largely to more inventions, that is ―barking up the 
same tree‖ [Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980a]. 
 
With respect to the granting of broad patents, Joshua Lerner found that the awarding of 
broad patents to one party inventing in a field, could cause other inventors to stop or 
divert their efforts, even if the inventions would have been somewhat different. Lerner 
found that in biotechnology, the holding of patents by large firms tended to deter small 
firms from trying to invent in these same areas [Lerner, 1995]. Roberto and Nelson 
(1998) discuss further that the issue of greater patent length or scope can have 
tremendous consequences if today‘s invention not only have direct use, but also form the 
basis for subsequent invention. This seems to be case with gene patents, where genes not 
only have value as part of today‘s diagnostics, but also as part of tomorrow‘s medical 
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therapies. The long-term effect of granting a broad, strong patent on the initial sequence 
of a gene will depend on how the gene patent will affect subsequent medical therapy 
development [Roberto and Nelson, 1998].  
 
Invention Disclosure Theory: The invention disclosure theory proposes that patents 
encourage disclosure and provide a vehicle for the quick and wide diffusion of the 
technical information underlying new inventions. One can argue that this theory turns the 
invention motivation theory on its head at first glance. Roberto and Nelson (1998) argue 
that this may not be as simple as it appears, since in most specific cases, the possibility to 
make more profit through wider disclosure for example, through licensing the invention, 
enhances the incentives for invention in the first place. However, the invention disclosure 
theory does not cause the reduction in use of an invention that it does in the canonical 
version of the invention motivation theory [Roberto and Nelson, 1998]. Instead, the focus 
is on incentives for disclosure, particularly important when an inventor cannot exploit all 
the possible uses of the invention [Roberto and Nelson, 1998]. As an example, gene 
patents can facilitate licensing, thereby not only increasing the monetary rewards to the 
inventor, but also facilitating wider use of the gene in areas of therapy that the original 
inventor cannot or wishes to not pursue. Various studies have also shown that in certain 
industries, firms regularly engage in cross-licensing of technology—sharing of 
technology that would likely be more difficult if patents were not available on the 
technology [Roberto and Nelson, 1998]. However, the wide dissemination and use of a 
patented technology does depend on whether an exclusive or nonexclusive licensing 
strategy is pursued [Eisenberg, 1996]. Exclusive licensing can give a particular company 
the ‗right of first refusal‘ to develop a technology, placing one company in a strategically 
advantageous position [Eisenberg, 1996]. Non-exclusive licensing on the other hand can 
allow many firms to have access to the technology, with licenses sold at a cheaper price 
[Eisenberg, 1996]. 
 
Commercialization Theory: The induce commercialization theory is discussed as a 
possible variant of the invention motivation theory—with patenting occurring early in the 
process of inventing and with a lot of follow on work to be conducted before the crude 
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invention, e.g., a gene is ready for use in a medical therapy. A patent at the early stage is 
seen as providing assurances that if the development of the technology is successful, its 
economic rewards can be appropriated, thus inducing a further positive development 
decision. Eisenberg has added to this argument by stating that the patent enables the 
patent holder to approach capital markets for financing [Eisenberg, 1997]. This capability 
might be crucial for a small firm facing large development costs, as in the biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical industries, for clinical testing and development of a medical 
therapy—costs that are assumed even before the invention reaches the market. Therefore, 
the induce commercialization theory becomes distinctively different than the invention 
motivation theory in circumstances where one organization does the early inventing 
work, e.g., a firm conducts research to find a gene, but is not in a position to complete the 
development work required to test the gene and develop it in the context of a medical 
therapy [Roberto and Nelson, 1998]. Under this circumstance, the possession of a patent 
by the original inventor facilitates handing off the task, via licensing of protected 
technology, to an organization better suited for development and commercialization. If a 
first-stage inventor is in the game for profits and knows that profiting will require 
handing-off the invention to another organization for development, then expectation of a 
patent may be necessary to induce the initial invention [Roberto and Nelson, 1998]. In 
context, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 gave universities patent rights on inventions that 
resulted from their government-funded research projects [Powell and Owen-Smith, 
1998]. Companies were likely to undertake such development, but would only do so if 
they possessed the patent rights to the invention it licensed from the university. This 
placed universities in a strong position to sell such licenses [Powell and Owen-Smith, 
1998]. 
 
The contrary argument is that the presence of a patent and the requirement to acquire a 
license to conduct further work on the original idea, could restrict the number of parties 
who could indeed complete the development work. In the case of gene patents, possibly 
granted with a limited understanding of its future utility, if potential developers are 
diverse in their approach to using the gene for medical therapies, and if licensing 
arrangements of the preliminary gene sequence, whose commercial value is unclear, are 
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not easy to work out, companies may opt to work on other easily accessible technologies 
or research arenas [Roberto and Nelson, 1998; Walsh et al. 2003]. Furthermore, if a 
developer needs to license different parts of a technological puzzle in order to advance a 
given project, the royalties that need to be paid out could reduce the eventual product‘s 
monetary attractiveness. The notion of companies ―stacking royalties‖ is of concern to 
developers such as the larger pharmaceutical companies. When companies actually sue 
these pharmaceutical developers to enforce payments for milestones and royalties, or if a 
pharmaceutical company licenses a lead from a biotechnology firm and that compound is 
later blocked by another party‘s patent, the costs (with possible royalty stacking) become 
even higher [Signals, 1998].     
 
Exploration Control Theory: The exploration control theory assumes that from an initial 
discovery or invention, a whole range of follow-on developments or inventions are 
possible. Under this theory, Roberto and Nelson argue that unless there is a controlling, 
broad patent, a lot of inventors would see the same opportunity and know that their 
competitors also see them, with the consequence being a race for specific targets of 
opportunity and a general overfishing in the prospect ―pond‖. Thus, a broad patent on the 
initial invention may be necessary if the ―wasteful mining of the prospect‖ or the 
―overfishing of the pool‖ is to be avoided [Roberto and Nelson, 1998]. However, if one 
assumes that different inventors see very different opportunities from a prospect, there 
might be very high social costs to granting a broad patent that gives monopoly rights on 
the exploration of the prospect. This would essentially cut down the number of diverse 
inventors who would be induced to work on the prospect in anticipation of a profitable 
invention down the road, since their ability to work on the invention would be limited by 
their ability to negotiate a license with the holder of the original prospect-defining patent. 
In biotechnology, where litigations are high and the transaction costs of negotiating a 
license high, one needs to seriously consider the impact of granting a large prospect-
controlling patent [Roberto and Nelson, 1998]. For example, the role of particular 
receptors in a disease pathway may not be clear when identified at the outset, but their 
probable importance as drug targets implies that firms will patent them regardless. 
Metabolic pathways involved in many common diseases will be complex, so it may be 
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better for the firm to patent and allow the patent to lapse if in due course, a particular 
receptor or enzyme (and hence the gene associated with the receptor or enzyme) proves 
not to be relevant in the proposed medical therapy. Because the scale of genetic 
information production today is so large and many thousands of genes can be sequenced 
in a particular set of disease tissues, owning the rights to these molecules becomes 
critical; however the problem arises with over-patenting and firms pursuing the same 
information for the same diseases [Thomas, 1999].  
 
Implications from the Roberto and Nelson paper are particularly applicable to science-
based industries such as biotechnology. Roberto and Nelson discuss that patent races are 
more common to such science-based industries. Multiple players are often attracted to the 
same opportunity i.e., see the same broad unmet needs and particular avenues to follow. 
Science-based industries are the arena where the need for ―technology transfer‖ between 
university and industry researchers is most salient. Strong patents are needed to induce 
companies to develop these university inventions and in a number of instances, university 
researchers in control of patents have been directly instrumental in setting up new 
ventures. Science-based technologies tend to require a lot of work to be brought to 
practice, and there may be significant uncertainty as to how to accomplish this. An early 
patent on such findings can narrow down the number of parties who have the incentive to 
do the follow-on work.  
 
Patent Structures and Firm Behaviour: Several other studies have been conducted on 
patent issues such as: the optimal duration and scope of patent life [Nordhaus 1969, 
Scherer and Ross, 1990]; level of research activity required, the cost reduction achieved 
and the relationship of the magnitude of the invention sought versus patent life 
[Nordhaus, 1969]; the consequence of rivalry among potential inventors prior to granting 
of the patent; the development time frame chosen for research and development and how 
appropriability and rivalry enter a firm‘s determination of the introduction date of an 
innovation [Scherer and Ross, 1990].  For example, the earlier an innovation is 
introduced, the sooner the benefits become available [Scherer and Ross, 1990]. But more 
rapid development usually occurs at a higher cost. Incomplete appropriability of profits 
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by the inventor may prolong the development period, while on the other hand, the 
benefits of being first can accelerate development [Kamien and Schwartz, 1974]. 
 
What is most interesting is the impact of rivals prior to and after the granting of a patent 
to an inventor. Kamien and Schwartz (1974) develop a model to demonstrate the impact 
of several variables on development and expenditures on a particular invention. Variables 
in this model include magnitude of inventive effort, introduction date and development 
period, the discount rate of expenditures, the level of rivalry and entry of rivals, the 
reward stream possible from a patent, and the patent duration. 
 
Their model determined that the present value of expected expenditure on development 
increased as the development period contracted and as the amount of effort required for 
the invention increased [Kamien and Schwartz, 1974]. It also increased as the discount 
rate fell—since future expenditures would be less heavily discounted. The present value 
of expenditures also rose as the instantaneous probability of rival entry fell or as the 
expected rival entry date became more distant i.e., the later a rival project is completed, 
the more development a firm will have been able to conduct [Kamien and Schwartz, 
1974]. Development expenditures were only made once the patent issued and rewards are 
collected by the firm only if it is the recipient of the patent; a firm will lose whatever 
investment it has already made and does not get anything if a rival completes the R&D 
first and receives the patent. Hence, this represents a winner take all situation [Kamien 
and Schwartz, 1974]. 
 
Kamien and Schwartz further demonstrate for a single potential invention of given size, 
that development will occur only if the reward stream is large, the patent duration 
sufficiently long, and the required R&D effort to get the patent and discount rate are 
somewhat low [Kamien and Schwartz, 1974]. Rivalry must also not be too intense or the 
expected time of rival claims to the patent, distant. As far as the speed of development or 
timing of innovation, the planned development period will be longer in this model, the 
smaller the value of the reward stream from the new product or process, the greater the 
effort required to obtain the innovation and patent, and the higher the discount rate 
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[Kamien and Schwartz, 1974]. These factors can be used to determine if a multi-
participant race for a patent will ensue initially and then a race to get a medical 
therapy/diagnostic out onto the market with respect to biotechnology [Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1974]. 
 
Lippman and McCardle (1987) have studied what conditions caused a firm after having 
invested in R&D to drop out of a competitive race. Lippman and McCardle refer to 
Kamien and Schwartz, indicating that their model did not take into account how a firm‘s 
decision would affect the R&D efforts of unknown rivals and their model is static—never 
the case that a firm enters the race and then drops outs, instead that the firm does not 
pursue research if rivalry is sufficiently intense [Lippman and McCardle, 1987]. Lippman 
and McCardle also discuss that many papers assume that a race is symmetric and no one 
firm takes the lead, with competition ensuing until the invention is discovered. None of 
these models entailed a dropout by any firm. In contrast, the authors discuss the 
possibility of a firm having invested in R&D, dropping out of the race, due to its own 
misfortune or the good fortune of a competitor [Lippman and McCardle 1987]. The 
Lippman and McCardle model demonstrates that in the case of identical firms, it may be 
optimal for a firm to dropout out of a race if a rival firm attains a large lead. By moving 
ahead a stage in the race, a firm is thought to increase its experience level, thereby 
increasing its probability of beating the other firm [Lippman and McCardle 1987]. A 
follower firm in this case may begin the race, and upon falling behind drop out, 
particularly since it is assumed that increments to experience arrive exponentially 
[Lippman and McCardle 1987]. 
 
If the firms do not share the same value for the technology being sought, costs of doing 
research, and/or efficiencies i.e., the arrival rates to the end of each stage of the race, with 
an increase in value assessment or efficiency and a decrease in cost of research for one 
firm, this can increase the chance that a rival firm will drop out [Lippman and McCardle 
1987]. Even the firm in the lead may drop out in this case if these parameters clearly 
favour another firm. For instance, a small firm may regard the invention as providing an 
opportunity for it to survive, whereas a larger firm may regard the invention as just 
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another product. One firm may be better able to also exploit the invention. These 
differences can cause even a leader to find it optimal to drop out of a race [Lippman and 
McCardle 1987].   
 
Other studies have shown the impact of novelty requirements on the incentive to conduct 
research, the value of the patent, and how much technical information is shared among 
firms through patenting [Scotchmer and Green, 1990]. Scotchmer and Green discuss that 
the social goal of protecting an inventor‘s profit and the incentive to conduct research is 
served by a strong novelty requirement i.e., that small derivative improvements to an 
invention will clearly infringe on a prior patent. Therefore, the patent is likely to have a 
long effective life before a sufficiently different technology replaces it [Scotchmer and 
Green, 1990]. Patents are also issued to accelerate future innovation through disclosure of 
inventions. If each technological advance is disclosed, as would be promoted by a weak 
novelty requirement, the shared technical knowledge could help other innovators in their 
research, reduce redundancy, and quicken the time for subsequent innovation. Therefore, 
Scotchmer and Green (1990) argue that in contrast, the social goal of disclosure is served 
by a weak novelty requirement.  
 
These authors discuss the decisions that have to be made by firms as an R&D race 
unfolds. The initial decision may be to enter the race, which depends on whether R&D is 
expected to be profitable [Scotchmer and Green, 1990]. Second, if the novelty 
requirement is weak so that a small technical advance does not infringe on a previous 
patent, the inventor of the small advance must decide whether to disclose it by marketing 
it or patenting it [Scotchmer and Green, 1990]. There is a tradeoff between the profit 
attained from marketing it and the value of maintaining one‘s competitive advantage in 
technical know-how (by not disclosing) for later stages of the race. The third decision 
may be whether or not the lagging firm should drop out of the race when the first 
innovator has not disclosed its technical advance, since it is unlikely that the lagging firm 
will catch up [Scotchmer and Green, 1990]. An important reason why an early innovator 
might not patent a first advance is that it might be able to force a shakeout by sending a 
signal that it has innovated, but not patented, thereby not revealing its technical know-
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how immediately and losing ex-ante profits that might occur under a weak novelty 
requirement [Scotchmer and Green, 1990]. Under the weak novelty requirement, 
disclosure can reduce the probability that the first innovator will achieve the final patent 
[Scotchmer and Green, 1990].  Since a final patent is likely to have a longer effective life 
than an interim patent, the innovator may opt not to earn the interim profits, and instead 
make the patent stronger by continuing onto the next stage of innovation. In this case, 
there is no difference between weak and strong novelty requirements as both do not result 
in disclosure. As well, with strong novelty requirements, competition occurs between a 
base technology and more advanced technology, rather than a close substitute, and 
therefore, the innovator will be assured a higher profit stream [Scotchmer and Green, 
1990]. Consequently, the strong novelty requirement may be socially better than the weak 
requirement, as it might induce entry into an R&D race when the weak requirement 
would not [Scotchmer and Green, 1990]. 
 
The decision to disclose or suppress an innovation and whether to continue in a race also 
depends on the legal conditions of priority under which a patent can be granted—first-to-
file or first-to-invent. The first-to-invent rule will discourage disclosure relative to the 
first-to-file rule. With first-to-invent, a first innovator does not need to patent in order to 
keep a claim alive [Scotchmer and Green, 1990]. If a competitor catches up in this case 
and attempts to patent the invention, the first innovator can successfully counterpatent to 
receive the patent, in contrast to the first-to-file system where the counterpatent would be 
unsuccessful [Scotchmer and Green, 1990]. There may be an advantage in not patenting 
initially since information that could enable a competitor to catch up is not disclosed. In 
the first-to-file system, besides more disclosures, the incentives for firms to stay in the 
race are also strong [Scotchmer and Green, 1990]. However, the incentives to remain in 
the race under the first-to-invent regime are weaker than those under file-to-file. First-to-
invent can encourage firms to drop out of the race when it is socially efficient, whereas 
first-to-file can induce them to stay in [Scotchmer and Green, 1990]. 
 
Licensing Strategies: Knowledge governance strategies include openly disclosing 
knowledge, depositing knowledge into the existing pool of knowledge, restricting usage 
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if the knowledge is developed by a collective group, licensing knowledge exclusively to 
one party for further downstream development, licensing knowledge to multiple parties 
through a non-exclusive licensing strategy, or using the knowledge internally as an input 
in downstream development activities.  
 
Transaction costs will impact the choice of governance strategy. Antonelli (2003) 
distinguishes between demand-side knowledge transaction costs and supply-side 
knowledge transaction costs. Demand-side knowledge transaction costs include all the 
costs associated with searching, screening, processing, and contracting for knowledge. 
Supply-side knowledge transaction costs include all the costs associated with preventing 
unintentional disclosure, marketing the knowledge, identifying potential buyers, and 
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Table 2.2: Governance Mechanisms, Organizational Structures, and 
Transaction Costs 
 
The decision to sell disembodied knowledge in the form of patents and licenses can 
complement or substitute for the sale of embodied knowledge. Substitution occurs when 
the profits from the sale of disembodied knowledge are greater than those from the sale of 
embodied knowledge [Antonelli, 2003; Arora and Fosfuri, 2003]. For example, when the 
costs of internal coordination of the knowledge are larger than the transaction costs 
associated with the market for technical knowledge, or when special assets are required to 
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progress further downstream, the patent holder may chose to maximize revenue through a 
licensing strategy, specifically an exclusive licensing strategy [Teece, 1986; Antonelli, 
2003]. Complementarity between the sale of disembodied knowledge and internal 
embodiment occurs when knowledge possesses high applicability and it is possible to 
operate in different markets from other licensees of the knowledge [Teece, 1986; Arora 
and Fosfuri, 2003, Foray, 2004]. In this case, a non-exclusive licensing strategy can 
ensure that multiple participants can pursue multiple streams of research. Furthermore, 
cross-licensing is a useful governance mechanism when knowledge exhibits high levels 
of complementarity [Shapiro, 2001]. With downstream activities dependent on the 
recombination of a variety of knowledge, the cost of the coordination including 
accumulation of the full range of required knowledge may be too high for one researcher 
[Antonelli, 2003; Burk and Lemley, 2003]. Specifically, the capabilities of the one 
researcher may only cover a portion of the research domain. Consequently, researchers 
may find it profitable to engage in cross-licensing for knowledge. However, the ability 
for each researcher to access knowledge depends of the amount and type of proprietary 
knowledge each one is able to contribute in any bargaining event [Antonelli, 2003].  
 
Licensing imposes a negative pecuniary externality upon other firms in the product 
market. Although licensing reduces profits from the product market because of increased 
competition from multiple users of the knowledge, this strategy can increase a licensor‘s 
share of such profits. Arora and Fosfuri (2003) propose that there are two main effects 
that licensing generates on the profits of the licensor—the revenue effect and rent 
dissipation effect. The revenue effect occurs when rent accrues to the patent holder in the 
form of licensing payments. The rent dissipation effect occurs through the erosion of 
profits of the licensor in the product market as a result of increased competition [Arora 
and Fosfuri, 2003]. The corresponding market power conferred to the licensor through 
the assignment of property rights will be a major factor in the decision to license 
technology to enjoy the revenue effect versus the decision to remain a monopolist on the 




Chokshi, Parker, and Kwiatkowski (2006) discuss the usage of geographic exclusivity or 
co-exclusivity by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Technology Transfer 
as an incentive for a licensee to develop a product for particular regional markets. 
Depending on the needs of the regional market, a license is therefore, non-exclusive, co-
exclusive, or exclusive [Chokshi, Parker, and Kwiatkowski, 2006]. 
 
Under the compulsory license mechanism, the government or a court can compel a patent 
holder to license his rights.  In general, compulsory licenses are provided in cases of 
dependency of a downstream patent on an upstream patent, and in cases in which the 
invention is not (or insufficiently) exploited [Overwalle et al., 2006]. Recently, it has 
been suggested that the compulsory licensing mechanism can be invoked to address the 
problems of innovation that affect public health care [WTO, 2002]. Such an approach 
was formally recognized during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, 
confirming that the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
and the compulsory licensing regime are part of a wider national and international 
strategy to address public-health problems [WTO, 2001; 2002]. 
 
Research Exemptions: In Europe, the research exemption is part of patent law. The 
original provision, which was laid down in the Community Patent Convention, states that 
the rights that are conferred by a patent shall not extend to ―acts done for experimental 
purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention‖. The equivalent 
provisions in the European member-states mirror but sometimes also deviate from this 
wording. Because different national legislations and court rulings exist, the exact scope of 
the exemption differs from country to country [Overwalle et al., 2006]. 
 
In the U.S., the research exemption is not part of the patent act but exists as a theory. The 
theory has a very narrow scope of application. In the landmark case Madey v. Duke 
University, it was recalled that:  
 
Regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavour 
for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer‘s 
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legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for 
strict philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly 
limited experimental use defense [Madey v. Duke University, Fed. Cir. 2002]. 
 
Therefore, research projects that are financed by major research universities, but that 
have no prospect of commercialization, still further the institution‘s legitimate business 
objectives, including ―educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in 
these projects‖, and ―serve to increase the status of the institution and lure lucrative 
research grants, students and faculty‖ [Madey v. Duke University, Fed. Cir. 2002]. As a 
result of the Madey v. Duke University case, universities can no longer invoke 
experimental use in their defense. In practice however, the research exemption is 
administered more flexibly as companies would prefer not to sue universities [Walsh et 
al., 2001]. 
 
Patent Pools:   Shapiro (2001) discusses that when two or more companies control 
patents necessary to make a given product, a patent pool or a package license may be an 
effective solution. Under a patent pool, an entire group of patents is licensed in a 
package, either by one of the patent holders or by a new entity established for this 
purpose, usually to anyone willing to pay the associated royalties [Shapiro, 2001]. Under 
a package license, two or more patent holders agree to the terms on which they will 
jointly license their complementary patents and divide up the proceeds [Shapiro, 2001]. 
 
In 1995, U.S. Justice Department and the FTC issued the Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property (―IP Guidelines‖), which sets forth their enforcement 
policies in this area [IP Guidelines, 1995]. The IP Guidelines specifically address pooling 
arrangements involving intellectual property owners and their rights [IP Guidelines, 
1995]. 
 
In particular, the IP Guidelines state that intellectual property pooling is procompetitive 
when it: 
(1) integrates complementary technologies, 
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(2) reduces transaction costs, 
(3) clears blocking positions, 
(4) avoids costly infringement litigation, and 
(5) promotes the dissemination of technology [IP Guidelines, 1995]. 
 
The IP Guidelines also discuss that excluding firms from an intellectual property pool 
may be anticompetitive if: 
(1) the excluded firms cannot effectively compete in the relevant market for the good 
incorporating the licensed technologies, 
(2) the pool participants collectively possess market power in the relevant market, and 
(3) the limitations on participation are not reasonably related to the efficient development 
and exploitation of the pooled technologies [IP Guidelines, 1995]. 
 
Currently, the guidelines have been ―collapsed‖ into the following two overarching 
questions: 
(1) ―whether the proposed licensing program is likely to integrate complementary patent 
rights,‖ and (2) ―if so, whether the resulting competitive benefits are likely to be 
outweighed by competitive harm posed by other aspects of the program.‖ [Clark et al., 
2000]. 
 
As an example, it is anticipated that the Knockout Mouse Project (see Chapter 6) will 
require the resolution of several intellectual property claims involving both the 
production and use of knockout mice. To effectively deal with existing intellectual 
property covering knockout technology, the researchers in the Knockout Mouse Project 
advocate the use of a patent pool. Austin et al. (2004) indicate that several researchers 
from various organizations/institutions controlling such patents have agreed to the 
formation of a patent pool of mouse knockout technologies. 
 
2.6.2 The Ex-Ante View 
The ex-post view analyzes strategies for enabling intellectual property assignment and 
transfer as a means of providing access to and then enabling downstream knowledge use 
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in product development. In contrast, the ex-ante view analyzes other mechanisms 
available, either prior to patent assignment or during patent assignment, to ensure access 
to and use of knowledge for product development.  
 
Open Source Initiatives: The open source model has provided a valuable framework for 
collective knowledge production and dissemination beyond the software community. 
Mirroring the efforts of the open source community that developed Linux, open 
knowledge networks and other cooperative strategies (classified as open source discovery 
initiatives) are enabling biopharmaceutical companies to access disembodied knowledge-
based resources critical to downstream drug development. The objective of these 
cooperative strategic alliances is to preserve the downstream technological opportunities 
for multiple firms. When upstream discovery research cannot yield commercial products 
and when the costs associated with excessive upstream competition are too high, 
companies jointly benefit from cooperative knowledge production and open knowledge 
dissemination [Nelson, 1959; Reichman, 2003]. 
  
The Human Genome era has emphasized the notion that biological knowledge is 
complex. Discovery research no longer simply focuses on individual units of knowledge, 
but considers the behaviour and relationships of all units of knowledge in a particular 
biological system from a functional perspective. Genomes are now being described as 
consisting of complex, intersecting systems rather than unitary collections of separately 
functioning structures [Hood, 2000; Dutfield, 2003]. In this sense, we can observe many 
similarities to software development. Software is a complex system, developed from 
many intersecting components (lines of code). Thousands of developers may be required 
to develop these intersecting lines of code to enable the processes associated with this 
code to emerge and function. Demarking the lines of ownership in this case can be an 
onerous task—both in terms of inventor and in terms of invention. 
  
The International Human Genome Project catalyzed the open-source movement in 
genomics-based research. Globally dispersed laboratories jointly collaborated to map and 
sequence the Human Genome. The resulting data were rapidly deposited into the public 
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domain to ensure an open and level playing field for all researchers. Open source has also 
flourished in bioinformatics, where software code and databases are traded and pooled on 
a mutual sharing basis.  
 
Efforts in the public sector to enable large-scale genomics research through open 
knowledge networks or open source initiatives have encouraged the private sector to 
promote and participate in open source initiatives. The Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms 
(SNP) Consortium brought together ten of the world‘s largest pharmaceutical firms. 
Consortium members recognized the SNP map as a pre-competitive, research tool. The 
competitive members viewed the map as a tool to be jointly developed and shared, with 
open access to the Consortium‘s data guaranteed for the public at large. Firms 
relinquished any property rights to the knowledge generated within the Consortium 
[Davies 2001].   
 
Open Review System/Peer Review with Monitoring: Certain national legal systems 
provide for the ability to oppose patents after they are granted. The U.S. Patent Reform 
Act of 2007 hopes to create such a post-grant review to challenge issued patents. Other 
systems provide for the possibility of opposing applications before patent rights are 
granted. Foray discusses that the pre-grant opposition is only possible if information 
concerning the patent application is published early in the process i.e., within 18 months 
of the application [Foray, 2000].  
 
On June 15th 2007, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) opened the 
patent examination process for online public participation. With the consent of the 
inventor, the Peer-to-Patent: Community Patent Review pilot, developed by the New 
York Law School Institute for Information Law and Policy in cooperation with the 
USPTO, enables the public to submit prior art and commentary relevant to the claims of 
250 pending patent applications in Computer Architecture, Software, and Information 




Peer-to-Patent involves 1) reviewing and discussing posted patent applications, 2) 
locating prior art references 3) uploading prior art references relevant to the claims, 4) 
annotating and evaluating submitted prior art, and 5) submitting the top ten references, 
along with a commentary to the USPTO. The goal of this pilot is to determine if 
organized public participation can improve the quality of issued patents [USPTO, 2007]. 
 
New Category of Goods: Foray suggests that a new category of intellectual property such 
as ―common goods‖ may be required to deal with the uncertainties associated with new 
forms of knowledge. He suggests that with new, complex objects such as genes that do 
not ideally fit into the usual categories of private-public goods, that the new category of 
common goods might prove useful. Under this regime, an organization or institution that 
is in possession of a good useful in product development, would not serve as the owner, 
but simply the manager of the good [Foray, 2000]. 
 
Overwalle et al. (2006) allude to this management of goods via clearinghouses—by 
which providers and users of goods are matched. For example, the Science Commons 
encourages technology transfer and intellectual property licensing via the adoption of 
standardized licenses to create transparency in the use of patented technology in science. 
Similarly, the Creative Commons enables the transferring and licensing of copyrighted 
material [Overwalle et al., 2006]. 
 
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BiOS) is an initiative of the Centre for 
Applications of Molecular Biology in Agriculture (CAMBIA) with the objective to 
develop new means for cooperative invention, improvement, and delivery of technologies 
for life sciences. Research tools that have resulted from the BiOS initiative are made 
available on the basis of a BiOS license [Overwalle et al., 2006]. Instead of royalties or 
other conditions that disfavour creation of products, under a BiOS-compliant agreement, 
the user must agree to conditions that encourage cooperation and development of the 




These conditions include a provision that licensees cannot exclusively appropriate the 
fundamental essence of the technology and/or improvements.  The base technology 
remains the property of the entity that developed it, but improvements can be shared with 
others that support the development of a protected commons around the technology; 
those participants who agree to the same terms of sharing obtain access to improvements, 
and other information such as regulatory and biosafety data [www.bios.net, 2007].  
To maintain legal access to the technology, users must agree not to prevent others who 
have agreed to the same terms from using the technology and any improvements in the 
development of varied products. 
 
The Commons: In this regime, all researchers have the privilege of using knowledge and 
resources. In the commons, researchers have one guaranteed right—that of not being 
excluded from exploiting knowledge or resources. Concerns about the enclosure of 
genomic resources have led to movements within the industry to preserve the existing 
―biotech commons‖ and to reclaim knowledge that has already been privatized.  
 
Under certain conditions, the biotech commons is an efficient institution that can preserve 
downstream opportunities for multiple researchers fairly and efficiently.  Cooperative 
interactions during discovery research can ensure that knowledge is generated for the 
purpose of disclosure and deposit into the biotech commons. Foray (2004) proposes five 
classes of incentives to participate in the commons and freely reveal knowledge: 
 
1) Voluntary spillovers are likely to occur when reward systems specifically encourage 
knowledge diffusion e.g., collegial reputation as a reward for working in open science.  
2) Voluntary spillovers are likely to occur when researchers or organizations need to 
create ―general reciprocity obligations‖ in order to access external knowledge from others 
working in a similar arena.  
3) Voluntary spillovers are likely to occur when an organization freely reveals an 
innovation in order to benefit from its increased diffusion e.g., to influence adoption of a 
technology or technology standard. 
50 
 
4) Voluntary spillovers are likely to occur when firms are interested in improvements of 
the average aggregate performance of an industry e.g., to increase safety and regulation 
associated within an industry.  
5) Voluntary spillovers are likely to occur when an organization is attempting to pre-empt 
rivals from pursuing a particular technological pathway or enclosing a technological 
arena e.g. SNP Consortium.  
 
 
2.7 Strategic Alliances: Knowledge Acquisition versus Knowledge Access  
 
Knowledge Acquisition:  Alliances between biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies provide access to complementary assets [Teece, 1986; 1992]. In resource-
based alliances, parties are assumed to be mutually dependent upon the resources 
controlled by other parties and common benefits are associated with pooling resources 
[Powell, 1990; Das and Teng, 2000]. The exchange and accumulation of resources 
becomes necessary when resources are mingled with other resources or embedded in 
organizations [Das and Teng, 2000]. Mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances are 
alternatively employed to access these resources [Child and Faulkner, 1998; Kogut, 1998; 
Das and Teng, 2000].  
 
For example, academic institutions and biotechnology companies can supply new insight 
and ideas for drug pipelines, validate drug targets, and develop compounds, therapies, 
and technologies. Large traditional pharmaceutical manufacturers possess complementary 
research capabilities such as large research assets not available in smaller biotechnology 
companies and resources for large-scale development and marketing. Hence, clinical 
testing, manufacturing, and marketing know-how, have encouraged smaller 
biotechnology companies to form alliances with pharmaceutical companies possessing 
these intangible resources [Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Greis et al., 1995; Powell et al., 
1996].  This division of labor allows small biotechnology firms to focus on upstream 
research and large pharmaceutical companies to gain access to newer technologies by 
exploiting their large-scale development advantages. Small biotechnology firms may 
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invest in research despite not being able to develop and commercialize their inventions. 
Instead, these small firms rely on licensing scientific knowledge and technology to larger 
pharmaceutical firms. Consequently, genes, proteins, biological systems and their 
associated patents have become strategic knowledge-based assets [Blumenthal, 1992; 
Powell and Owen-Smith, 1998; Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Jackson, 2003]. 
 
Concerns about protecting knowledge-based resources in strategic alliances will impact 
the decision to form an alliance and the structural choice for the alliance. From the 
resource-based perspective, firms are not only interested in acquiring complementary 
assets, but are also interested in protecting their own resources and knowledge in an 
alliance. Studies indicate that firms will choose a more hierarchical structure when 
partnering with other firms in environments with weak intellectual property protection 
[Oxley, 1999]. A hierarchical structure, including equity based alliances, are used to 
monitor the behaviour of alliance partners, limit a partner‘s use of technology, and 
encourage adherence to the spirit of any agreement between the parties [Pisano et al., 
1989; Oxley, 1999]. However, hierarchies do have their costs as technological 
opportunities may not be optimally or completely exploited within these alliances.  
 
In alliances such as joint R&D, joint production, and joint marketing, bilateral contract-
based alliances provide more opportunities for learning than unilateral contract-based 
alliances such as licensing and subcontracting [Das and Teng, 2000]. Of import in such 
alliances, is that scholars suggest that once learning has been accomplished, alliances will 
be terminated, with each firm progressing unilaterally thereafter [Khanna et al., 1998].  
 
Unilateral contract-based alliances are preferred when partners are contributing property-
based resources to the alliance. These alliances can include licensing, subcontracting, and 
distribution agreements. In such alliances, there is essentially an exchange of property 
rights e.g., intellectual property rights for licensing fees, royalties, or the future right to 
licenses on downstream applications of the original intellectual property [Eisenberg, 
1996; Das and Teng, 2000; Kieff, 2003]. Table 2.3 outlines the above alliance structures 
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and the incentive to participate in such alliances from a knowledge acquisition 
perspective.  
Alliance Structure Knowledge Acquisition Incentive 
Mergers and Acquisitions- 
Equity Based Alliances 
―A firm will favour acquisitions over joint 
ventures when the assets it needs are not 
commingled with other unneeded assets within 
the firm that holds them, and hence can be 
acquired by buying the firm or a part of it.‖ 
[Hennart and Reddy, 1997]. 
 
―If the market is munificent or the firm is 
pursuing a strategy for which it has extensive 
resource capabilities, there is much less incentive 
to cooperate. Firms are more likely to continue 
alone.‖ [Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996]. 
Strategic Alliances- 
Joint R&D, Joint Marketing, 
Bilateral Contract-Based Alliances 
Alliances are preferred ―when the critical inputs 
required to pursue the opportunity are owned by 
different parties and when these inputs are 
inseparable from the other assets of the owner 
firms.‖ [Ramanathan et al., 1997]. 
 
―Collaborations are a useful vehicle for 
enhancing knowledge in critical areas of 
functioning where the requisite level of 
knowledge is lacking and cannot be developed 
within an acceptable timeframe or cost.‖ 
[Madhok, 1997]. 
Market-Based Transactions- 
Licensing, Subcontracting  
When ―the purchase of the resource…from the 
firm that possesses it‖ [Chi, 1994] can be 
efficiently conducted through the market. 
Table 2.3: Theories of Knowledge Acquisition 
 
Knowledge Access: Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) contend that the primary basis for 
knowledge-based alliances is knowledge access rather than knowledge acquisition 
[Mody, 1993; Mowery et al., 1996; Larsson et al., 1998; Mowery et al., 1998; Das and Teng, 
2000; Kale et al., 2000; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004]. Such alliances contribute to the 
efficient utilization of knowledge and the efficient integration of knowledge into the 
development of products. These efficiencies are critical when there is uncertainty as to 
the role of future knowledge requirements for new product development and where there 
are early-mover advantages associated with rapid knowledge access and product 
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development [Greis et al., 1995; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004]. Where products require 
a broad range of different types of knowledge, efficiency of integration is maximized 
through separate firms specializing in different knowledge areas that are linked by 
strategic alliances [Liebeskind et al., 1996; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004]. As the 
breadth of knowledge required to generate new products increases, the propensity to form 
alliances with other firms who have specialized in the requisite knowledge, also increases 
[Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004].  
 
 
2.8 Using Game Models to Understand Firm Behaviour 
A game of strategy is conceived in game theory as ―as a situation in which two or more 
players make choices among available alternatives‖ [Rapoport and Chammah, 1965]. The 
totality of choices determines the outcome of the game and the rank order of preferences 
of outcomes is assumed to vary for different players. Thus the ―interests‖ of the players 
could be in conflict. Rapoport and Chammah state that psychologically the most 
interesting situations arise when the interests of the players are only partly opposed 
and/or partly coincident, because of the possibility of conflicts not only among the 
players, but also inner conflicts ―within‖ players [Rapoport and Chammah, 1965]. Mixed 
motive games with conflicting parties and conflicting motives within participants are 
formalized in game theory as ―nonzero-sum games‖.  
 
By definition, in nonzero sum games, some outcomes of these games are jointly better for 
both players than other outcomes. This is in contrast to two-person zero-sum games in 
which the preferences of the two players must always be opposite [Rapoport and 
Chammah, 1965]. Prisoner‘s Dilemma is an example of a nonzero-sum game, with a 
mixture of interpersonal and intrapersonal conflicts. 
 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma has been commented upon but forgotten many times in literature, 
usually without the realization that it is a universal problem. Political scientist Robert 
Axelrod told Poundstone that ―…with Prisoner‘s Dilemma, you can say there‘s a conflict 
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between individual and group interests, but you can‘t really get very far without the 
framework of game theory‖ [Poundstone, 1992].  
 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma, derives from the following anecdote used to illustrate the game: 
 
Two prisoners, held incommunicado, are charged with the same crime. They can be 
convicted only if either confesses. The payoff associated with conviction on the 
basis of confession is –1 and the payoff associated with acquittal is +1. Further, if 
one prisoner confesses, he is set free for having turned state‘s evidence and is given 
a reward with the payoff of +2. The prisoner who has held out is convicted on the 
basis of the previous prisoner‘s testimony and is given a more severe sentence than 
if he had also confessed with a payoff of –2 [Rapoport and Chammah, 1965].  
 
The most common type of Prisoner‘s Dilemma in everyday life is the ―free-rider 
dilemma‖. This is a dilemma with many, rather than just two players. The name of this 
dilemma refers to the problem confronting public transit riders. Simply: It‘s late at night, 
and there‘s no one in the subway station. Why not just hop over the turnstiles and save 
yourself the fare. But if everyone hopped the turnstiles, the subway system might not be 
able to maintain itself to the detriment of all of its users. There can be no doubt that many 
people will defect and hop the turnstiles. Since there will always be people who ―get 
away with‖ not paying, the others are suckers who pay full fare [Poundstone, 1992]. 
 
In New Zealand, newspaper boxes operate on an honour system. Readers are supposed to 
drop a coin into the payment box, but nothing physically prevents someone from taking a 
newspaper without paying. However, few readers evidently steal, recognizing the 
consequences of mass defection [Poundstone, 1992].  
 
The free-rider dilemma can be even more hopeless than the two-person Prisoner‘s 
Dilemma as defectors can hide in the crowd. Taxes are one way governments avoid free-
rider dilemmas. It would be nice if people voluntarily contributed money for maintaining 
roads, running schools, and other such public works. But few people would do so 
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knowing that many others would pay nothing. Most people can be convinced that taxes 
for public works are desirable, provided that everyone pays. Thus, the government 
enforces the payment of taxes [Poundstone, 1992]. In the government however, 
Poundstone distinguishes between the liberal cooperators and the conservative defectors. 
A liberal is described as a ―cooperator‖—someone willing to put himself at risk for 
exploitation in order to increase the common good. Liberals favour paying taxes that go 
to help the homeless in the expectation that the homeless will not fritter way such aid, but 
will use it to get on their feet. Conservators are ―defectors‖ in that they seek to guarantee 
themselves the best outcome possible on their efforts alone. Taxes may be squandered, so 
the best course it to let people keep as much of their income (i.e. via lower taxes) as 
possible and decide individually how best to spend it [Poundstone, 1992].  
 
The Tragedy of the Commons: A common view is that a multi-player Prisoner‘s 
Dilemma can be reflected in what Garret Hardin popularized as ―the tragedy of the 
commons‖ [Hardin, 1968]. Hardin‘s tragedy of the commons develops in the following 
way: Each member of a group of neighboring farmers prefers to allow his cow to graze 
on the commons (common land), rather than keeping it on his own inadequate land. But 
the commons will be rendered unsuitable for grazing if more than some threshold number 
of farmers uses it [Hardin, 1968]. 
 
As the human population increased, the idea of the commons had to be abandoned in one 
aspect after the other. The overgrazing problem was solved with the institution of private 
property or the allocation of the right to enter the commons area. Restrictions have been 
placed on the disposal of domestic sewage, with an ongoing attempt to close the 
commons to pollution by automobiles, factories, insecticide sprayers, fertilizing 
operations, and atomic energy installations. Taxes can be used to induce people to be 
temperate in their use of the commons i.e., not forbidding a person from using the 
commons, merely making it expensive to do so. Hardin also believed that while 
abandoning of the commons in breeding is difficult, it needed to be dealt with [Hardin, 
1968]. The figure that follows (Figure 2.5) graphically shows the transition from the 
commons to private property with the parceling of the commons into distinct sections of 
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privately owned property—denoted as A, B, and C, owned by three individuals—denoted 
as 1, 2, and 3.  In this regime, individuals 1, 2, and 3 are able to exploit their property (or 











Figure 2.5: The Transition from a Commons to Private Property 
 
Tragedies in Biotechnology Research: Merges (1996) discusses that cooperating is very 
attractive if it is mutual, but defecting is proof against being a ―sucker‖ (ending up at 
one‘s worst outcome), which explains why players may defect unless the opponent‘s 
cooperation is assured [Axelrod, 1984; Gulati et al., 1994; Kollock, 1998]. Each 
researcher will find defection in his or her own interest, and will therefore expect the 
partner to similarly defect [Merges, 1996]. 
 
The tragedy of the biotech commons is a result of free riding by other users and the 
inability of the original inventor to appropriate knowledge. The properties of non-rivalry 
and non-excludability will enable non-authorized users to benefit from use of the 
knowledge at little or no cost. Therefore, patents provide a temporary monopoly to the 
original innovator to use or assign rights for usage of knowledge for appropriation. 
Specifically, the owner will have control over the rights to use, returns from any activity 
that will use the knowledge, and any transfer of usage. The first innovator‘s incentive to 
invest will be ensured if he/she can receive a private return on first-generation knowledge 
and possibly on second-generation knowledge produced either internally or externally by 





1 2 3 
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others. The tragedy where innovative knowledge is not generated and diffused for others 
to use can be avoided through the assignment of property rights [Hardin, 1968; Foray 
2004].  
 
In contrast, Heller and Eisenberg propose that with the proliferation of property rights in 
biomedical research—a tragedy of the anticommons, can occur in which follow-on 
innovators underuse a scarce resource because too many owners can block these 
innovators and no one has effective privilege of use [Heller and Eisenberg, 1998]. This 
tragedy occurs in the course of downstream research and product development based on a 
proliferation of upstream property rights. In Figure 2.6, the anticommons results from the 
fact that private ownership rights fragment goods. Tragedy occurs as a result of multiple 
owners of fragments of A, B, and C. The owners 1, 2 and 3 can exclude others from using 
their fragments, however, nobody can exploit these good in their entirety [Foray, 2004]. 
Overcoming the tragedy involves managing transaction costs, dealing with problems 
associated with bargaining for rights to use of knowledge, and preventing holdouts. 
Similarly, excess privatization can occur when initial patents are too broad and reward 
early innovators too generously, thereby blocking the possibility for incremental 
innovation and the exploitation of technological opportunities not captured by the early 
innovator [Foray, 2004]. Although the tragedy of the anticommons is associated with 
excessive fragmentation of the knowledge base, both scenarios of excessive privatization 








Figure 2.6: The Anti-Commons 
In the winner take all situation, the incentive to race is strong. In the two-player game, if 















grants the defector a monopoly over several years for the invention. The patent can 
become a crucial bargaining tool for the defector. The payoff for being left behind, either 
by being the lone cooperator or being the second-in-time, is lost investment in research 
and development. Therefore, it makes rational sense to defect no matter what the other 
company does, with the possibility of being first-to-invent or even the first-to-file and 
receive the patent on one‘s invention. With a responsibility of the firm to its shareholders, 
a company is obligated to protect its R&D and its monetary investments. It is therefore 
likely that both companies will defect, exacerbating the race, with high costs before and 
after the patent is granted (i.e. via litigation to defend patent rights). A possible game 
matrix of these payoffs is shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: The Patent Race 
―R‖ stands for reward and refers to the payoff each player receives as reward for cooperating; the ―S‖ 
stands for the sucker‘s payoff and is the payoff received by the player who cooperated while the other 
player defected; the ―T‖ stands for temptation—the payoff that a player may hope to get if he can defect 
and get away with it; and the ―P‖ stands for punishment, given out to both players when both have defected 
[Rapoport and Chammah, 1965]. 
 
To avoid an anti-commons situation, cooperation should be encouraged via joint 
licensing, including cross-licensing of intellectual property between companies for 
further research and development activities. (Table 2.5) Companies can use their patent 
positions to trade with other companies for access to other research tools. Defection 
occurs when companies engage in the use of submarine patents, large and complex 
agreements including reach through licensing agreements (RTLAs) to profit from a 
licensee‘s downstream product development, charge high royalties fees, or license patents 




Player 1/Player 2 C2  Cooperates D2  Defects and Races 
C1 Cooperates R=Faster discovery or 
increased probability of 






D1 Defects and 
Races 
T=Patent granted/Monopoly 
over invention; S=Sunk 
costs/No patent 
P=Exorbitant costs 
with no guarantee on 
the patent situation 
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Table 2.5: Avoiding the Anti-commons 
 
Both companies are better off engaging in cooperative behaviour to remove any 
downstream obstacles. However, submarine patents, exclusive licensing, and large 
royalty payments provide a strong incentive to defect as a result of the large payments 
that can be extracted from a downstream developer. If a company engages in defective 
behaviour it can secure a large future royalty stream—even negotiate a RTLA on future 
products, and not be the ―sucker‖ who cooperates. Double defection can be seen as a 
―TIT for TAT‖ move—a punishment for other companies defecting, with the end result 
becoming a ―tragedy of the anticommons‖. Even Eisenberg does not expect the 
biotechnology industry to come together cooperatively to widely cross-license patents to 
ease product development. ―I haven‘t seen any signs of that. I mean, every biotechnology 
product that has come to market has been accompanied by litigation—to the death‖, 
states Eisenberg [Garber, 2000]. She further states that the biggest losers could be the 
small biotechnology firm that lacks the ―trading currency‖ for equitable cross-licensing 
[Garber, 2000].  
 
In the sections that follow below as well as in Chapter 6, we analyze how new models of 
operation are in fact enabling for cooperative knowledge production and dissemination to 





   C2  Cooperates D2  Defects 
C1 Cooperates R=Faster discovery or 
increased probability of 
discovery and profits; Cost 
containment  
S=Cost of licensing, 
royalty payments, or 0 
if no license is granted; 
T=Large royalty 
streams, even RTLAs 
D1 Defects  T=RTLAs, large royalty 
stream; S=0 or Cost of 
licensing and royalty 
payments  
P=Exorbitant costs to 





2.9 Models of Cooperation 
 
Open Innovation: Chesbrough explains that innovation has become increasingly open 
through a division of labour. In many industries, the vertically integrated organizational 
structure where innovation is solely an internal activity is gradually transforming into a 
more fluid structure tapping into both internal and external sources of innovation. For 
example, companies are finding value through the licensing of intellectual property, the 
development of joint R&D ventures, or other arrangements to exploit technology outside 
the boundaries of the firm [Chesbrough, 2003; 2007]. In the pharmaceutical industry, 
giants such as Merck and Pfizer have watched as biotechnology upstarts such as 
Genentech, Amgen, and Genzyme have exploited external discoveries to become major 
players in this industry. These companies have used an open business model in which 
ideas move from discovery to commercialization through at least two different 
organizations—with different parties involved in the innovation process [Chesbrough 
2003]. 
 
Rising costs, technological complexities, and shorter life cycles have put pressure on 
companies and their internal innovation processes. The pharmaceutical industry is facing 
patent expirations, empty pipelines, increased regulatory complexities, and a shorter life 
cycle created by brand competitors and generic competitors that quickly enter the market. 
Chesbrough (2003) discusses that open business models can enable pharmaceutical 
companies to leverage external resources and human capital to save time and money 
during the innovation process. The open business model further enables companies to 
generate revenue through the licensing of technologies that cannot be fully exploited 
within an organization and through the in-licensing of technologies that are discovered 
outside the boundaries of the organization [Chesbrough 2003]. 
 
From a knowledge perspective, in the closed model, human capital is employed within 
the boundaries of the organization. Knowledge is generated within and belongs to the 
originating firm. The organization‘s profit model revolves around the notion that 
knowledge is discovered, developed, and then embodied within firm-only products 
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[Chesbrough 2003]. Appropriated knowledge is controlled by the originating firm. In the 
open model, human capital and knowledge are accessed both inside and outside the 
boundaries of the organization. External knowledge can create significant value for a 
firm; internal innovation processes are therefore also needed to evaluate and exploit this 
knowledge. Firms can profit from the embodiment of knowledge within internally 
developed products as well the embodiment of knowledge in products developed by other 
firms [Chesbrough, 2003]. 
  
Knowledge-Based Networks: Knowledge-based networks are communities of individuals 
with the objectives of producing and disseminating knowledge. Norms or rules for 
knowledge sharing and knowledge appropriation are necessary in networks with varied 
types of researchers [Ostrom et al., 1994; Liebeskind et al., 1996]. Knowledge networks 
enable multiple researchers to pool assets, know-how, and expertise for the purpose of 
knowledge generation, knowledge validation, and new wealth creation [Powell et al., 
1996; Reid et al., 2001].  
 
Open network structures exists to undertake research and to generate new knowledge in a 
specific scientific or technological domain [Hacklin et al., 2004]. These alliances are only 
concerned with the generation of new, disembodied knowledge. They are not concerned 
with the possible application and embodiment of knowledge [Liebeskind et al., 1996; 
Stokes, 1997]. A formal organizational structure, rules for participation (by invitation or 
match of qualifications to the theme of the network) as well as norms regarding 
knowledge dissemination are typical of these types of network structure [Liebeskind et 
al., 1996]. In this type of alliance, members provide a function or resource that is 
complementary to and synergistic with the contributions of other members of the alliance 
[Child and Faulkner 1998; Reid et al., 2001]. Firms are able to benefit not only from their 
own knowledge, but also through the recombination of knowledge from other firms 













Figure 2.7: Upstream Knowledge Creation through Strategic Alliances 
C=Complementarity, S=Substitutability, A=Applicability, IP=Intellectual Property Rights Sought; Dotted, 
clear circle=Disembodied, open knowledge; Solid, filled circle=Embodied, closed knowledge 
 
In contrast, development networks exist to create new knowledge and to accelerate the 
application of the knowledge [Stokes, 1997]. A variety of formalized projects may be 
undertaken in this type of network. Participants are carefully chosen based on reputation 
and capabilities. These networks are marked by tight forms of governance and hierarchy 
[Reid et al., 2001]. Given the application orientation of these networks, issues relating to 
the ownership of intellectual property can become important [Oxley, 1999; Das and 













Figure 2.8: Downstream Knowledge Creation through Strategic Alliances 
C=Complementarity, S=Substitutability, A=Applicability, IP=Intellectual Property Rights Sought; Solid, 
clear circle=Embodied, open knowledge; Solid, filled circle=Embodied, closed knowledge 
 
Relevant Models from the Information Technology Sector: Models of cooperation 
associated with open standard development and open source software development 
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Open standard development reflects collaborative technology production between 
multiple organizations.  Open source software development entails both collaborative 
production as well as implementation of a technology. 
 
Open standards are essentially a set of rules for the design of new products. These rules 
enable coordination between products and components by establishing a common 
interface to manage their cross-interaction [Chesbrough et al., 2006]. Voluntary non-
market Standard Setting Organizations that operate in industries such as software 
development, where coordination is large, can have a considerable impact on the rate and 
direction of technological change i.e., via the adoption of a particular technology as an 
industry standard [Chesbrough et al., 2006]. 
 
Open standards create value for consumers by promoting competition between 
implementations. Firms selling products that implement a standard enjoy less uncertainty 
associated with the coordination of products [Chesbrough et al., 2006]. It is anticipated 
that firms that produce technologies used to implement a standard, participate in open 
standard groups to capture the value associated with the development of a new 
compatibility standard e.g., absorptive capacity, early access to technology [Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Chesbrough et al. 2006]. 
 
In the management of standard creation, standard setting organizations establish a set of 
rules and obligations for members as outlined in the charter and bylaws of the 
organization [Lemley, 2002]. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) in open standard 
development are governed by these rules and address searching for IPRs within member 
files and or the broader literature, disclosing information within the organization, and 
licensing of IPR. These rules are essentially designed to prevent members from adopting 
a standard that entails ex-post hold-ups by patent owners offering a licensing that likely 
would not have been accepted ex-ante. Table 2.6 outlines the intellectual property 





Table 2.6: Intellectual Property Strategies Used in Standard Creation 
 
Open source software development reflects both collaborative production and shared 
implementation of a technology [Chesbrough et al., 2006]. Open source software is 
considered to be a reaction to the proprietary software model, differing from this latter 
model in terms of intellectual property rights and its production. Namely, open source 
software involves collaborative production and requires free distribution of software 
source code and the right for others to modify the code.   
 
Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) discovered in their research three types of incentives 
driving firm participation in open source software development including: direct utility to 
the organization from collaborative, open software development e.g., absorptive capacity 
development and early access to technology; intrinsic benefit from participating in the 
development of this software e.g., learning a new skill; and signaling one‘s abilities in a 
technological arena to one‘s peers or firms. Two highly visible open source projects are 
the Linux operating system through the Open Source Development Labs (OSDL) and the 
Strategy Description Examples 
Contributing IPRs  Royalty-free licensing to promote 
implementation of standard. 
Ethernet 










Disclosing of patents during 




Ex-post Licensing Conducting a search for standard 
related IPR and approaching 
implementers about licensing. 
Eolas vs. Microsoft BT 
hyperlink suit 
Active Hold-up Participating without disclosure 










Pooling of patents within a 





Mozilla web browser project. In both cases, firms donate their research to the open source 
project while exploiting the pooled R&D of the project to enable the sale of related 
products [Chesbrough et al., 2006]. 
 
Open source software and related free software are essentially about intellectual property 
rights. Both models require the public disclosure of source code and ensure that all users 
have the right to modify the source code. However, there are key differences between the 
two models that should be noted [West and Dedrick, 2001]. (Table 2.7) Open source 
licenses impose fewer restrictions and are attractive to firms to use as components of their 
own systems. Free software licenses are much more restrictive. Licenses such as the 
General Public License (GPL) require modifications to GPL-licensed technology to be 
publicly disclosed as a means of preventing firms from developing proprietary derivative 
works to supplant the free version [West, 2003]. Valimaki (2003) discusses that firms use 
the restrictions of the GPL to their advantage—releasing the details of a technology to 
make it less attractive for use by direct competitors.  
License Terms Strategic Advantage 
Open Source Source code should be 
disclosed; Modifications 
possible by any user. 
Free access to technology 
that can serve as a platform 
for internal innovation and 
technology development that 
can supplant open source 
technology. 
Free Software Source code should be 
disclosed; Modifications 
possible by any user; 
Modifications should also be 
disclosed.  
Shared innovations remain 
shared; Limiting the 
incentives for competitors to 
develop proprietary 
technology to supplant shared 
version. 
Table 2.7: Comparing Open Source and Free Software Licenses 
 
We use the above theoretical concepts and models (including strategies employed by the 
information technology sector) to provide a foundation for our discussion of the biotech 




In Chapters 4 and 5, we begin the discussion by describing the simultaneous evolution of 
research paradigms and knowledge structures supporting such paradigms. As the current 
systems biology paradigm emerges, we discuss knowledge appropriation and the impact 
on downstream development if the current strategies are used to award intellectual 
property rights. To determine if problems may exist on the horizon, we analyze seven 
biological systems and the patents filed on these systems; we specifically analyze the 
focus of each patent in terms of paradigm, stage of development, and institutional 
ownership. In Chapter 5, we open the discussion further and analyze the impact of 
knowledge structures generally on the formation of upstream research-based alliances. 
We discuss (using data acquired for the period 1980 to 2005) how upstream research-
based alliances (including targets for knowledge appropriation) in the public and private 
sectors have evolved with drug discovery and development paradigms. In Chapter 6, we 
then specifically analyze one type of strategic alliance—the research consortia and its 
role in preserving the biotech commons. In this chapter, we analyze 39 consortia formed 
since the Human Genome Project including the structure of these consortia, the 
underlying knowledge production processes, and knowledge appropriation strategies used 
to ensure broad dissemination and exploitation of consortium knowledge. Based on this 
understanding, we develop three game models to understand (1) the incentive to 
participate in such research consortia (Chapter 7), (2) the incentive to keep knowledge in 
the biotech commons rather than appropriate knowledge through the filing of patents 
(Chapter 8), and (3) the bargaining process once patents are filed and the impact of 
knowledge structures on the interactions between licensor and licensee (Chapter 9).  
 
We anticipate that our ex-ante perspective on knowledge structures will enable industry 
stakeholders to better understand how knowledge production, dissemination, and 
appropriation strategies need to evolve as our understanding of disease and medical 
intervention deepens. The decisions made by these industry stakeholders with respect to 
alliance formation, knowledge management within such alliances, and unilateral versus 
cooperative product development should therefore, take account into the changing value 
of knowledge. This notion of ―changing value of knowledge‖ is our novel contribution to 
the current literature on intellectual property rights; our game models also provide a 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Purpose of Models 
Drug discovery research and development has become increasingly complex and costly. 
As paradigms change—from the chemical paradigm, to the molecular biology paradigm, 
and now the systems (information) paradigm—new models of innovation are emerging. 
What was once a simple linear race to the market by pharmaceutical companies has 
become an integrated system of alliances with multiple feedback links between 
pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology companies, and academic institutions. This 
system of alliances and links is enabling traditional pharmaceutical companies to access 
new discoveries and technologies, and biotechnology companies as well as academic 
institutions to access capital needed to progress into drug development. The objective of 
this new model of innovation is to better manage the time and cost to market.  
 
Adding to the complexities associated with drug discovery and development, is the need 
to design new intellectual property strategies. From the notion that any new composition 
of matter or article of manufacture can be patented, has evolved the notion that biological 
organisms and material including genomic material can be patented, and now the notion 
that entire biological systems can be appropriated. With limited insight into the role that 
genomic material and biological systems play in future drug discovery and development 
efforts, industry stakeholders are forming alliances to efficiently handle upstream and 
downstream knowledge management issues. Open source initiatives have as their 
objective the open dissemination of knowledge for members and the public at large. With 
competition best reserved for product development, members of these open source 
initiatives are hoping to level the playing field.  
 
In this thesis, we analyze the patenting strategies of both public institutions and private 
organizations across paradigms—with an in-depth analysis of current patenting strategies 
across several biological systems. The goal of this analysis is to determine if problems lie 
on the horizon as the biopharmaceutical industry increasingly adapts to the systems 
biology paradigm. We then broaden our analysis of patenting and licensing strategies by 
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analyzing early research-based alliances in the public and private sectors. The goal of this 
analysis is to understand the evolution and focus of alliances as drug discovery paradigms 
evolve (as described in section 3.3) as well as the focus of licensing across paradigms. As 
part of the solution to potential knowledge production and management problems, we 
then analyze how both open innovation and open source initiatives are currently 
managing the collective production and dissemination of biological knowledge. Using a 
game framework, we model the decision to cooperate versus compete in knowledge 
production and dissemination—with the goal of providing stakeholders a novel 
mechanism to analyze knowledge management strategies employed as knowledge 
structures change.  
 
While we contend that valuing knowledge is a complex process, the game models we 
develop provide a simple framework to strategically analyze the interactions occurring 
during drug discovery and development. Using subjective values for knowledge, 
ascertained through an understanding of the characteristics of the knowledge itself, firms 
can hopefully determine when cooperation (within strategic alliances) will enable for 
cost-effective and timely product development. Furthermore, it is anticipated that firms 
should be able to better understand competitor strategies given the characteristics 
associated with knowledge and the game models developed in this thesis.  
 
 
3.2 Methods of Inquiry 
We use a variety of methods in this thesis including patent analysis using the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) public database, analysis of the 
Recombinant Capital Alliances Database, literature analysis and survey of selected open 
innovation and open source directors, and case analysis for the purpose of game model 
development.  
 
For the patent analysis, we used title based searches to isolate those patents that focus on 
the selected biological systems. We use a title based search as a means of isolating those 
patents that centrally discuss and claim the selected biological systems from those patents 
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that may only peripherally discuss the biological systems. From this collection of patents, 
we then analyzed patent abstracts and patent claims to complete our data analysis. While 
innovators seeking protection for their inventions in Canada, the U.S., Europe, and Japan 
must file for a patent in each place, most companies are likely to first patent inventions in 
the much larger U.S. market; hence, we limit our analysis to the USPTO database with 
this assumption [Gold, 2006]. 
 
For the strategic alliances analysis, we used the Recombinant Capital Alliances database. 
Recombinant Capital has earned its reputation in the biotech industry by building some of 
the largest and most detailed biotech business intelligence databases in the world. Using 
the Alliances database we isolated upstream research-based alliances namely 
collaborative, research, and licensed based alliances. Based on an analysis of the 
Recombinant Capital database we were able to determine that the above three categories 
represented early upstream focused alliances. Furthermore, by using literature references, 
we determined that the strongest early mover advantages exist in the upstream research-
based phases. From this collection of alliances, we then analyzed alliance formation 
across periods and paradigms, as well as licenses issued across alliances and paradigms.  
 
For the open innovation and open source initiative (consortia) analysis, we isolated 39 
post-Human Genome initiatives. We focus on large-scale alliances, namely the 
consortium model, as literature review seems to suggest that this is becoming a dominant 
model for the management of upstream-based research in the post-genome paradigm. 
Using literature analysis we were able to determine that these consortia are visible and 
significant in their achievements, thereby enabling us to retrieve adequate literature 
sources for usage in our study. We analyzed the type of participants in each consortia, the 
structure of the knowledge generated within each consortia, and the subsequent 
knowledge management strategies adopted.  
 
Based on the above consortia case studies, we then model the decision to participate in 
research-based consortia as well as the decision to appropriate knowledge. Using game 
models we hope to demonstrate the decisions and outcomes available as knowledge 
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structures (represented as the common and private value of knowledge) change. The 
game models serve as a simple framework to understand the current interactions between 
industry stakeholders and to highlight key issues at hand from a knowledge perspective.  
 
 
3.3 Knowledge Framework Development 
Underlying our empirical analysis and game model development is a knowledge 
framework that we develop to provide a nuanced understanding of strategic alliances and 
intellectual property strategies. As research and development paradigms evolve, we 
contend that knowledge structures change. From the chemical paradigm to the molecular 
biology paradigm, and now the systems or information paradigm, we see the target of 
knowledge appropriation activities also evolve—from chemical substances, to genomic- 
based information and biological organisms, to biological systems and their underlying 
components. Furthermore, the focus of strategic alliances including the open source 
initiatives analyzed in this thesis changes from the simple objective of knowledge 
acquisition to knowledge access in an increasingly complex drug discovery and 
development paradigm. Refer to Chapter 2—sections 2.1 to 2.3, Chapter 4—sections 4.1 
to 4.4 and Chapter 5—section 5.3 for the knowledge framework.  
 
By understanding intellectual property and strategic alliance formation strategies from the 
perspectives of phase of knowledge—upstream or downstream, paradigm—chemical, 
biological, or information, knowledge structure—complementarity, substitutability, 
applicability, and subject matter—general upstream research, broad drug discovery 
research, tool development, process development, or targeted therapeutic development, 




3.4 Patent Analysis  
Existing patent law allows a researcher who has discovered a new, nonobvious, and 
useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter to receive a 
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patent. However, the notion of biological entities as being composition of matter from the 
chemistry perspective tends to support the view that patent protection of biotechnological 
inventions is simply an expansion of an existing logical patent category.  Given the 
complexities associated with systems biological, an information perspective to 
intellectual property should be adopted and should include an understanding of the 
impact of enclosing hierarchical and complementary, basic biological knowledge, on the 
technological opportunities available for the development of novel medical products 
[Hood, 2000]. 
 
We propose the following based on the above: 
 
Analysis 4.1*: A closer examination of patents filed on key biological systems will 
reveal the paradigm focus and subsequent intellectual property focus for the selected 
systems.  
Analysis 4.2:  A closer examination of patents filed on key biological systems will reveal 
the breadth of claims and possible impact on downstream product development.   
*Note: The first number refers to the chapter where the analysis is discussed; the second number refers to the sequence of analysis.  
 
Case Selection: In order to understand the current paradigm and the state of patenting in 
the current paradigm, we selected seven biological systems based on their biological 
significance i.e., in terms of biological function and role in disease development, as 
determined from literature analysis, including: the Akt (Protein Kinase B), BCR-ABL, 
GPCR (G-Protein-Coupled Receptor), JAK/STAT (Janus Kinase/Signal Transducers and 
Activators of Transcription), MAP Kinase, NF-ĸB (Nuclear Factor Kappa B), and the 
Phospholipase C signaling pathway. In order to assess the biological significance of these 
systems we first analyzed the number of articles published over the approximate period of 
patent approvals using PubMed. In almost all cases, over 1000 articles had been 
published over the equivalent period. Next, we generally searched through company press 
releases to understand the focus of product development with respect to cell signaling 
systems—the goal was to verify the significance of the chosen systems to companies in 
terms of product development. Finally, we researched the specific biological significance 
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of each system in terms of involvement in biological and disease processes using the 
BioCarta cell signaling database [www.biocarta.com, 2007]. 
 
Data Collection: We searched the public United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) database specifically for patents with these cell signaling systems mentioned in 
their titles.  
 
Patent Analysis: Patents were first categorized by target area: structural patents with 
reference to the 2-dimensional (sequence) and 3-dimensional (folded) structure of the key 
system component(s) as well as localization of the key system component(s); method or 
assay patents targeting the cell signaling systems; activator, modulator, or inhibitor 
patents with reference to the cell signaling systems; and usage patents that specifically 
refer to pharmaceutical compositions, disease intervention, or process/production patents 
with respect to the cell signaling systems.  The title and abstract were analyzed to 
categorize by target area.  
 
From this first categorization we then associated each patent with paradigm—chemical, 
biological, or information. As well, we categorized the research by phase as being 
upstream—focusing on disembodied knowledge generation, or downstream—focusing on 
applications including tools, drugs, and diagnostics. The title of the patent, abstract, and 
claims were closely analyzed to categorize both by paradigm and phase of research. The 
definitions used for the paradigm and phase categorization are provided in Table 3.1. By 
strictly adhering to the definitions provided in Table 3.1 we attempt to remove any bias 
during the categorization process. These definitions are based on well-known industry 
terms used to describe R&D paradigms and phases [BIO.org, 2007; PhRMA.org, 2007]. 
 
The final component of our analysis involved determining patent ownership details. We 
have collectively analyzed the number of patents owned by public organizations and/or 
private organizations for each biological system. As well, we have analyzed the major 
patent holders (from this collective analysis), for each biological system, using the 
criteria of three or more patents owned by the same public or private institution.  
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Table 3.1: Patent Analysis Parameters 
 
The results of our patent analysis are presented in Chapter 4—tables 4.1 through to tables 
4.8. We also include the original patent data and analysis in the appendix (Appendix 
tables 1 to 7).  
 
Analysis Limitations: While we limit our analysis of biological systems to seven 
significant systems, there may be value in extending our analysis to other biological 
systems. Analyzing patent usage patterns i.e., internal usage or external usage through 
licensing, may also enable us to determine potential downstream product development 
issues including blocks for other researchers who need to acquire the right to use the 
knowledge contained within key biological system patents. It may also be worthwhile to 
extend our patent analysis to other databases including the Canadian and World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) databases.  
 
 
3.5 Historical Analysis of Alliances 
As the pharmaceutical industry transitions into the systems biology paradigm, the nature 
of biological knowledge, namely the complementary nature of upstream biological 
knowledge, its complexity in terms of function, and its breadth of application, will 
Categorization Definition 
 
Chemical Paradigm Focus of alliance activities on chemical knowledge, and on the 
traditional aspects of drug discovery including small molecule 
pharmaceuticals e.g. medicinal chemistry, bioorganic chemicals. 
Biological Paradigm Focus of alliance activities on biological knowledge, including 
physiology and molecular biology as well as large molecule 
biologics e.g. vaccines, antibodies, gene therapy, stem cells. 
Information Paradigm Focus of alliance activities on genomics-based or systems-based 
information development or tool development e.g. genomic and 
proteomic information, bioinformatic tools.  
Upstream Research Focus on disembodied, early knowledge and/or early phase 
knowledge e.g. discovery research, structural information.  
Downstream Research Focus on embodied knowledge; clearly focused on the later stages 
of development e.g. small molecule or large molecule 
development, diagnostic, or tool development. 
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encourage the formation of strategic alliances to ensure equitable access to knowledge for 
future product development. Strong early-mover advantages in drug development rest on 
the ability to rapidly identify, access, and integrate new combinations of knowledge 
[Antonelli, 2003; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004].  
 
Where products require a broad range of different types of knowledge, efficiency of 
integration is maximized through separate firms specializing in different knowledge areas 
that are linked by strategic alliances [Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004]. As the breadth of 
knowledge required to generate new products increases, the propensity to form alliances 
with other firms who have specialized in the requisite knowledge, also increases. 
 
Based on this understanding, we propose the following: 
 
Analysis 5.1*: An examination of strategic alliances from a paradigm perspective will 
reveal the formation of alliances as paradigms evolve i.e., trends across time periods and 
paradigms.  
Analysis 5.2: An examination of strategic alliances from a subject matter perspective will 
further reveal the knowledge focus—upstream vs. downstream activities; a correlation 
across paradigms should also prove useful.  
Analysis 5.3: An examination of strategic alliances and licenses issued within these 
alliances will reveal the knowledge focus of licenses across paradigms.    
*Note: The first number refers to the chapter where the analysis is discussed; the second number refers to the sequence of analysis.  
 
Data Collection: To better understand how strategic alliances have evolved over time and 
since the development of recombinant technology (a milestone attributed to the 
development of the biotechnology industry), we acquired access to the Recombinant 
Capital Alliances Database. Using the Recombinant Capital Alliances Database we 





Data Selection: Collaborative alliances, research-based alliances, and license-only 
alliances were chosen in order to concentrate our analysis on the earlier phases of (i.e. 
where strong early mover advantages exist) the drug discovery and development 
paradigm as assessed through the categorizations used in the database and then verified 
through a more detailed analysis of the alliances themselves. We analyzed both public-
private and private alliances between academic institutions, nonprofit research-based 
institutions, and biotechnology or pharmaceutical firms. 
 
Data Analysis: Initially, each alliance was associated with a knowledge paradigm— 
chemical, biological, information. (Table 3.1) We associated each alliance with a 
paradigm based on the primary research activity. From the perspective of knowledge 
production, our analysis specifically investigates the evolutionary path of alliance focus 
over the period 1980 to 2005.  We also investigate how the relative frequency of alliances 
changes as the underlying knowledge paradigm changes. We segregate data into 5-year 
periods to better observe/note any trends.  
 
From the perspective of knowledge access, we determined if and when privatization (or 
enclosure) of knowledge occurred within each alliance (denoted by the granting of a 
license; we assume that patenting precedes licensing). It is important to note that licenses 
were issued in license-only alliances as well as in collaborative or research-based 
alliances. Licenses were analyzed across knowledge paradigms. By further analyzing the 
scope of the licenses, we determined the focus of privatization i.e., upstream or 
downstream knowledge. (Table 3.1) By strictly adhering to the definitions provided in 
Table 3.1 we attempt to remove any bias during the categorization process. These 
definitions are based on well-known industry terms used to describe R&D paradigms and 
phases. As well, the categorization process was completed at one sitting to ensure 
consistency during the categorization process. Only a limited number of entries posed 
difficulties for categorization at the first sitting; however, by referring to the first-round 




The final component of our analysis involved categorization by subject matter. We 
closely analyzed each alliance from the perspective of subject matter focus namely 
prediscovery research, general drug discovery, tool development, targeted therapeutic 
development, combinatorial chemistry and/or screening, and other process development. 
The goal of this analysis was to determine the subject matter focus as paradigms evolve.  
 
Analysis Limitations: While we do attain some interesting results from this analysis, we 
do assert that the study should be extended into the next five year period i.e., from 2006 
to 2010 to determine if key trends (particularly with respect to the current paradigm) 
continue.  
 
We also contend that our results depend on the accuracy of data collection by the creators 
and managers of the Recombinant Capital Alliances Database. While the database 
contains alliance information from the U.S., several European countries, and countries 
from Asia such as Singapore and Japan, Canadian information is not as well represented; 
this may be the result of reporting or information acquisition issues from Canadian 
institutions and/or companies Therefore, it may be worthwhile to augment our current 
data with Canadian alliance and licensing information such as from the Association of 
University Technology Managers‘ database.  
 
In terms of model replicability, it would be worthwhile to have an outside expert analyze 
our categorizations. Strictly using the definitions outlined in Table 3.1, such an expert 
should be provided the opportunity to analyze the public-private and private alliances in 
our model. Should the categorizations match, we would be able to state with greater 
confidence that our model is accurate and our process replicable. The model should also 
be tested for falsifiability. A model is falsifiable if and only if there is some possible 
observation which could show that it is false i.e. if an outside expert can provide 
counterexamples that our categorizations are incorrect or can provide an alternative set of 




The results of our analysis are presented in Chapter 5—tables 5.3 through to tables 5.6 as 
well as Figures 5.3 and 5.4. We include the condensed version of Recombinant Capital 
data in the appendix to demonstrate the paradigm, phase, and then subject matter 
categorization for selected alliances. (Appendix tables 8 and 9) 
 
 
3.6 Consortium Analysis  
It has become apparent that the premature appropriation of upstream knowledge poses 
great risks for downstream development. Ensuring that these downstream opportunities 
are available for multiple firms has become the objective of open source initiatives 
(consortia) catalyzed by the public and private sectors.  
 
The ability to join an open initiative will be tempered by the existence of informal versus 
formal rules of participation. With formality, entrance costs may be used to enable 
research and development activities as well as to signal cooperation and commitment to 
the consortium. Furthermore, rules may be used to determine the dissemination and/or 
appropriation (including licensing terms) of knowledge produced within the consortium.  
 
An analysis of 39 consortia provides us with information on: the likely participants in 
such open source initiatives, the focus of knowledge production activities, the 
characteristics of the knowledge generated, and the management of joint knowledge 
assets. The objective of the consortium analysis is to determine the impact of knowledge 
structures on alliance formation and the dissemination of knowledge assets generated 
within each consortium. Based on this, we propose the following: 
 
Analysis 6.1*: An analysis of the selected consortia will reveal the structure of each 
consortium including type of participants and their geographic dispersion.   
Analysis 6.2: Furthermore, a closer examination of the rules established by consortia 




Analysis 6.3: A closer examination of the knowledge generated by consortia members 
including focus and structure will reveal the purpose of each consortium and if any rules 
are required to enable knowledge dissemination.  
Analysis 6.4: An analysis of the rules established with respect to patenting will enable for 
an understanding of common and contrasting licensing strategies used to manage 
knowledge dissemination (including as a function of knowledge structure).  
*Note: The first number refers to the chapter where the analysis is discussed; the second number refers to the sequence of analysis.  
 
Data Collection and Selection: The International Human Genome Project catalyzed the 
open-source movement in genomics-based research. The achievements and failures of the 
Human Genome Project, which involved the cooperation of globally dispersed labs, 
prompted us to analyze other such consortia focused on genomic and post-genomic 
research. Through extensive literature search we were able to isolate several post Human 
Genome consortia that would warrant inclusion in our study. Using the Science of 
Collaboratories project and PubMed literature database as a starting basis for our data 
collection, we isolated approximately 50 consortia that focused on genomic, proteomic, 
and systems-based research. The goal was to analyze mechanisms of cooperative 
knowledge production and dissemination in the current information paradigm.  
 
We then selected 39 such consortia for further analysis. These consortia are visible and 
significant in their achievements, thereby enabling us to 1) accurately analyze 
interactions over a reasonable period of time, 2) analyze the policies established with 
respect to knowledge production and dissemination, and 3) retrieve adequate literature 
sources for usage in our study. Therefore, in cases where consortia are premature and still 
developing so that the period of study would be relatively too short, policies would not 
have been established to address knowledge production and/or dissemination, and where 
additional material beyond consortia websites was not available, we eliminated these 
from our original list—hence leaving us with 39 consortia.  
 
Literature sources analyzed included: peer-reviewed journal articles by consortium 
members or third-party researchers, press-releases, consortia websites, publications, 
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and/or presentations. We also were able to substantiate the data through a survey of 
directors of such consortia. (See Appendices 5 and 6) These directors were asked to 
verify the focus of research, the types of participants including private sector participants 
and communication strategies used, the sources of funding, and the existence of rules 
regarding participation, knowledge generation, knowledge dissemination, and/or 
knowledge appropriation. The appendix lists the sources of data used in each case. 
(Appendix Table 10)  
 
Data Analysis: In terms of participation, we analyzed the type of participants—namely 
from the public sector including academia, government, the non-profit, and/or private 
sector. It was important to also determine the geographic location of participants i.e., to 
determine the scale of participation. We further determined if rules existed to address 
participation i.e., who can participate and how participation is signaled as a function of 
alliance structure used.  
 
We then analyzed the research activities of each consortium. The aim was to determine 
the focus of research activities and the structure of knowledge being generated in each 
consortium. We strictly adhere to the knowledge framework and definitions outlined in 
section 3.3 (see also Table 2.1 for knowledge characteristics). 
 
Based on this knowledge analysis, we determined whether not rules exist to manage the 
dissemination of knowledge generated within each consortium. We comparatively 
analyze the rules established for the dissemination of disembodied knowledge such as 
raw data and the dissemination of embodied knowledge such as tools, reagents, and 
biomaterials.  
 
Finally, we determine the licensing arrangements used, if any, to enable the sharing of 
data, tools, reagents, and biomaterials. If appropriation occurs, a close analysis of the 
rules surrounding the patenting of knowledge assets reveals the type of participant that is 




Analysis Limitations: An extension of our consortium analysis during the chemical and 
biological paradigms should yield interesting results regarding participation within such 
alliances, the knowledge assets generated, and the management of such knowledge assets 
across paradigms. Therefore, a comparative analysis across paradigms may provide more 




3.7 Game Model Development 
Based on the consortium analysis we then develop game models to better understand the 
decision to participate in strategic alliances such as the consortium, the decision to 
appropriate knowledge from a consortium, and then the bargaining problem between a 
licensor and licensee.  
 
The decision to participate in a consortium is affected by the degree of accessibility of the 
associated knowledge. Open access ensures that knowledge will be available to all 
participants in future downstream research regardless of participation. In this case, the 
possibility exists that other participants will free-ride by enjoying knowledge disclosed at 
little or no cost, and without contributing knowledge to the alliance. Closed access, in 
contrast, ensures that knowledge is available only to contributing members of the alliance 
or consortium; therefore, a researcher outside the alliance may be unable to pool internal 
knowledge with that of the alliance or may do so only at a cost that varies according to 
the market power of the closed group. Therefore, we model the decision to participate in 
a consortium when knowledge is accessible by the public at large (public access setting) 
and when knowledge is accessible only to consortium members (restricted access 
setting).  We also consider the scenario where only two players exist to form a new 





Analysis 7.1: The objective of the participation model is to understand under what 
circumstances players choose to cooperate and join a consortium i.e., to jointly produce 
and disseminate knowledge.  
 
Once a commitment is made to participate in a consortium, researchers will face the 
decision on when to privately (and if indeed to) appropriate knowledge. In the case of 
biotechnology, appropriation most often occurs through the filing of patents. The 
common benefits from contributing to versus the private benefits associated with 
appropriating knowledge will determine when a participant will choose to signal his/her 
departure from the consortium. For example, when the private benefits from filing patents 
are higher than the common benefits from open knowledge dissemination, researchers 
will choose to defect and likely depart from the alliance [Khanna et al., 1998].  The 
probability of receiving a patent will depend on whether the knowledge is nonobvious, 
novel, and has utility and can be affected by a rival firm‘s disclosure through the creation 
of patent defeating prior art [Parchomovsky, 2000]. From a knowledge perspective, 
common benefits will derive from the characteristics associated with the knowledge and 
the value from collectively holding together the knowledge in the public domain. 
Equivalently, private benefits derive from the characteristics associated with the 
knowledge—namely the level of substitutability, complementarity, and applicability. 
Consequently, we model the decision to appropriate knowledge as knowledge 
characteristics change.  
 
Analysis 8.1: The objective of the appropriation model is to similarly understand when 
consortium participants voluntarily choose to cooperate and keep knowledge in the 
―commons‖ and/or when participants pre-emptively disclose knowledge to ensure its 
availability for downstream product development.  
 
Our third model analyzes the licensing environment where two players exist—the 
licensor and licensee. The terms of the license will be the outcome of bargaining, which 
will depend on the threat points for each player and bargaining surplus. The threat 
point—each player‘s BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement)—is the 
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expected profit he/she can guarantee itself if he/she leaves the bargaining table. The 
bargaining surplus is the total amount by which the players will be richer if bargaining is 
successful. In our model, we specifically explore the impact of knowledge characteristics 
on the licensing process. 
 
Analysis 9.1: The objective of the bargaining model is to understand whether or not a 
license is issued, when it is issued, and the type of license issued as knowledge 
characteristics change.  
 
Game Model Validation: We use various case studies as presented in our consortium 
analysis to demonstrate the utility of our participation and appropriation models. The 
game models are simple representations of firm behaviour during upstream research and 
downstream development activities. By using the case studies to validate our models, we 
are able to demonstrate their usefulness in the ―real world‖. We also use case analysis to 
model various bargaining (licensing) settings. For example, we use various knowledge 
settings by changing the characteristics of knowledge and using examples to better 
understand the decisions made by the licensor and licensee. Through the use of case 
studies we search for dominant strategies favouring cooperation or failing that, Nash 
equilibria. Future research should evaluate the stability of these equilibria regardless of 
case example.  
 
Game Model Limitations: The value of knowledge cannot be accurately measured. As 
such, we assign subjective values for knowledge and hence game payoffs only as a 
simple means to understand firm behaviour in our participation, appropriation, and 
bargaining models. Future research might include assigning values to these payoffs. 
However, we contend that these payoffs will vary according to phase of research. If 
upstream knowledge is at stake (particularly upstream knowledge that does not have 
commercial value on its own, but needs to be embodied in a downstream product), the 
private payoffs associated with unilateral knowledge production and/or appropriation 
might derive from licensing revenue. If downstream knowledge is at stake, the private 
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payoffs will likely stem not only from licensing revenues, but also profits from internal 
product development.  
 
Although, for simplicity, we chose to evaluate simultaneous decisions in our participation 
and appropriation game models, it is worthwhile to consider the impact of sequential 
decisions on 1) the decision to join an alliance and engage in cooperative knowledge 
production and 2) the decision to continue cooperation during the knowledge 
dissemination phase. Signals of cooperation are visible and (binding) cooperative 
agreements are possible in games involving sequential decisions. We do however 





Chemical paradigm: Focus of alliance activities on chemical knowledge, and on the 
traditional aspects of drug discovery including small molecule pharmaceuticals. 
 
Biological paradigm: Focus of alliance activities on biological knowledge, including 
physiology and molecular biology as well as large molecule biologics. 
 
Information paradigm: Focus of alliance activities on upstream genomics-based, 
systems-based (or other upstream) information development including information-based 
tool development.  
 
Upstream: Focus on early knowledge and/or early phase knowledge e.g. drug discovery.  
 
Downstream: Focus on the later stages of development e.g., small molecule or large 
molecule development, diagnostic, or tool development. 
 
Complementarity: New knowledge production is conditional on the identification and 




Non-substitutability: Knowledge may be lacking in direct substitutes; a researcher may 
not be able to ―invent around‖ the knowledge. 
 
Applicability: Knowledge can vary in terms of applicability in downstream use—from 
narrow to wide-ranging application. 
 
Disembodied knowledge: Pure knowledge; Can be sold in the market for technological 
knowledge in the form of patents and licenses. 
 
Embodied knowledge:  Knowledge that is applied in products and processes; Can be sold 
in the product marketplace in the form of tools, diagnostics, and drugs.  
 
Pre-discovery:  Disease related research or genomics-based research.  
 
General drug discovery: Broad drug discovery research of drug targets and leads.  
 
Tool development: Upstream or downstream tool development including the 
development of analytical tools, assays, reagents, biological materials such as cells, tissue 
samples and model organisms, databases, algorithms, techniques, protocols and 
equipment. 
 
Targeted therapeutic development: Chemical-based or biologics-based drug 
development targeting a specific disease and/or system.  
 
Combinatorial chemistry and/or screening: The rapid synthesis and screening of a large 
number of different but structurally related molecules.  
 
Process development: Small or large-scale drug process development e.g., antibody 




Open network: Knowledge network focused on upstream research; intellectual property 
rights are not important in this network.  
 
Development network: Knowledge network focused on the application of knowledge; 




Chapter 4: A Knowledge Perspective of System-Based 




In this chapter, we develop our knowledge framework to better understand the research 
and development activities associated with the current systems biology paradigm. Using 
this knowledge framework, we then analyze the appropriation activities of the public and 
private sector in this paradigm. By analyzing patenting trends across seven biological 
systems, we uncover the focus (Analysis 4.1) of and breadth of these patents (Analysis 
4.2) as well as possible downstream problems associated with the claims filed.  
 
With the completion of the Human Genome Project, systems biology or the information 
paradigm has emerged. The Human Genome Project has advanced the view that 
biological information operates on multiple hierarchical levels and is processed in 
complex networks. A new hierarchical framework for biological knowledge is being 
constructed to understand the relationships between the various levels of biological 
information.  
 
Systems biology does not focus on individual genes and proteins one at a time, but 
focuses on the behaviour and relationships of all components, in a particular biological 
system, from a functional perspective [Kitano, 2001; 2002]. Biological systems are 
fundamentally composed of information: genes, their encoded products, and the 
regulatory components controlling the expression of these genes [Ideker et al., 2001]. 
Targets that function across diseases will be selected to develop drugs that either augment 
or suppress the associated biological systems, thereby enabling for disease intervention.  
It is anticipated that blockbuster drugs will eventually target multiple systems at a 
common intervention point.  
 
In the systems biology paradigm, the focus of intellectual property rights will also 
gradually shift to the patenting of information [Hood, 2000]. This information perspective 
must incorporate an understanding of the impact of enclosing hierarchical and 
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complementary, basic biological knowledge, on the technological opportunities available 
for the development of novel medical products.  
 
 
4.2 Characterizing Systems Knowledge 
As an understanding of the interconnections between structures across systems and the 
interconnections between systems is still forming, actions that result in the enclosing of 
large research terrains are likely to have significant impact on the technological 
opportunities available for follow-on developers should patent holders not provide fair 
access to complementary knowledge.   Furthermore, research is being conducted to better 
understand biological systems, the associated pathways, and the central nodes functioning 
across systems. The greater the applicability, the higher is the likelihood that multiple 
systems, domains, and disease models will share the same pool of knowledge. The single 
structure-single function, system, or disease view is problematic as it lacks the biological 
insight that is required to correctly intervene in a system or disease [Scherer, 2000]. 
This view also distorts the incentives for both a first innovator and follow-on innovator to 
conduct further research if patent rights are granted on the basis of a single function 
[Scherer, 2000]. 
 
Organizational Hierarchy of Biological Information: The Human Genome Project has 
advanced the view that biological information operates on multiple hierarchical levels 
[Ideker et al., 2001]. From this perspective, it is no longer sufficient to develop a model 
and perform analysis at only one or two levels of biological information. Information 
storage, information processing, and the execution of the various cellular programs occur 
at the level of cell‘s genome, transcriptome, proteome, and metabolome. These building 
blocks organize themselves into recurrent patterns called pathways in genetic-regulatory 
networks [Oltvai and Barabási, 2002]. These pathways and motifs form functional 
modules or groups of nodes that are then responsible for cellular function [Oltvai and 




Modular Framework for Biological Knowledge: Scientists have accumulated vast 
amounts of genomic data, proteomic data, expression profile data, and molecular 
interaction data along the biological hierarchy. The central task is to now integrate and 
analyze these data for the purpose of biological and pharmacological discoveries. 
Clustering of data based on structure, function, patterns of expression, interactions, and 
association with biological system has become a key feature of systems biology. The 
attempt to capture systems-level laws governing cells is in fact a search for the common 
patterns that apply to complex systems and networks in general.  A modular framework 
for biology will organize systems into classes that share a common set of characteristics 























Figure 4.1: A Knowledge Perspective of Systems Biology 
M=Modules; Module Black Arrow=Internal System Relationship; Module Grey Arrow=External 





4.3 Knowledge Production in the Systems Paradigm 
Systems biology is an integrated process of computational modeling or ―dry 
experiments‖, system analysis, technology development for experiments, and quantitative 
―wet‖ experiments [Ideker et al., 2001; Kitano, 2001; 2002]. Computational biology 
involves knowledge discovery, data mining to uncover the patterns from experimental 
data, and simulation-based analyses that will test hypotheses with in silico experiments. 
 
Biological and physiological knowledge enables for the development of virtual models of 
gene networks, biochemical networks, cells, and organs. Computational ―dry‖ 
experiments test system models and related hypotheses. Data are integrated and displayed 
graphically and system responses are modeled mathematically to predict the structure and 
behaviour of informational pathways in systems. Experimental techniques are developed 
and ―wet‖ experiments are used to verify or reject hypotheses from computational 
experiments. Once sufficient information has been gained about a system, this 
experimental cycle can be applied to drug discovery research targeting the system 
[Kitano, 2001; 2002]. 
 
Given the broad scope of systems biology, collective effort is required from multiple 
research arenas including: molecular biology, cell biology, physiology, mathematics, 
physics and chemistry, computer science, electrical, mechanical, and biological 
engineering. Life sciences research has long been dominated by a culture of independent 
laboratories organized around single principal investigators. However, the need in 
systems biology for diverse skills and the complexity of the experimental technologies 
require the formation of interdisciplinary research teams [Kitano, 2002]. Teams of 
biologists, engineers, and computational scientists from the public and private sectors, 
will increasingly collaborate to handle the iterative and multi-dimensional aspects of 







4.4 Knowledge Appropriation in the Systems Paradigm 
In a systems biology network, each scientific or technical field has its own conventions 
regarding knowledge dissemination and appropriation. These conventions may not be 
identical or stable; it cannot be assumed that the conventions of all members will 
converge simply through the creation of a cross-disciplinary organizational structure 
[Hilgartner, 1996]. Knowledge can be valued as a good itself and sold in disembodied 
form as intellectual property in the market for technological knowledge. Transactions for 
embodied knowledge occur through the sale of tools, drugs, and other medical products. 
Intellectual property concerns will likely be mediated by the value placed on disembodied 
versus embodied knowledge by the participating disciplines. Measures and signals of 
success in knowledge generation activities will determine the value placed on this 
knowledge by the various disciplines. Through the development of rules to manage the 
knowledge collectively generated by these participants, the downstream opportunities for 
multiple researchers can be preserved [Hilgartner, 1996; Dalrymple, 2003]. 
 
The Transition Point: Studies indicate that scientists‘ collaborative relationships change 
according to the stage of research [Atkinson et al., 1998]. The continuum of scientific 
interactions ranges from full cooperation among all participants, to fully cooperative 
subcollaborations, to secrecy, and finally to outright competition [Atkinson et al., 1998]. 
The gene races of the past decade followed a trajectory from cooperation to competition. 
Collaboration is certainly the norm in the early phases of research. But as projects 
progress, for example as the discovery of a gene becomes imminent, the private gains 
associated with achieving priority (first to discover or first to patent) are often seen to 
exceed the common benefits of joint discovery [Davies, 2001]. While competition may 
hasten discovery, the outcome may be less than optimal, as premature enclosure of 
knowledge may prevent downstream researchers from applying it to develop diagnostics 
and therapeutics.   
 
Therefore, we define the transition point in discovery research to be the moment when 
researchers come to believe that private gains from unilateral knowledge are greater than 
shared gains from joint knowledge. The key is to find this transition point. If it occurs too 
92 
 
far upstream, holdouts and bargaining failures may make knowledge inaccessible for 
development downstream. A researcher who takes a strong ownership position with 
respect to knowledge being sought (by capturing a patent, for example), may be giving 
too little priority to the shadow of the future (the likelihood of future interactions with 
individuals whose past behaviour is known) and therefore less likely to succeed in 
bargaining for future knowledge held by erstwhile collaborators.  
 
Data Hierarchies in Systems-Based Intellectual Property: From the perspective of 
intellectual property, the challenge is to determine whether or not systems as a whole are 
patentable. In any system, there are two-dimensional and three-dimensional structures 
e.g., gene sequences and the corresponding folded protein structures respectively, as well 
as their time variant interconnections. These elements themselves are individually 
patentable. If prior patents on such structures or subsystems exist, what is then the impact 
on the patent filed to cover the entire system? Given the fact that the individual structures 
and subsystems in isolation do not provide information about a system as a whole, its 
properties, and role in disease, by mapping a system in entirety, new, possibly patentable, 
knowledge is created.  
 
Complicating the matter is the hierarchical nature of biological information in a system. 
At any level in this hierarchy, patents may exist. Depending on the breadth of patents 
filed at a particular level, these patents can dominate over other hierarchical levels of 
biological information [Hood, 2000]. Dominance of patents filed earlier in time, at the 
lowest levels of the biological information hierarchy, can hinder the incentive to progress 
into the higher levels of the hierarchy where appropriation may not be possible. 
Furthermore, if multiple researchers own patents over the structures or subsystems 
comprising a system, the system may become so fragmented that other researchers may 
no longer be able to exploit the system in its entirety [Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Foray, 
2004]. The transaction costs associated with recombining the elements that comprise the 
system, for downstream exploitation, may be too high for a downstream developer 




4.5 Analyzing Patents on Critical Cell Signaling Systems 
We selected seven systems based on their biological significance i.e., in terms of 
biological function and role in disease development, as determined from literature 
analysis, including: the Akt (Protein Kinase B), BCR-ABL, GPCR (G-Protein-Coupled 
Receptor), JAK/STAT (Janus Kinase/Signal Transducers and Activators of 
Transcription), MAP Kinase, NF-ĸB (Nuclear Factor Kappa B), and Phospholipase C 
signaling pathway, for our patent analysis. We searched the public United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) database specifically for patents with these cell signaling 
systems mentioned in their titles. Patents have been categorized by target area: structural 
patents with reference to the 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional structure of the key system 
component(s) as well as localization of the key system component(s); method or assay 
patents targeting the cell signaling systems; activator, modulator, or inhibitor patents with 
reference to the cell signaling systems; and usage patents that specifically refer to 
pharmaceutical compositions, disease intervention, or process/production patents with 
respect to the cell signaling systems.  A closer scrutiny of these patents reveals in which 
target area the greatest number of patents have been filed—an indication of the research 
trajectory as well as ownership patterns. Table 4.1 provides a collective summary of our 
analysis across these cell signaling systems.  
 
In some cases, there appears to be a primary area of focus for research. For example, in 
the case of the GPCR signaling pathway, the focus of research is on upstream information 
discovery i.e., structural components of the signaling pathway and/or the receptor itself 
followed by methods or assays associated with the signaling pathway and uses including 
the treatment of disease. Almost half of the patents filed on the Phospholipase C cell 
signaling pathway are focused on downstream applications and the other half on 
upstream discovery. In the case of the Akt, BCR, JAK, Map Kinase, and NF- ĸB 
signaling pathways, the emphasis appears to be on downstream application i.e., 
techniques/technologies that activate, modulate, or inhibit the associated pathway.  
 
In terms of patent assignee, the private sector is the primary location of research 
concerning the Akt, GPCR, Map Kinase, and Phospholipase C cell signaling pathways. 
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However, the public sector dominates in terms of research on the BCR and JAK 
pathways. Interestingly, the private and public sectors have their attention equally 
focused on the NF- ĸB pathway. 
Table 4.1: Patent Statistics for Cell Signaling Systems 
Categorization of Patents: S=Structural, MA=Method or Assay, AMI=Activator, Modulator, Inhibitor, 
U=Use; Patent Assignee: PR=Private Entity, PUB=Public Entity, IND=Individual; Totals may not add 
correctly due to multiple category placement of patents. 
 
We further analyzed each patent filed on and the associated claims for the seven cell 
signaling systems to determine the focus of research in terms of phase of activities—
upstream versus downstream, paradigm followed—chemical (with a focus on chemical 
forms of medical intervention), biological (with a focus on the use of biological processes 
and biological forms of medical intervention, namely genomic, proteomic, cellular), or 
information (with a focus on disembodied knowledge about the system, namely structural 
aspects of the systems), as well the major patent holders—public or private. Interestingly, 
our analysis revealed key institutions as owners of the majority of the patents with respect 
to each biological system. (See Appendix Tables 1 to 7 for Expanded Patent Lists and 
Associated Analysis by Phase, Paradigm, and Patent Holder.)  
 
Akt (Protein Kinase B): Akt signaling regulates cell proliferation and survival, cell 
growth (size), glucose metabolism, cell motility, and angiogenesis. Aberrant regulation of 










MA AMI U PR PUB IND 
Akt 10 1999-2006 1 0 7 2 10 0 0 
BCR 5 1994-2003 0 1 2 2 1 5 0 
GPCR 133 1993-2006 71 26 10 26 92 43 5 
JAK 14 1998-2006 
 
0 1 13 0 1 13 0 
MAP Kinase 27 1997-2006 8 3 14 2 21 6 0 
NF-ĸB 13 1998-2006 2 1 9 1 6 7 0 
Phospholipase 
C 
14 1994-2006 6 2 6 0 12 2 0 
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numerous studies testify to the frequent hyperactivation of Akt signaling in many human 
cancers [Dudek et al., 1997; Frane et al., 1997; Hemmings et al., 1997; Kauffmann-Zeh et 
al., 1997; Kulik et al., 1997; Altomare and Testa, 2005]. 
 
Phase       Paradigm  Major Patent Holder 
U D C B I P PR 
1 9 4 5 1  Merck & Co., Inc. (Rahway, NJ); Isis 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Carlsbad, CA) 
Table 4.2: Patents Held on the Akt Cell Signaling System 
U=Upstream Focus; D=Downstream Focus; C=Chemical Paradigm; B=Biological Paradigm; 
I=Information Paradigm; P=Public Institution; PR=Private Organization 
 
From our analysis it appears that the focus of U.S. patents is on downstream applications 
associated with the Akt signaling pathway. Interestingly, both the chemical and biological 
paradigms are used for downstream technology development. Merck and Co. and Isis 
Pharmaceuticals each own 4 and 3 of the 10 patents respectively.  
 
BCR-ABL: Activation of the oncogenic (cancer) potential of normal cellular proteins 
such as protein tyrosine kinases may occur by alteration of the proteins‘ corresponding 
enzymatic activities, their inappropriate binding to other cellular components, or both.   
 
For example, the BCR-ABL protein tyrosine kinase oncoprotein may transform cells via 
changes in enzyme activity and/or altering of noncovalent protein-protein interactions. 
The gene encoding the BCR-ABL oncoprotein is a chimeric oncogene generated by the 
translocation of sequences from the ABL protein tyrosine kinase on chromosome 9 into 
BCR sequences on chromosome 22 [Kurzrock et al., 1998; Rosenberg and Witte, 1998]. 
The BCR-ABL oncogene has been implicated in the patheogenesis of Philadelphia 
chromosome (Ph.sup.1) positive human leukemias. Specifically, the kinase activity of 
ABL in the abnormal BCR-ABL protein becomes activated and unregulated, thereby 
driving uncontrolled cell growth [Sattler and Griffin, 2001]. 
 
There are a variety of cellular substrates of the BCR-ABL kinase that may be involved in 





Phase       Paradigm  Major Patent Holder 
U D C B I P PR 
0 5 0 5 0 The University of Texas Systems 
(Austin, TX) 
 
Table 4.3: Patents Held on the BCR-ABL Cell Signaling System 
U=Upstream Focus; D=Downstream Focus; C=Chemical Paradigm; B=Biological Paradigm; 
I=Information Paradigm; P=Public Institution; PR=Private Organization 
 
In this case, all five patents are downstream applications associated with BCR-ABL cell 
signaling system and all five ascribe to the biological paradigm. The University of Texas 
Systems owns 3 of the 5 patents.  
 
GPCR (G-Protein-Coupled-Receptor): G-protein-coupled receptors (GPCRs) constitute 
a major class of proteins responsible for transducing a signal within a cell and are a major 
target for drug action and development [Beaumont and Negulescu, 1999]. Upon binding 
of a ligand to an extracellular portion of a GPCR, a signal is transduced within the cell 
that results in a change in a biological or physiological property of the cell [Beaumont 
and Negulescu, 1999]. 
Table 4.4: Patents Held on the GPCR Cell Signaling System 
U=Upstream Focus; D=Downstream Focus; C=Chemical Paradigm; B=Biological Paradigm; 
I=Information Paradigm; P=Public Institution; PR=Private Organization 
 
Alarmingly, more than half of the patents on the GPCR cell signaling systems are 
upstream-based, and discovery oriented applications; hence the dominance of the 
information paradigm. Interestingly, of the 62 downstream application based patents, 55 
Phase       Paradigm  Major Patent Holder 
U D C B I P PR 
71 62 7 55 71 Duke University (Durham, 
NC); The Regents of The 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA) 
Arena Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (San Diego, CA); 
Human Genome Sciences, 






PA); Takeda Chemical 
Industries, Ltd. (Osaka, 




ascribe to the biological paradigm. Of further concern, is the fact that almost half of the 
patents on these systems are owned by a concentrated number of private organizations 
and public institutions. For example, on the private side, SmithKline Beecham owns 14 
patents and on the public side, University of California owns 10 patents.  
 
JAK/STAT (Janus Kinase/Signal Transducers and Activators of Transcription):  
In mammals, the JAK/STAT pathway is the principal signaling mechanism for a wide 
array of cytokines and growth factors. JAK activation stimulates cell proliferation, 
differentiation, cell migration, and apoptosis [Igaz et al., 2001; O‘Shea, 2002]. These 
cellular events are critical to hematopoiesis, immune development, mammary gland 
development and lactation, adipogenesis, sexually dimorphic growth, and other 
processes. Mutations that reduce JAK/STAT pathway activity affect these processes [Igaz 
et al., 2001; O‘Shea, 2002].  Conversely, mutations that constitutively activate or fail to 
regulate JAK signaling properly cause inflammatory disease, erythrocytosis, gigantism, 
and an array of leukemias [Igaz et al., 2001; O‘Shea, 2002]. 
 
Phase       Paradigm  Major Patent Holder 
U D C B I P PR 
0 14 9 5 0 St. Jude Children‘s Research 
Hospital (Memphis, TN); Parker 
Hughes Institute (Roseville, MN) 
 
Table 4.5: Patents Held on the JAK/STAT Cell Signaling System 
U=Upstream Focus; D=Downstream Focus; C=Chemical Paradigm; B=Biological Paradigm; 
I=Information Paradigm; P=Public Institution; PR=Private Organization 
 
All 14 patents are downstream applications with the majority ascribing to the chemical 
paradigm. Interestingly, two public institutions—the St. Jude Children‘s Research 
Hospital and the Parker Hughes Institute own 4 and 8 out of the 14 patents, respectively.  
 
MAP KINASE (MAPK): The mitogen-activated protein kinase (MAP kinase) pathways 
consist of four major groupings and numerous related proteins which constitute 
interrelated signal transduction cascades activated by stimuli such as growth factors, 
stress, cytokines, and inflammation. The four major groupings are the ERK, JNK or 




MAPK activity is regulated through three-tiered cascades composed of a MAPK, MAPK 
kinase (MAPKK, MKK or MEK), and a MAPKK kinase or MEK kinase (MAPKKKor 
MEKK) [Chang and Karin, 2001]. MAPKs are evolutionary conserved enzymes 
connecting cell-surface receptors to critical regulatory targets within cells [Chang and 
Karin, 2001]. For example, signals from cell surface receptors such as GPCRs and 
growth factor receptors are transduced, directly or via small G proteins such as ras and 
rac, to tiers of protein kinases that amplify these signals and/or regulate each other. The 
endpoints of these cascades include the MAPK activated protein kinases (MAPKAPK) 
and some of the numerous transcription factors that regulate genes involved in apoptosis, 
inflammation, cell growth, and differentiation [Chang and Karin, 2001; Wheeler-Jones, 
2005]. 
 
Phase       Paradigm  Major Patent Holder 
U D C B I P PR 
8 19 13 6 8  Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC  
(Palo Alto, CA); Incyte, Inc. (Palo 
Alto, CA) 
Table 4.6: Patents Held on the MAP KINASE (MAPK) Cell Signaling System 
U=Upstream Focus; D=Downstream Focus; C=Chemical Paradigm; B=Biological Paradigm; 
I=Information Paradigm; P=Public Institution; PR=Private Organization 
 
In this case, 19 out of the 27 patents focus on downstream applications of the cell 
signaling system. Although the majority use the chemical paradigm for technology 
development, 8 are upstream, discovery-based patents focused on the structural 
(informational) aspects of this cell signaling systems; 7 of these 8 upstream patents are 
owned by private organizations.  
 
NF-ĸB (Nuclear Factor Kappa B): The Nuclear Factor -ĸB (NF-ĸB) cell signaling 
pathway is a key biological component described in more than 5,000 scholarly papers and 
a convergent pathway for a number of stimuli that impact cells. There is a great deal of 
interest in this signal transduction pathway in the biopharmaceutical industry. Given the 
central effector role that this pathway occupies for a number of cell-surface receptors, it is 
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an important drug target as well as proxy for other effector molecules located on the 
pathway [Ashok et al., 2004; Coutois and Gilmore, 2006].  
 
The Nuclear Factor -ĸB is a nuclear transcription factor that regulates the expression of a 
large number of genes that are critical for the regulation of cell death, viral replication, 
tumorigenesis, inflammation, and various autoimmune diseases [Ashok et al., 2004; 
Coutois and Gilmore, 2006]. Companies are researching how to prevent the activation of 
NF-ĸB and the subsequent expression of select disease-associated genes responsible for 
the onset and progression of cancer, autoimmune, inflammatory, neurological, and 
cardiovascular diseases [Ashok et al., 2004; Coutois et al., 2006]. Various small molecule 
inhibitors are being sought to modulate or inhibit targets within this signal transduction 
pathway. 
  
Phase       Paradigm  Major Patent Holder 
U D C B I P PR 
2 11 7 6 2 7 7 
Table 4.7: Patents Held on the NF-ĸB (Nuclear Factor Kappa B)  
Cell Signaling System 
U=Upstream Focus; D=Downstream Focus; C=Chemical Paradigm; B=Biological Paradigm; 
I=Information Paradigm; P=Public Institution; PR=Private Organization 
 
While our patent analysis reveals that the majority of patents filed on this cell signaling 
system are downstream applications, adhering to both the chemical and biological 
paradigms, this system is an interesting case by virtue of one patent filed and exclusively 
licensed by three public institutions. From this one patent case we learn that it may not 
simply be a matter of several patents filed on a cell signaling system, but the case of one 
patent with broad claims covering the system including intervention mechanisms, that 
can be the source of downstream conflict.  
 
U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 on the NF-κB cell signaling system is assigned to Harvard 
College (Cambridge, MA), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, MA), 
and the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research (Cambridge, MA). The patent 
claims cover methods of treating human disease by regulating NF-κB activity, methods of 
treating disease by inhibiting NF-κB, and methods useful for treating various disease 
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conditions through modulation of NF-κB activity. The associated patent on the upstream 
system itself was awarded in 2002, with claims that may cover almost every putative 
downstream application of this fundamental signaling pathway. Licensed to Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals in 2002, Ariad sued Eli Lilly, arguing that Lilly‘s Evista and Xigris 
products for osteoporosis and sepsis, approved in 1997 and 2001 respectively, infringe 
upon their patent since the drugs work via the NF-ĸB pathway [Rai and Eisenberg, 2003]. 
A federal jury ruled on May 4th 2006 that Eli Lilly & Company had infringed the NF-ĸB 
patent covering drugs that work on this basic biological pathway, and ordered Lilly to pay 
$65.2 million in back royalties to Ariad Pharmaceuticals [Mack, 2006]. A separate trial, 
or bench trial, however, commenced before the judge on August 7th 2006 on certain 
defenses asserted by Lilly relating to the validity and enforceability of the claims of the 
patent; these defenses must be addressed before the court enters a final judgment in this 
lawsuit [Civil Action No. 02 CV 11280 RWZ, 2006]. Interestingly in June 2005, the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) also commenced a reexamination of the U.S. 
patent. In the reexamination, the USPTO has asserted that there exists a substantial new 
question of patentability for certain claims of the patent [Re-examination C.N. 
90/007,503]. 
 
Describing a system and its informational pathways are critical for treating a disease, but 
legal scholars are unsure whether the value of this information is equivalent to 
discovering and developing a drug that acts on the biological pathway to effectively treat 
the disease. Legal scholars are divided on whether the discovery of a biological pathway 
is sufficient in itself to merit the granting of a broad patent that lays claim to any 
treatment acting on the pathway. The case of the Nuclear Factor-ĸB (NF-ĸB) cell 
signaling pathway relates directly to these questions. Lawyers contend that the breadth 
and assertiveness of the patent filed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
the Whitehead Institute of Biomedical Research, and Harvard University and then 
exclusively licensed to Ariad Pharmaceuticals, could signal a paradigm shift among 
academic research institutions that have historically collaborated with other researchers 
[Rai and Eisenberg, 2003]. Such institutions could collect patents and use such patents 
against other researchers, blocking off research pathways in the hopes of 
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commercializing their discoveries [Rai and Eisenberg, 2003]. If it is not possible to 
circumvent the enclosed pathway, then the market power conferred to the owner of such a 
broad patent will be very strong, leaving follow-on innovators who cannot license the 
knowledge in a weak position with regard to downstream activities. 
 
PHOSPHOLIPASE C: Phospholipase C (PLC) belongs to a family of enzymes, also 
known as disulfide isomerases, which play an important role in mediating signal 
transduction pathways. Many extracellular signaling molecules including hormones, 
growth factors, neurotransmitters, and immunoglobulin bind to their respective cell 
surface receptors and activate PLCs [Nishizuka, 1992; Nishizuka, 1995]. Its main 
function is to hydrolyze phosphatidylinositoldiphosphate into diacylglycerol (DG) and 
inositoltriphosphate (IP3). DG is necessary for further activation of Protein Kinase C 
(PKC) while IP3 leads to the release of intracellular calcium. PKC activation is known to 
be involved in diverse array of cellular responses in the endocrine, exocrine, nervous, 
muscular, inflammatory, and immune systems [Nishizuka, 1992; Nishizuka, 1995].  
 
Phase       Paradigm  Major Patent Holder 
U D C B I P PR 
6 8 3 5 6  Merck & Co., Inc.; Kyowa Hakko 
Kogyo Co., Ltd. (Tokyo, JP) 
Table 4.8: Patents Held on the Phospholipase C Cell Signaling System 
U=Upstream Focus; D=Downstream Focus; C=Chemical Paradigm; B=Biological Paradigm; 
I=Information Paradigm; P=Public Institution; PR=Private Organization 
 
In this case, almost half of the patents are focused on downstream applications and the 
other half on upstream, discoveries; the majority of patents ascribe to the biological or 
information paradigm. Once again, problems may exist on the horizon due to the number 




Systems biology attempts to understand the interactions and informational flow between 
structures in the cell. Data from various hierarchical levels of biological information will 
be incorporated into the modeling of systems. Each level of information builds on 
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information found at lower levels in this hierarchy. Consequently, system biology uses 
cumulative knowledge to build models, providing positive externalities to researchers 
who can use this knowledge to generate and embody the knowledge in new products. 
Given the uncertainty associated with the function of the structures that comprise a 
system and the role of a system in disease, the incentives to find the full breadth of a 
system‘s properties and functions should be preserved for multiple researchers. Blocks, 
holdouts, and bargaining failures are all possible if a first innovator is granted an 
excessively broad patent, conferring strong market power over downstream research.  
Blocking critical pathways whose functions are yet to be discovered can reduce the 
opportunity to develop novel and more effective medical products. Despite the fact that 
existing patent law allows a researcher who has discovered a new, nonobvious, and useful 
process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter to receive a patent, is 
the discovery of a system and putative function enough to enclose not only the system but 
also all possible medical developments that arise from the system?  
 
These complexities will be exacerbated as multiple disciplines increasingly work together 
in the systems biology paradigm. Each discipline will have its own priorities and 
conventions regarding knowledge dissemination and knowledge appropriation. One 
discipline may signal its success during knowledge generation through enclosure and the 
sale of disembodied knowledge. Another discipline may measure its success exclusively 
by the embodiment of knowledge. As collaborations cross institutional boundaries, the 
parceling out of intellectual property rights may be too difficult a task. With the 
assignment of property rights, the role of the patent holder in providing broad versus 
narrow access to the knowledge will then depend on the original incentives for producing 
the knowledge.  
 
Table 4.9 describes these problems and offers solutions to the challenges presented in 
systems biology. With the transition to a systems biology paradigm, the research 




In Chapter 5 we broaden our framework to generally understand the evolution of 
biological knowledge structures across paradigms including the systems (information) 
paradigm and the impact of knowledge structures generally on the formation of upstream 
research-based alliances. We further analyze how upstream research-based alliances 
(including appropriation targets within alliances) in the public and private sectors have 
evolved with drug discovery and development paradigms. 




Problem Possible Solution 
Cross-Disciplinary 
Research 
Differing conventions by 




Early establishment of rules to 
manage knowledge activities. 
Complexity of Research Need for access to 
complementary expertise & 
information 
Networks of collaboration;  
Cross-licensing. 
Composition of Matter 
Patents for Biological 
Information 
 
Upstream, basic patents 
assigned. 
Better understanding of the 
patenting of disembodied 
knowledge i.e. informational 





Unknown function and 
interconnections in system 
when patenting. 
Protection for narrower patent 
claims; Non-exclusive licensing. 
New Organizational 
Hierarchy of Biological 
Information 
 
Dominance of patents filed 
on genes and proteins (lower 
level of hierarchy) over 
biological systems (higher 
level of hierarchy). 
Protection for narrower patent 




Unknown role of system and 
its structures across diseases. 
Protection for narrower patent 




Chapter 5: A Knowledge Perspective of Strategic Alliances  
 
5.1 Introduction 
A rapidly evolving drug discovery and development paradigm, as evidenced through the 
scientific and technical knowledge requirements for the successful development of new 
medical entities, is encouraging companies to form alliances to fill gaps in their upstream 
knowledge and/or downstream capabilities [Gambardella, 1995; Greis et al., 1995]. 
Alliances between academic institutions, biotechnology companies, and pharmaceutical 
companies provide access to complementary assets [Teece, 1986; 1992].  In resource-
based alliances, parties are assumed to be mutually dependent upon the resources 
controlled by other parties and common benefits are associated with pooling resources 
[Powell, 1990; Das and Teng, 2000]. Mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances such 
as joint ventures, represent alternative strategies that may be used to acquire or access 
these resources [Child and Faulkner, 1998; Kogut, 1998; Das and Teng, 2000]. It is our 
contention however, that a framework that is centrally focused on knowledge will provide 
a nuanced view of pharmaceutical alliances in the post Human Genome era.  [Hall, 1992; 
Liebeskind et al., 1996; Mowery et al., 1996; Reid et al., 2001; Foray, 2004].  
 
As the pharmaceutical industry transitions into the systems biology paradigm, the nature 
of biological knowledge, namely the complementary nature of upstream biological 
knowledge, its complexity in terms of function, and its breadth of application, will 
encourage the formation of strategic alliances to ensure equitable access to knowledge for 
future product development. Strong early-mover advantages in drug development rest on 
the ability to rapidly identify, access, and integrate new combinations of knowledge 
[Antonelli, 2003; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004].  Where products require a broad range 
of different types of knowledge, efficiency of integration is maximized through separate 
firms specializing in different knowledge areas that are linked by strategic alliances 
[Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004]. Consequently, many pharmaceutical companies are 
reconsidering their strategies with respect to upstream, pre-competitive, discovery 




We use our knowledge framework in this chapter to specifically analyze the role of 
knowledge characteristics on biopharmaceutical alliance formation, the role of 
knowledge form on the choice of alliance structure, as well as the impact of knowledge 
valuation as a function of knowledge form, on alliance performance.  Our proposed 
knowledge view of biopharmaceutical alliances, not only advances the notion of 
knowledge access as a strong motivator for interfirm alliances, but also closely analyzes 
the nature of knowledge structures and the process of knowledge generation in the 
biopharmaceutical industry as impacting the need for knowledge access.  We begin with 
a discussion of the resource-based view of strategic alliances and role of resource 
characteristics and types on alliance formation [Das and Teng, 2000]. We then outline the 
traditional view of complementary assets as encouraging biopharmaceutical alliances and 
discuss how, in the information paradigm of drug discovery and development, the need 
exists to view these alliances specifically from a knowledge perspective. 
 
Then using the Recombinant Capital Alliances Database, a private, searchable database 
of almost 13,000 strategic alliances, we analyze discovery-based/early research-based 
biopharmaceutical alliances covering the period from 1980 to 2005 [www.recap.com, 
2006]. Through our preliminary analysis, we discover that the focus of research in public-
private alliances favours the biological paradigm across time periods. With respect to 
private alliances, of interest is the continued focus on the chemical paradigm in the later 
periods of our analysis. Appropriation activities across the chemical and biological 
paradigms tend to focus on downstream, application oriented discoveries. However, the 
relative frequency of licenses on upstream oriented knowledge and discoveries when the 
focus of research is information-based warrants closer scrutiny to determine if problems 
exist on the horizon for downstream development of products based on these patents.  
 
 
5.2 A Resource-Based View of Strategic Alliances 
A resource-based view of strategic alliances considers resource characteristics and the 
impact of value maximization through the pooling of such resources as encouraging the 
formation of alliances. Imperfect mobility, imperfect imitability, and imperfect 
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substitutability of required resources are instrumental in the decision to form an alliance 
with firms that own these resources [Barney, 1991; Das and Teng, 2000]. Strategic 
alliances become critical institutional mechanisms to facilitate the pooling of, sharing of, 
and exchanging of valuable resources with other firms when these resources cannot be 
acquired efficiently through market transactions or mergers and acquisitions [Gulati, 
1995; Ramanathan et al., 1997; Das and Teng, 2000].  
 
Barney (1991) describes firm resources as ―all assets, capabilities, organizational 
processes, firm attributes, information, and knowledge controlled by a firm that enable 
the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and 
effectiveness‖. Imperfectly mobile and imitable resources provide firms with competitive 
advantage through the provision of sustainable economic rents, assuming that the 
resources have no substitutes or strategic equivalents [Barney, 1991; Chi, 1994].  Kogut‘s 
(1998) organizational learning model further suggests that alliance formation is intended 
to either acquire another firm‘s ―know-how‖ or to augment one‘s know-how by 
benefiting from the other firm‘s knowledge or technology. Kogut also argues that 
opportunities for interfirm transfer of knowledge or technology will influence the choice 
of strategic alliance structure used.    
 
For example, a firm will favour acquisitions over joint ventures when the resources 
required are not commingled with other unneeded resources within the firm that 
possesses them [Hennert and Reddy, 1997]. Hennert and Reddy refer to such resources as 
―digestible‖. In contrast, strategic alliances such as joint ventures are used when required 
resources are owned by different firms and when these resources are inseparable from 
other resources owned by a firm [Ramanathan et al., 1997]. It has also been suggested 
that appropriability problems will impact the decision to choose a more hierarchical 
alliance structure. Indeed, where appropriability problems are sufficiently high, vertical 
integration will be preferred to collaborative innovation [Teece, 1986; Pisano et al., 1998; 
Oxley, 1999]. Firms may be hesitant to share their knowledge or technology through 
collaborative alliances when legal protection of these resources is uncertain, unless this 




Characteristics of Resources: The resource-based view suggests that firm resource 
heterogeneity can be a source of sustained competitive advantage [Barney, 1991]. 
Resource characteristics that prevent firms from achieving resource homogeneity include: 
imperfect mobility, imperfect imitability, and imperfect substitutability [Barney, 1991; 
Chi, 1994; Das and Teng, 2000]. Imperfect mobility refers to the difficulty associated 
with transferring resources from one firm to another. Peteraf (1993) describes this as 
specificity—the condition that a resource is so specialized to one firm that it is either not 
tradable at all or is imperfectly tradable.  For example, tacit knowledge can lose its value 
if transferred from one organizational context to another. Imperfect imitability is 
associated with the notion of causal ambiguity—where the precise nature of the causal 
connection between a resource and the competitive advantage it confers is not visible to 
outside firms [Barney, 1991; Chi, 1994; Das and Teng, 2000]. Competitive advantage is 
sustained when the firm that possesses the resource has better knowledge of these causal 
connections [Chi, 1994]. Firms also enjoy sustainable competitive advantage when 
resources have no strategic equivalents and are themselves rare and imperfectly imitable 
[Barney, 1991]. In the pharmaceutical industry, small biotechnology firms collaborate 
with large pharmaceutical companies to gain access to resources such as clinical trial 
networks, marketing and distribution channels, and regulatory know-how, which 
represent resources that are immobile, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable [Arora 
and Gambardella, 1990; Greis et al., 1995; Powell et al., 1996; Das and Teng, 2000].  
 
Types of Resources: Barney (1991) classifies firm resources into physical capital 
resources, human capital resources, and organizational capital resources. However, for 
our purposes, we consider the Miller and Shamsie classification (1996) most appropriate. 
Miller and Shamsie classify resources into two broad categories: property-based 
resources and knowledge-based resources. Property-based resources are legal properties 
owned by a firm including financial capital, physical resources, and human resources. 
Owners enjoy clear property rights relating to these resources or rights to use these 
resources. Knowledge-based resources typically refer to a firm‘s intangible know-how 
and skills. Tacit knowledge and technological resources fall into this category [Hall, 
108 
 
1992]. The central difference between property-based resources and knowledge-based 
resources is that protection of knowledge is not perfect. Knowledge-based resources are 
vulnerable to unintended transfers and as a result, appropriation problems [Arrow, 1962]. 
The protection of such knowledge-based resources has traditionally been a critical 
concern when forming alliances [Hamel, 1991; Mowery et al., 1996]. In contrast, 
property-based resources enjoy near-perfect legal protection.  
 
Alliance Structures: Concerns about protecting knowledge-based resources in strategic 
alliances will impact both the decision as to whether to form an alliance and the structural 
choice for the alliance.  From the resource-based perspective, firms are not only 
interested in accessing or acquiring complementary assets, but are also interested in 
protecting their own resources and knowledge in an alliance [Hamel, 1991; Mowery et 
al., 1996]. Hierarchical structures, including equity based alliances, may be used to 
monitor the behaviour of alliance partners, limit a partner firm‘s use of knowledge or 
technology, enable learning across firms, and encourage adherence to the spirit of any 
agreement between firms [Pisano et al., 1989; Oxley, 1999].  
 
In strategic alliances such as joint R&D, joint production and joint marketing, and 
bilateral contract-based alliances, more opportunities exist for learning and interfirm 
knowledge transfer than in unilateral contract-based alliances such as licensing and 
subcontracting [Das and Teng, 2000]. In such alliances, partner firms work closely 
together, pooling resources, and sharing knowledge. Property-based or knowledge-based 
resources can be contributed by member firms to the alliance. However, it has been 
suggested that once learning and interfirm knowledge transfer has been accomplished, 
alliances are terminated, with each firm progressing unilaterally thereafter [Khanna et al., 
1998]. Firms engaged in a knowledge transfer alliance must therefore take care to avoid a 
premature learning or development race [Hamel, 1991; Larsson et al., 1998].  
 
Unilateral contract-based alliances are preferred when partners are contributing property-
based resources to the alliance. These alliances can include licensing, subcontracting, and 
distribution agreements. In such alliances, there is essentially an exchange of property 
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rights e.g., intellectual property rights for licensing fees, royalties, or the future right to 
licenses on downstream applications of the original intellectual property [Eisenberg, 
1996; Das and Teng, 2000; Kieff, 2003]. Unilateral alliances create fewer opportunities 
for knowledge transfer as firms are expected to perform independently without much 
coordination or collaboration [Mowery et al., 1996, Das and Teng 2000]. 
 
The Performance of Alliances: The resource-based view suggests that competitive 
advantage is derived from the effective integration of partner firms‘ resources. The 
manner in which resources are aggregated will significantly impact the performance of 
the alliance [Hagedoorn, 1993]. Researchers have discussed the role of complementary or 
supplementary resources in alliance performance and the degree to which contributed 
resources are utilized for achieving alliance goals. Resource alignment between partners 
is supplementary when firms contribute similar resources, thereby creating greater value 
from the collective pooling of resources. Complementary alignment occurs when partners 
bring distinctive complementary assets to the alliance and synergy is created through a 
recombination of resources. Both supplementary and complementary alignments have a 
positive effect on alliance performance. The capacity to take advantage of these positive 
externalities will in turn determine if alliance goals are achieved [Das and Teng, 2000].  
 
However, the incentive to invest resources will differ as the alliance evolves. Common 
benefits are those that will accrue to each partner firm in an alliance from the collective 
pooling of resources and collective learning that partners experience. Private benefits are 
those that a firm can earn unilaterally by learning from another firm. By pooling a partner 
firm‘s resources and knowledge with internal firm resources and knowledge, a firm can 
gain a competitive advantage to progress unilaterally in downstream activities. Once a 
firm has learned enough from a partner it has no incentive to continue participating in the 
alliance and as such, it will choose to terminate the alliance. However, studies do indicate 
that if there is no incentive for a leading firm to quit or exit an alliance once it achieves 
private benefits, the laggard firm may not be locked out from the alliance or denied 
access to the full set of resources and knowledge [Khanna et al., 1998]. The situation can 
arise when there is an expectation of future common benefits and future interactions 
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between firms [Khanna et al., 1998]. Therefore, the structure of mechanisms for 
knowledge transfer and the transparency of motives during knowledge production are 
crucial to the sharing of knowledge [Larsson et al., 1998]. 
 
 
5.3 A Nuanced View of Strategic Alliances 
Alliances between biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies are often viewed from 
the perspective of complementary assets. When firms possess what Teece called 
complementary assets and where these assets are bound up in tacit or firm-specific 
knowledge, firms seek collaborations [Teece, 1986]. Academic institutions and 
biotechnology companies supply new insight and ideas for drug pipelines, validate drug 
targets, and develop compounds, therapies, and technologies. Large traditional 
pharmaceutical manufacturers possess complementary research capabilities such as large 
research assets not available in smaller biotech companies [Starpoli, 1998]. This division 
of labour allows small biotechnology firms to focus on upstream research and large 
pharmaceutical companies to gain access to novel technologies by exploiting their large-
scale development advantages.  
 
In the pharmaceutical industry, the development of many new drugs hinges upon 
advances in molecular biology and genetic engineering. As a result, research activity that 
adheres to the molecular biology paradigm (and now the information paradigm) often 
requires network-like alliances between academic institutions, biotechnology companies, 
and traditional drug manufacturers [Bower and Whittaker, 1992; Powell et al., 1996; 
Blumenthal et al., 1997]. The genomics era has further highlighted the need for 
partnerships that are broad and cross institutional boundaries. For example, genomics- 
based research is producing new drug targets that are unmanageable by even the largest 
of pharmaceutical companies [Roses, 2002]. Therefore, the breadth of upstream research 
to be conducted to ensure successful downstream drug development, particularly in a 
decade marked by shrinking pipelines and blockbuster drug patent expirations, has 




Genes, proteins, biological systems, and their associated patents are strategic knowledge-
based assets [Blumenthal, 1992; Powell et al., 1998; Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Jackson, 
2003]. The importance of these knowledge-based assets, combined with the increased 
complexity of molecular and systems-based knowledge, is encouraging the view that 
alliances between firms in this industry should be viewed centrally from a knowledge-
based perspective [Hood, 2000; Reid et al., 2001]. Our knowledge framework provides a 
nuanced understanding of the cooperation between academic institutions, biotechnology 
companies, and pharmaceutical companies during the drug discovery research and 
development process. Although the extent to which critical knowledge assets are 
protected governs the decision to engage in these alliances, it is interesting to observe, 
that many biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies also promote and engage in 
alliances that are committed to open source drug discovery—through which discoveries 
are made freely available to researchers. We anticipate that the decision to engage in open 
source drug discovery is a function of the structure of the associated knowledge in 
addition to the nature of the intellectual property rights associated with the knowledge in 
question. Specifically, biological knowledge characteristics are thought to impact the 
decision to participate in an alliance; the form of biological knowledge to be produced 
will impact the type of alliance structure; and the value placed on the knowledge by 
participating firms in an alliance will impact the performance of the alliance. It is 
important to note that the nature, strength, and perceived value of biological knowledge 
are likely to be dynamically determined by the existing state of knowledge. 
 
5.3.1 Knowledge Characteristics and Alliance Formation 
The transformation of knowledge from a purely public good to a quasi-private good has 
highlighted the need for balance between incentives for the market provision of scientific 
and technological knowledge by a first innovator and incentives for the market provision 
of incremental knowledge by a follow-on developer [Scotchmer, 1991; Caskey, 1996; 
Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Scherer, 2000]. The possibilities for holdouts and the 
likelihood of high transaction costs associated with gaining the right to use knowledge in 
downstream activities, increase as a function of the complementarity, non-substitutability, 
and applicability of upstream knowledge [Merges, 1994; 1996]. Holdouts occur when 
112 
 
buyers need to acquire complementary assets from sellers and sellers raise their prices to 
capture some of the value buyers attribute to collectively holding the assets [Merges, 
1994]. Bargaining failures occur when the first innovator and follow-on developer are 
unable to reach an agreement regarding access to knowledge and the rights to future 
developments [Merges, 1994]. 
 
Complementarity: Drug discovery research has become associated with a high level of 
knowledge complexity as the sources of knowledge are diverse and derive from a wide 
variety of scientific fields and technological competencies.  The chance of generating 
new knowledge and embodying knowledge in products or processes may be conditional 
on the ability to access and then piece together a significant variety of complementary 
research inputs [Scotchmer, 1991; Foray, 2004]. Upstream complementarity occurs 
among research inputs during the generation of new knowledge while downstream 
complementarity occurs in the development phase during the application of new 
knowledge [Antonelli, 2003]. Complementary knowledge can be used to generate new 
knowledge in the same context or in other adjacent ones. Knowledge will be pooled from 
the public domain or from owners of the knowledge willing to trade at a reasonable cost.  
 
Non-substitutability: Non-substitutability occurs when knowledge is discovered rather 
than invented. The ability to invent around knowledge will determine whether or not new 
knowledge can be generated and then embodied by follow-on researchers that do not 
directly own the knowledge. The discovery of facts from nature, as is associated with 
many of the informational, upstream, research inputs in genomics, cannot be substituted. 
These research inputs can be discovered and then used to generate new knowledge. As 
the centrality of this type knowledge to the research domain, biological system, or disease 
increases, the ability to substitute for or access knowledge will be critical for continued 
medical progress. When follow-on innovators cannot develop or obtain substitute 
knowledge, first innovators can potentially extract high rents for rights to access and use 
their knowledge. If the anticipated rent is higher than the value placed on the non-
substitutable knowledge by the follow-on researcher, bargaining failures are possible. 
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Consequently, excess appropriability can slow down if not impede downstream 
knowledge access and generation. 
 
Applicability: Research activities are characterized by high levels of risk and uncertainty 
in terms of both generating knowledge and then in terms of applying knowledge in 
downstream activities. In the genomics arena, a great deal of uncertainty exists with 
respect to the role of genes in disease susceptibility and progression, the hierarchy of 
proteins in any system, and the function of such genes and proteins during drug 
intervention. The simple discovery of a gene and its sequence do not necessarily provide 
this information. In one scenario, this knowledge may have a limited, specific role in one 
disease or system and in another scenario, the gene and its encoding products may have a 
central role across multiple diseases or drug intervention pathways. Given the functional 
uncertainty of this upstream knowledge, it can be difficult to assess ex-ante the economic 
value stemming from the putative application of biological knowledge in downstream 
activities [Dutfield, 2003]. As patent holders may not be aware ex-ante what knowledge 
will be key in disease development or drug intervention, patent holders should be willing 
to provide access to this biological knowledge at a fair price. 
 
From the perspective of knowledge access, in an increasingly complex drug discovery 
and development paradigm, firms will form strategic alliances to ensure equitable access 
to upstream biological knowledge. Studies indicate that cooperation levels are greatest 
when alliance members are asked to contribute to a public good that is indivisible. 
Generating a public good such as knowledge that is indivisible and in the case of 
biological knowledge, possibly non-substitutable, will likely reinforce a sense of group 
identity and interdependency among alliance members [Kollock, 1998]. If the value of 
the knowledge increases with joint production, cooperative behaviour is optimal. The 
shadow of the future in terms of knowledge access and transaction costs to invent, should 
knowledge be fragmented, will also moderate the temptation to defect and encourage 




From the two-dimensional information of the gene, to the three-dimensional information 
of proteins, biological research has moved into the fourth dimension of observing and 
mapping the time variant information present in biological systems [Hood, 2000]. Of 
particular importance will be the ability to follow the flow of information along the 
pathways that comprise such systems. To map this flow of information, complex systems 
will be divided into subsystems whose properties and interactions are observable. From 
each subsystem, the structures within each subsystem will be identified along with their 
interconnections with other structures. Ultimately, the flow of information from 
subsystem to subsystem will be mapped and modeled, thereby enabling researchers to 
decipher the structure of the informational pathway and the resulting system properties.  
 
In Figure 5.1, we use a graphical example to demonstrate the possible connections 
between knowledge units across five hypothetical projects/systems. Across these five 
projects/systems (1-5) knowledge units (A-E) have varied applicability. In this case, 
knowledge units A and E are substitutable with each other. Where knowledge unit A or E 
(e.g. isoforms of a proteomic sequence) applies to a project, knowledge unit B (e.g. 
corresponding genomic sequence) is also applicable to the same project as it is 
complementary to knowledge units A or E.  Knowledge unit D (e.g. a regulatory 
component) has applicability across all projects. Whereas, knowledge unit C is centrally 
important only across projects 1, 3, and 5—serving as the point of medical intervention 
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Figure 5.1: Linking Knowledge Structures  
Letters=Knowledge Units; Numbers=Projects; E(As)=Substitutable Version of Knowledge Unit A; Solid 
Grey Box (Knowledge Units A and E)=Substitutable Knowledge Units; Patterned Grey Box (Knowledge 
Unit B)=Complementary Knowledge Box (A or E Complementary to B); Black Box=Medical Intervention 
Point 
 
5.3.2 Knowledge Form and the Choice of Alliance Structure 
Knowledge may serve as an input into further development and the creation of new 
knowledge or serve as a component of the final embodiment of research and development 
activities. As knowledge evolves from the idea stage, through the research process, 
disembodied knowledge or pure knowledge is generated. Knowledge that is applied can 
be embodied in products and processes. Biological inputs such as genes, proteins, and 
drug targets as well as tools such as biological materials, databases, and analytical tools 
feed into the drug discovery and development process [Walsh et al., 2003]. Medical 
diagnostics embody knowledge of research inputs such as genes and proteins, to detect 
disease susceptibility and disease progression, as well as to predict therapeutic response. 
As research progresses further downstream, chemical based libraries are created from 
which drugs are sought, or biological therapeutics such as recombinant proteins, 
monoclonal antibodies, and even gene delivery are developed to correct malfunctioning 
processes. These therapeutic products are also embodiments of upstream discovery 
knowledge.  
 
Mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances are used to gain access to both tacit and 
codified molecular knowledge, and tend to be associated with downstream knowledge-
knowledge that is used for the purpose of medical application development [Greis et al., 
1995; Das and Teng, 2000]. Upstream knowledge that is far removed from commercial 
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application is typically developed through research-based partnerships between 
universities, biotechnology companies, and pharmaceutical companies [Arora and 
Gambardella, 1990; Blumenthal, 1992; Senker and Sharp, 1997].  
 
Knowledge-based networks are communities of individuals with the objectives of 
producing and disseminating knowledge. Norms or rules for knowledge sharing and 
knowledge appropriation are necessary in networks with varied types of researchers 
[Ostrom et al., 1994; Liebeskind et al., 1996]. Knowledge networks enable multiple 
researchers to pool assets, know-how, and expertise for the purpose of knowledge 
generation, knowledge validation, and new wealth creation [Powell et al., 1996; Reid et 
al., 2001]. The ability to generate new wealth depends on the capacity of researchers to 
learn from other researchers in a knowledge network or alliance. Asymmetric learning 
can lead to disappointing performance in a network or alliance [Larsson et al., 1998]. The 
formation of trust, through repeated interactions and communication between the 
researchers, will facilitate knowledge exchange and adherence to network norms 
[Merton, 1957; Axelrod, 1985; Merges, 1996].  
 
5.3.3 The Valuation of Knowledge, Knowledge Appropriation and Performance of 
Alliances  
Once a commitment is made to participate in a strategic alliance, firms will face the 
decision as to when (or indeed if) to privately appropriate knowledge. Appropriation most 
often occurs through the decision to formally patent knowledge. The common benefits 
from contributing knowledge to an alliance versus the private benefits associated with 
unilaterally appropriating knowledge from an alliance will impact the performance of the 
alliance and will determine when a firm will choose to signal its exit [Axelrod, 1985; 
Gulati et al., 1994; Gulati, 1995]. A higher ratio of private to common benefits is likely to 
lead to departures from cooperation in favour of defection or competitive behaviour, 
despite the original agreement to adhere to the norms associated with an alliance [Ostrom 
et al., 1994; Lerner, 1995; Atkinson et al., 1998; Khanna et al., 1998].  However, 
depending on the characteristics associated with the knowledge, accessibility may be 
required for multiple researchers to progress further downstream in the development of 
diagnostics and therapeutics.  The key is then to find the transition point.  The occurrence 
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of the transition point too far upstream may lead to holdouts and bargaining failures for 
access to and use of knowledge in downstream research. 
 
The decision to sell disembodied knowledge in the form of patents and licenses can 
complement or substitute for the sale of embodied knowledge. Substitution occurs when 
the profits from the sale of disembodied knowledge are greater than those from the sale of 
embodied knowledge [Antonelli, 2003; Arora and Fosfuri, 2003]. For example, when the 
costs of internal coordination of the knowledge are larger than the transaction costs 
associated with the market for technical knowledge, or when special assets are required to 
progress further downstream, the patent holder may chose to maximize revenue through a 
licensing strategy, specifically an exclusive licensing strategy [Teece, 1986; Antonelli, 
2003]. Complementarity between the sale of disembodied knowledge and internal 
embodiment occurs when knowledge possesses high applicability and it is possible to 
operate in different markets from other licensees of the knowledge [Teece, 1986; Arora 
and Fosfuri, 2003, Foray, 2004]. In this case, a non-exclusive licensing strategy can 
ensure that multiple participants can pursue multiple streams of research. Furthermore, 
cross-licensing is a useful governance mechanism when knowledge exhibits high levels 
of complementarity [Shapiro, 2001]. With downstream activities dependent on the 
recombination of a variety of knowledge, the cost of the coordination including 
accumulation of the full range of required knowledge may be too high for one researcher 
[Antonelli, 2003; Burk and Lemley, 2003]. Specifically, the capabilities of the one 
researcher may only cover a portion of the research domain. Consequently, researchers 
may find it profitable to engage in cross-licensing for knowledge. However, the ability 
for each researcher to access knowledge depends on the amount and type of proprietary 
knowledge each one is able to contribute in any bargaining event [Antonelli, 2003]. 
 
Bargaining stalemates are especially likely when the first innovator has been awarded a 
broad patent covering follow-on development [Roberto and Nelson, 1998].  This broad 
protection can lead to deficient incentives to develop second-generation knowledge or 
products. The second innovator who cannot progress downstream without a license is in a 
very weak bargaining position. The situation is troublesome particularly when first 
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generation knowledge does not have commercial value by itself, but needs to be 
recombined with other knowledge [Merges 1994; Antonelli, 2003]. The second 
innovator, who plans to invest substantial sums in downstream activities including 
testing, gaining regulatory approval, and marketing, will demand that he/she receive the 
lion‘s share of the revenue from these activities [Scherer, 2002]. In contrast, the first 
innovator with the ability to completely block development will demand an incompatibly 
large share [Scherer, 2002]. 
 
In Figure 5.2, we extend our previous example to demonstrate the impact of knowledge 
appropriation. In this hypothetical example, the projects are assigned to five researchers 
(Ri; see Figure 5.1 for corresponding project numbers); however, only three researchers 
have each appropriated various knowledge units. Researcher 1 has appropriated (through 
filing a patent) knowledge unit C.  Researcher 2 has appropriated knowledge units A and 
B. And researcher 3 has appropriated knowledge units D and E. Since knowledge units A 
and E are substitutable with each other the researchers 2 and 3 do not have a strong 
bargaining position with respect to these knowledge units as researchers can approach 
either patent holder. However, researcher 2 is definitely in a strong bargaining position 
for projects 1 and 3 by having patented complementary knowledge units A and B and for 
project 4 having patented knowledge unit B. Similarly, given that knowledge unit C is 
centrally important across projects 1, 3, and 5 serving as the point of medical intervention 
(e.g. drug target), researcher 1 is in a strong bargaining position for projects 3 and 5. 
However, it is researcher 3 that is in the strongest position having patented knowledge 
unit D. This knowledge unit has applicability across all projects. Cross-licensing 
knowledge unit B with researcher 3 for knowledge unit D is a possibility for researcher 2 
who only needs this one knowledge unit to pursue his/her project. In contrast, researcher 
1 will have to bargain with both researchers 2 and 3 to access knowledge units A-B and D 
respectively. While cross-licensing with researcher 3 is an option to access knowledge 
unit D for researcher 1 and knowledge unit C for researcher 3, researcher 2 does not 
require any units from researcher 1. As such, researcher 2 is a very strong position with 
researcher 1 for knowledge units A-B. Similarly, researchers 4 and 5 have nothing to 
offer in the bargaining setting (not having patented any knowledge units); hence both are 
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in a weak position with respect to bargaining for knowledge units. Depending on the 
terms offered, these researchers may not be able to pursue their respective projects.  
 
A      B       C      D E (AS) 
 
R1       
 
R2      
 
R3      
 
R4      
 
R5      
 
Figure 5.2: Appropriating Knowledge 
Letters=Knowledge Units; R=Researcher—Researchers are assigned to a Project; Dark Patterned Boxes 
around Knowledge Units C, A-B and D-E=Patented Knowledge Units by Respective Researchers 1-3. 
 
 
5.4 Analyzing Paradigms and Alliances 
Using the Recombinant Capital Alliances Database, we analyzed biopharmaceutical 
alliances that were formed between 1980 and 2005. Collaborative alliances, research-
based alliances, and license-only alliances were chosen in order to concentrate our 
analysis on the earlier phases of the drug discovery and development paradigm as 
assessed through the categorizations used in the database and then verified through a 
more detailed analysis of the alliances themselves. We analyzed both public-private and 
private alliances between academic institutions, nonprofit research-based institutions, and 
biotechnology or pharmaceutical firms. 
 
Initially, each alliance was associated with a knowledge paradigm—chemical, biological, 
or information paradigm. (Table 5.1) We associated each alliance with a paradigm based 
on the primary research activity. From the perspective of knowledge production, our 
analysis specifically investigates the evolutionary path of alliance focus over the period 
1980 to 2005.  We also investigate how the relative frequency of alliances changes as the 
underlying knowledge paradigm changes. (Analysis 5.1) We segregate data into 5-year 
periods to better observe/note any trends.  
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From the perspective of knowledge access, we determined if and when privatization (or 
enclosure) of knowledge occurred within each alliance (denoted by the granting of a 
license; we assume that patenting precedes licensing). It is important to note that licenses 
were issued in license-only alliances as well as in collaborative or research-based 
alliances. Licenses were analyzed across knowledge paradigms. (Analysis 5.2) By further 
analyzing the scope of the licenses, we determined the phase of research i.e., upstream or 
downstream.  
 
We include the condensed version of Recombinant Capital data in the Appendix to 
demonstrate the paradigm, phase, and then subject matter categorization for each alliance. 
(See Appendix Tables 8 and 9) The following examples provide a preliminary indication 
of the categorization process used.  
Alliance Focus Phase Paradigm Subject Matter 
Alzheimer‘s research Upstream 
Research 
Biological Disease Research 






Drug discovery for pain & 
urinary tract disorders 
Upstream 
Discovery 
Chemical Drug Discovery 




Information Tool  
Access to ChemDiv compound 
libraries 
Downstream Chemical Tool 










Antibody production Downstream Biological Process 
Nitric oxide donating drugs Downstream  Chemical Therapeutic 
Library screening for cancer Downstream Chemical Screening 
Table 5.1: Analyzing the Recombinant Capital Database 
 
Disease research is categorized as following the biological paradigm; however, we 
categorized genomic research as specifically adhering to the information paradigm. Both 
disease research and genomic related research are then categorized as pre-discovery 
research from a subject matter perspective in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. (Analysis 5.3) Several 
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examples also exist in the database of general drug discovery collaborations following the 
biological or chemical paradigms. 
 
Assay development, chip development, and database development are categorized as 
tools enabling discovery research or drug development; in Table 5.1 we have tool 
development adhering to all three paradigms.   
 
While gene transfer is categorized as focusing on therapeutic development, the 
development of vectors for use in gene therapy is categorized as tool development. 
Similarly, while monoclonal antibodies serve as biological therapeutics, we categorized 
the production of such antibodies as process development. We also differentiate between 
drug development and screening in Table 5.1, thereby maintaining the same consistency 
in the chemical paradigm as done for the biological paradigm. As shown in Figures 5.3 
and 5.4, for simplicity, alliances that focus on combinatorial chemistry and screening 
form one subject-matter category. 
 
Finally, in Table 5.1, general disease research, gene discovery research, and drug 
discovery are all examples of upstream research; in contrast, biological or chemical drug 
development, supporting tool development, antibody production, and drug screening are 
all categorized as downstream development work.  
 
Public-Private Alliances: Based on our preliminary analysis of 667 public-private 
alliances, the frequency of alliance formation between academic or nonprofit 
organizations and biotechnology or pharmaceutical firms generally appears to increase, 
with a substantial increase over the 2001-2005 period. The focus of public-private 
alliances favours the biological paradigm over the traditional chemical paradigm across 
time periods. (Table 5.2) However, we also note a gradual increase in alliances focusing 
on the information-based paradigm over the 2001-2005 period; the analysis should be 













Table 5.2: Analyzing Discovery and Early Phase  
Public-Private Alliances across Knowledge Paradigms 
  
In terms of licenses (from 667 discovery/early research alliances, 548 licenses were 
issued within these alliances), our analysis indicates that across the chemical and 
biological paradigms, the majority of licenses focus on downstream, clearly application 
oriented discoveries. (Table 5.3) Of concern however, is the significant number of 
licenses on upstream oriented knowledge and discoveries when the focus of research is 
information-based. Further study is necessary over the next five-year period to determine 









Type of License U D U D U D 
Subtotals 17 150 38 200 96 47 
Table 5.3: Analyzing Licenses across Knowledge Paradigms  
from Public-Private Alliances 
U=Upstream; D=Downstream 
 
A closer examination of the specific subject matter of each alliance is also of interest. 
When we categorize subject matter as being pre-discovery, general drug discovery 
research, tool development both pre-discovery and discovery-based, or targeted 
therapeutic research (drug or biologic), and compare subject matter for public-private 
alliances across paradigms, we notice that in the biological and chemical paradigms, 
targeted therapeutic research (drug or biologic) dominates other categories. In contrast, an 
analysis of the information paradigm reveals that pre-discovery research dominates all 








Date       
1980-1985 3 16 4 
1986-1990 12 22 11 
1991-1995 46 77 32 
1996-2000 43 60 34 
2001-2005 93 112 102 




Figure 5.3: Analyzing the Subject Matter of  
Public-Private Alliances across Paradigms 
CP=Chemical Paradigm; BP=Biological Paradigm; IP=Information Paradigm; Pre-Discovery=Broad 
genomics, disease related research; General Drug Discovery Research=Broad research into the discovery of 
new drug/biologic therapeutics; Tool Development=Broad research-based tools or drug discovery-based 
tools; Targeted Drug/Biologic Research=Specific research into a drug/biologic therapeutic; Combinatorial 
Chemistry/Screening=Combinatorial methods used for and High-throughput screening of drug leads; 
Other=Process related or Other unknown research. 
 
 
Private Alliances: Based on our preliminary analysis of 680 private biotechnology and/or 
pharmaceutical alliances, the frequency of alliance formation between biotechnology 
and/or pharmaceutical firms appears to increase, with a substantial increase over the 
2001-2005 period. The focus of the alliances only slightly favours the biological 
paradigm over the traditional chemical paradigm. Although we note a gradual increase in 
alliances focusing on the information-based paradigm over the 2001-2005 period, among 
BP CP IP
Pre-Discovery Research (Genomic, Disease 
Related) 29 0 123
General Drug Discovery Research 7 17 0
Tools Development (Pre-Discovery and 
Discovery) 68 4 52
Targeted Drug, Biologic Research 146 167 7
Combinatorial Chemistry/Screening 0 1 0















private firms, the chemical paradigm is still a significant focus for alliances over this later 













Table 5.4: Analyzing Discovery and Early Phase Private  
Alliances across Knowledge Paradigms 
 
The continued focus of alliances on the chemical paradigm may be a reflection of the 
need to share the risk and cost associated with drug discovery and development in a 
technologically complex traditional paradigm. Furthermore, the prevalence of high-
throughput screening and combinatorial chemistry technologies post 2000, within the 
private sector, may be encouraging traditional biopharmaceutical companies to form 
collaborative alliances even when adhering to the traditional chemical paradigm [Beeley 
et al., 2000]. 
 
With respect to the nature of licenses (from 680 discovery/early research alliances, 555 
licenses were issued from these alliances), our analysis indicates that across the chemical 
and biological paradigms, the majority of licenses are focused on downstream, clearly 
application oriented discoveries. (Table 5.5) When the focus of research is information-
based, interestingly an equivalent number of upstream and downstream licenses are 
issued. Further study is necessary over the next five-year period to determine if this trend 













Date       
1980-1985 1 5 0 
1986-1990 4 3 0 
1991-1995 11 12 4 
1996-2000 58 51 78 
2001-2005 157 177 119 











Type of License U D U D U D 
Subtotals 40 141 36 176 81 81 
Table 5.5: Analyzing Licenses across Knowledge Paradigms  
from Private Alliances 
 U=Upstream; D=Downstream  
 
A closer examination of the specific subject matter of each private alliance similarly 
provides interesting results. Although targeted therapeutic research dominates as subject 
matter for the biological paradigm, tool development closely follows. Similarly, targeted 
therapeutic research (drug or biologic) only slightly dominates as subject matter for the 
chemical paradigm, with general drug discovery following closely behind. When 
adhering to the chemical paradigm, combinatorial chemistry and screening are also 
notable subject matters for private-based alliances. Finally, although pre-discovery is a 
notable subject matter, tool development dominates within the information paradigm. 
Interestingly, within private alliances (as is the case for public-private alliances), the 
majority of pre-discovery research is following the information paradigm. (Figure 5.4) 
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Figure 5.4: Analyzing the Subject Matter of  
Private Alliances across Paradigms 
CP=Chemical Paradigm; BP=Biological Paradigm; IP=Information Paradigm; Pre-Discovery=Broad 
genomics, disease related research; General Drug Discovery Research=Broad research into the discovery of 
new drug/biologic therapeutics; Tool Development=Broad research-based tools or drug discovery-based 
tools; Targeted Drug/Biologic Research=Specific research into a drug/biologic therapeutic; Combinatorial 
Chemistry/Screening=Combinatorial methods used for and High-throughput screening of drug leads; 
Other=Process related or Other unknown research. 
 
 
5.5 Discussion  
Through our analysis of public-private and private alliances formed from 1980 to 2005, 
we were able to determine the paradigms followed, phase of research and development 
activities, as well as central focus of these alliances. An analysis of 667 public-private 
alliances indicates that the frequency of alliance formation between academic or 
nonprofit organizations and biotechnology or pharmaceutical firms generally appears to 
increase, with a substantial increase over the 2001-2005 period. Similarly, our analysis of 
680 private biotechnology and/or pharmaceutical alliances reveals the same trends.  
BP CP IP
Pre-Discovery Research (Genomic, Disease 
Related) 13 0 84
General Drug Discovery Research 8 70 0
Tools Development (Pre-Discovery and 
Discovery) 84 25 110
Targeted Drug, Biologic Research 100 75 1
Combinatorial Chemistry/Screening 7 45 5













The focus of public-private alliances favours the biological paradigm over the traditional 
chemical paradigm across time periods. However, we also note a gradual increase in 
public-private alliances focusing on the information-based paradigm over the 2001-2005 
period. In contrast, the focus of private alliances only slightly favours the biological 
paradigm over the traditional chemical paradigm. Although we note a gradual increase in 
alliances focusing on the information-based paradigm over the 2001-2005 period, among 
private firms, the chemical paradigm is still a significant focus for alliances over this later 
period. 
 
When we categorize subject matter as being pre-discovery, general drug discovery 
research, tool development both pre-discovery and discovery-based, or targeted 
therapeutic research (drug or biologic), and compare subject matter for public-private 
alliances across paradigms, we notice that in the biological and chemical paradigms, 
targeted therapeutic research (drug or biologic) dominates other categories. In contrast, an 
analysis of public-private alliances following the information paradigm reveals that that 
pre-discovery research dominates all other subject matter categories. Comparatively, 
although targeted therapeutic research also dominates as subject matter for the biological 
paradigm among private only alliances, tool development closely follows. Similarly, 
targeted therapeutic research (drug or biologic) only slightly dominates as subject matter 
for the chemical paradigm, with general drug discovery following closely behind for 
these private alliances. In addition, when adhering to the chemical paradigm, 
combinatorial chemistry and screening are also notable subject matters for private-based 
alliances. Finally, although pre-discovery is a notable subject matter for these alliances, 
tool development dominates within the information paradigm. Interestingly, within both 
types of alliances, the majority of pre-discovery research is following the information 
paradigm. Given the significant paradigm change since the completion of the Human 
Genome Project, it is understandable that pre-discovery research would focus on the 
search for genomic, proteomic, systems information to enable an understanding of viable 




In terms of licenses issued within public-private and private alliances, our analysis 
indicates that across the chemical and biological paradigm, the majority of licenses focus 
on downstream, clearly application oriented discoveries. Interestingly, a significant 
number of licenses have also been issued on upstream oriented knowledge and 
discoveries when the focus of research is information-based within these public-private 
alliances. In contrast, when the focus of research is information-based within private 
alliances, an equivalent number of upstream and downstream licenses were issued. 
 
Drug discovery research has become associated with a high level of knowledge 
complexity as the sources of knowledge are increasingly diverse and derive from a wide 
variety of scientific fields and technological competencies. As a result, the chance of 
generating new knowledge and embodying knowledge in new products or processes is 
likely to be conditional on the ability to access and then piece together a significant 
variety of complementary research inputs [Scotchmer, 1991; Foray, 2004]. In the 
genomics arena, a great deal of uncertainty exists with respect to the role of genes in 
disease susceptibility and progression, the hierarchy of proteins in any system, and the 
function of such genes and proteins during drug intervention [Reid et al., 2001; Roses, 
2002]. Hence, pharmaceutical companies and even the larger biotechnology companies 
adapting to the information paradigm, are forming alliances with academic institutions 
and the smaller biotechnology companies that are often significantly further down the 
molecular biology and genomics learning curves, accessing both disembodied knowledge 
and embodied knowledge in the form of therapeutics or supportive tools [Bower and 
Whittaker, 1992; Liebeskind et al., 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Blumenthal et al., 1997].  
 
To complete the sequence map of the Human Genome required breakthroughs in 
computational sciences, measurement technologies, statistics, and data management 
[Kitano, 2001]. Tools enabling high-through quantitative measurements of biological 
information were developed from this collective understanding. Today, such tools have 
become an integral component of drug discovery research. Therefore, it is interesting to 
note that tool development is a significant focus within private alliances following the 




With the prevalence of high-throughput screening and combinatorial chemistry 
technologies in drug discovery and development, pharmaceutical firms may need to form 
strategic alliances with their traditional chemical counterparts to similarly manage the 
complexities associated with the chemical paradigm. Based on our analysis, these firms 
are also not only accessing therapeutics, but also expertise in drug discovery.  
 
Once a commitment is made to participate in a strategic alliance, individuals or firms will 
face the decision as to when (or indeed if) to privately appropriate knowledge. 
Appropriation most often occurs through the decision to formally enclose knowledge by 
filing a patent. In the information-based paradigm, of concern is that as the degree of 
complementarity, applicability, and functional uncertainty of biological knowledge 
increases, excessive privatization will increase the transactions costs associated with 
procuring licenses for access to the required knowledge should intellectual property rights 
be assigned to upstream knowledge.  
 
It is interesting to observe that in the case of the information paradigm, cooperative 
strategies including open discovery initiatives are enabling companies to access 
disembodied, upstream knowledge-based resources critical to downstream drug 
development and provide further evidence of our assertions [Eisenberg, 2000; Cassier, 
2002]. One of the principal objectives of these cooperative strategic alliances is to 
preserve downstream technological opportunities for multiple firms. These initiatives, 
analyzed in Chapter 6, are essentially seeking to reverse the trend we observe with 
respect to upstream, information-based patents. When upstream discovery research 
cannot yield commercial products and when the costs associated with excessive upstream 
competition are high, then companies jointly benefit from cooperative knowledge 
production and open knowledge dissemination [Nelson, 1959; Reichman, 2003]. Norms 
or rules for knowledge sharing and knowledge appropriation are often established within 
such alliances to ensure equal opportunities for learning for all participants [Ostrom et al., 
1994; Liebeskind et al., 1996].  
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Chapter 6: Open Innovation-Managing the Complexities of the 
Information Paradigm through the Consortium Model 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In October of 2004, Novartis, the Broad Institute of MIT, and Harvard announced a joint 
project to decipher the genetic causes of type 2 diabetes. The collaboration reflects the 
mission of the Broad Institute to bring together researchers to solve complex problems 
that require multi-disciplinary teams and that are difficult to solve in the traditional 
(isolated) laboratory setting [Lawler, 2004]. 
 
Companies typically demand that data created in cooperative ventures be kept away from 
competitors. However, Novartis argues that the benefits of openness will outweigh those 
of secrecy, and the company intends to put the genetic variation data it collects on a 
public web site. While the team will not file patents on the database, it will allow others 
to patent new therapies or diagnostic tests based on the public information (delaying 
appropriation to downstream activities) [Lawler, 2004]. Novartis‘ decision is a signal of 
an emerging change in attitude toward the appropriation of all forms of biological 
knowledge— an industry correction that is increasingly common in the initiatives 
analyzed in our study.  
 
 
6.2 The Drive toward the Consortium Model 
Biology knowledge is complex and derives from a variety of scientific and technical 
disciplines. The molecular level of analysis, the computational nature of discovery 
research, and the global scale of research, all provide evidence that the drug discovery 
and development paradigm has changed dramatically. From a knowledge perspective, 
biopharmaceutical knowledge production processes, knowledge dissemination processes, 
and even knowledge appropriation mechanisms are rapidly evolving. Networks of 
collaboration that are supported by information and communication technologies are 
enabling researchers from a variety of disciplines and laboratories to generate and 
validate biological and even chemical knowledge. The structure and rules associated with 
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6.3 Analyzing Biopharmaceutical Consortia 
The International Human Genome Project catalyzed the open-source movement in 
genomics-based research. The achievements and failures of the Human Genome Project, 
which involved the cooperation of globally dispersed labs, prompted us to analyze other 
such consortia focused on genomic and post-genomic research. Through extensive 
literature search we were able to isolate several post Human Genome consortia that 
would warrant inclusion in our study. 
 
We then selected 39 such consortia for further analysis; these consortia are visible and 
significant in their achievements, thereby enabling us to retrieve adequate literature for 
our study. Literature sources analyzed included: peer-reviewed journal articles by 
consortium members or third-party researchers, press-releases, consortia websites, 
publications, and/or presentations. We also were able to substantiate the data through a 
survey of directors of such consortia. (See Appendices 5 and 6) These directors were 
asked to verify the focus of research, the types of participants including private sector 
participants (Analysis 6.1) and communication strategies used, the sources of funding, 
and the existence of rules regarding participation (Analysis 6.2), knowledge generation, 
knowledge dissemination (Analysis 6.3), and/or knowledge appropriation (Analysis 6.4). 
The appendix lists the sources of data used in each case. (See Appendix Table 10)  
 
 
6.4 Participating in a Consortium 
The ability to join a consortium is tempered by informal and formal rules of participation. 
With formality, entrance costs may be used to facilitate research and development 
activities as well as to signal cooperation and commitment to the consortium [Kollock, 
1998; Gintis et al., 2001]. The role of such entrance costs or rules for participation is to 
create trust through a visible signal. For example, committing resources in advance 
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including monetary fees, makes other participants in the consortium, and future 
researchers who are considering participation, aware of a researcher‘s cooperative 
intentions [Gulati et al., 1994].   
 
The decision to participate in a consortium is also affected by the degree of accessibility 
to the associated knowledge. Open access ensures that knowledge will be available to all 
participants in future downstream research regardless of participation. In this case, the 
possibility of free-riding exists by outside firms who can enjoy the disclosed knowledge 
at little or no cost [Gintis et al., 2001]. Closed access in contrast, ensures that knowledge 
is available only to contributing members within the alliance; therefore, a researcher 
outside the alliance may be unable to pool internal knowledge with that from the closed 
group, or may face a cost that will vary with the market power of the closed group.  
 
Type of Participant: Researchers from academia are present in all 39 consortia; similarly 
researchers from non-profit research organizations are present in the majority of the 
cases. In 17 cases, there are government researchers and/or government participation via 
consortium catalyzation or monetary support. In terms of the private sector, 22 cases exist 
where there is significant participation by private firms.  Interestingly, in 6 of these cases, 
private sector participants are directly or significantly responsible for the catalyzation of 
the initiative-namely, the SNP Consortium, the Novartis-Broad Initiative, the Accelrys 
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium, the Accelrys Functional Proteomics Consortium, 
the Accelrys Nanotechnology Consortium, and the Agilent-Industry Open Microarray 
Design Program [Davies, 2001; Cassier, 2002; Lawler, 2004; www.agilent.com, 2007; 
www.accelrys.com, 2007]. (Table 6.1) 
 
In terms of geographical representation, 31 of the 39 consortia include researchers and/or 
firms from two or more continents. The remaining 8 consortia either have only U.S. or 
European members.  
 
Interestingly, although 32 out of the 39 consortia are funded by public sources (primarily 
via government grants), 15 consortia are also jointly funded and/or sponsored by private 
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organizations; 4 consortia, namely the Accelrys consortia and the Cancer Vaccine 
Consortia are funded primarily by the associated private sector participants. (Table 6.2) 
 
Out of 39 consortia, 15 have established external partnerships i.e., beyond consortium 
membership, with academic researchers, institutions, and/or private sector organizations 
for the provision of research-based resources such as human capital, tools, and facilities, 
financial-based resources to support consortia activities, or as part of their data 
management strategy. Based on our analysis, there is no evidence of influence from these 
external partners on the activities or organizational processes associated with the 
consortia. (Table 6.2) 
 
Alliance Structures: Based on the definitions provided in Chapter 3, all but 3 of the 
consortia use an open access alliance structure. The Accelrys Combinatorial Chemistry 
Consortium, the Accelrys Functional Proteomics Consortium, and the Accelrys 
Nanotechnology Consortium are all closed access consortia—ensuring that knowledge is 
only available to those contributing members within the consortium [www.accelrys.com, 
2007].  
 
Focus of Alliances: In our analysis, almost half of the 39 consortia have as their focus 
genomic or proteomic research; an additional 7 consortia are focusing on systems-based 
research.  Interestingly, some of the consortia are progressing further downstream and are 
developing tools to support molecular biology-based drug discovery or chemistry-based 
drug discovery; in some cases, consortia are enabling pre-clinical and clinical research. 
Only two initiatives, the Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS) and the Cancer 
Vaccine Consortium are focused on downstream biological product development 
[Sulston, 2006; www.sabin.org, 2007]. (Table 6.3) From the perspective of knowledge 
structures, the knowledge being generated in the majority of cases is high in 
complementarity, non-substitutable, and high in applicability. Highly complementary 
knowledge involves the identification and integration of diverse and dispersed units 
acting as inputs into downstream product development—including genomic, proteomic, 
or systems-based biological information. Non-substitutable knowledge is knowledge that 
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cannot be replicated through human processes with complete preservation of biological 
form or biological function. While genes or proteins can be expressed outside the body, 
their complete biological form including association with other biological entities cannot 
be maintained outside the body. In contrast, some of the tools supporting drug discovery 
and development developed by the consortia are indeed substitutable—through 
duplication or work-around solutions. High applicability of knowledge occurs when the 
target of knowledge is more than one biological intervention pathway or domain; 
generally knowledge that is high in applicability can be targeted toward multiple products 
or markets.  (See Table 2.1 for definitions used to determine knowledge structures.) 
 
Tool development across 11 consortia includes the generation of embodied knowledge 
that is high in complementarity in terms of downstream development and high in terms of 
applicability. Mouse models, microarrays, software, databases, and/or reagents however, 
are in most cases, tools that are reproducible by other firms or substitutable by other 
technologies. It is likely then that the complexities associated with tool development are 
driving the formation of strategic alliances e.g., the Combinatorial Chemistry 
Consortium, where simulation software is the focus of development, and the 
Collaborative Cross initiative, where multiple animal models are being developed 
[Churchill et al., 2004; www.accelrys.com, 2007].    
 
In the case of the Biological Innovation for Open Society where materials and methods 
are shared for the purpose of downstream development under an open-source agreement 
and the Cancer Vaccine Consortium with the goal of accelerating the process of bringing 
cancer vaccines from the development stage to the clinic, embodied knowledge is being 
generated that is high in complementarity, high in applicability, and likely substitutable. 
In both cases, knowledge that is complex from a structural perspective (multiple 
components) or from a production perspective (multiple clinical trials and global 
regulatory approval), provides the incentive to form such downstream-based alliances 




Rules for Participation: In terms of participation, 18 consortia have established rules 
regarding membership. Offering monetary commitments, making formal commitments to 
the mandate and policies of the initiative, or licensing products used within the initiative, 
are signals of cooperation used when joining consortia. (Table 6.4)  
 
While the majority of consortia allow members with the requisite research experience to 
join voluntarily, 7 of these 18 initiatives use formal invitations or applications, steering or 
executive committees, or by-laws to determine membership. Where formal commitments 
are made, as in the case of the International Regulome Consortium, participation by-laws 
and agreements tend to address admission policies, exit policies, as well as the objectives 
and rules of participation of the consortium. 
 
Ten consortia require a monetary commitment as part of membership—out of this group, 
2 require the maintenance of grants and 8 require up-front membership fees. In open 
access initiatives such as the SNP Consortium, large upfront payments are made to 
support research [Davies, 2001]; in other instances, such as the International Structural 
Biology Consortium, membership fees are paid, as verified by the director in our survey. 
These membership fees entitle a member to access beta-version software, experimental 
instruments, and technology developed by associated research labs and institutions. 
In the case of the Accelrys closed consortia, both monetary fees and licenses of pre-
requisite software are required to join these consortia. As Accelrys software forms the 
basis of the Consortium project, in order to take part in and obtain the benefits of the 
project work, members are required to maintain licenses to a number of products which 
form the core of Consortium technology [www.accelrys.com, 2007]. 
 
 
6.5 Appropriation of Knowledge from a Consortium 
Ostrom argues that private property rights do not emerge spontaneously from a common 
property system. Private property rights depend on the existence and enforcement of rules 
that define who has a right to pursue which activities involving a resource and how the 
136 
 
returns from that activity will be allocated [Ostrom, 1989]. For example, the use of 
binding agreements can ensure cooperation during knowledge dissemination.  
 
Rules for Knowledge Dissemination: In terms of knowledge dissemination, 32 consortia 
have explicit rules and/or procedures described on consortia websites and/or policy 
statements to ensure knowledge dissemination including the dissemination of data and the 
sharing of tools, biomaterials, and reagents created by consortium members. In the case 
of the Agilent-Industry Open Microarray Design Program, the rules for knowledge 
dissemination are determined by the participating researchers and/or consortia. We also 
note that 5 other consortia have plans in development to disseminate knowledge. (Tables 
6.5 and 6.6) 
 
Rules for Open Dissemination of Data-Non-substitutable Knowledge: In most cases 
data is released almost immediately with complete access provided to members and the 
public at large. Data are maintained within large data repositories with the objectives of 
standardizing data and enabling linkages between repositories developed within the 
consortium and between external repositories. For example, 30 consortia use or plan to 
use databases to provide access to upstream genomic, proteomic, systems, biochemical, 
or cell biology information. These consortia address the open dissemination of data as 
part of their rules for sharing of information with members and the public at large. In 
addition, 22 consortia use peer-reviewed publications to provide validated information to 
the public. (Table 6.6)  
 
Rules for Open Licensing of Tools, Biomaterials, and Reagents-Substitutable 
Knowledge:  We were able to determine that in the case of 16 consortia where tools, 
biomaterials, or reagents are a either a direct outcome or byproduct of consortia member 
research, rules exist that address the sharing of these items with members or the public at 
large.  These rules advocate sharing of materials for consortium research, ensuring access 
to open repositories where animal models are housed, or providing for the wide 
dissemination of materials for the public at large; only in a few cases is restricted access 




Although tools, biomaterials, and reagents supporting drug discovery and development 
may be highly dependent on complementary upstream knowledge such as gene sequences 
or SNPs, these downstream products can often be substituted for competitive products. In 
each of these cases, we assume that the target of knowledge appropriation is downstream 
products (tools and uses) rather than the upstream knowledge embodied in the tool. In the 
majority of these cases, consortia have developed rules regarding appropriation strategies 
including royalty free licensing or open licensing strategies, patent pooling, open 
dissemination, limited use licensing, or closed licensing.  
 
In the case of the RNAi consortium, reagents are distributed by Sigma-Aldrich and by 
Open Biosystems. Open Biosystems enables the life science community to access 
technologies through the Open Access Program and the Open Labs Program 
[www.broad.mit.edu, 2007; www.openbiosystems.com, 2007]. Open Access enables 
researchers to access leading-edge technologies available through existing core facilities, 
while Open Labs builds relationships with leading labs from around the world to provide 
access to novel tools and genomic content [www.openbiosystems.com, 2007]. 
 
In the case of closed access consortia such as the Accelrys consortia, access to data and 
supporting tools are benefits reserved for members only. The aim of such consortia is to 
provide early and competitive access to drug discovery and development technology— 




6.6 Bargaining for Appropriated Knowledge  
Once the decision has been made to privatize knowledge (as governed by the rules of a 
cooperative alliance), a patent holder may unilaterally choose one of three strategies:  
 to issue a non-exclusive license to facilitate rapid diffusion, thereby benefiting 
from the rent of several licensees, particularly when knowledge is substitutable;  
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 to maximize revenue through the granting of an exclusive license to one licensee 
willing to pay the highest price for the knowledge;  
 or not to issue a license when the value from internal exploitation (given the 
resources the patent holder has to internally exploit the knowledge) is greater than 
the additional value received from renting the knowledge [Arora and Fosfuri, 
2003]. 
 
Similarly, during bargaining, the licensee will be faced with the choices of a non-
exclusive license or an exclusive license. In the event that the parties cannot agree on the 
valuation of the knowledge and amount of shared surplus from downstream research, or 
in the event that a license is denied altogether, the buyer will have to determine if he/she 
can substitute for the knowledge through an internal duplication strategy that will not 
infringe on the licensor‘s patent. If the licensee can substitute for the knowledge, his/her 
bargaining position changes. The probability of duplication and the value from this 
knowledge, taking into account the costs associated with duplication, must be considered 
by the licensee before pursuing this strategy. Walsh, Arora, and Cohen (2003) provide 
evidence of work-around solutions that researchers may attempt should they be unable to 
agree on the licensing terms for an upstream blocking patent including: inventing-around 
technology, ignoring patents (sometimes invoking an informal research exemption), 
going offshore, creating public databases, and challenging patents in court.  
 
From the consortium analysis, we were able to identify the various licensing agreements 
employed to disseminate embodied knowledge in the form of tools, biomaterials, and 
reagents, as well as copyrighted material. (Table 6.7) 
 
Non-exclusive license: Many instances can be found from our analysis of Non-
Exclusive, Royalty-Free Licenses used to disseminate knowledge generated by 
consortium members.  
 
A Limited Use License is associated with products purchased from Open Biosystems. 
This license conveys to the researcher a limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable right to 
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the product (with no right to resell, repackage, or further sublicense). For example, the 
purchase of products distributed through Open Biosystems does not include nor carry any 
right or license to use, develop, or otherwise exploit products commercially 
[www.openbiosystems.com, 2007]. 
 
MIT license: DopaNet‘s Molecular Pages is a collection of annotated quantitative data. 
DopaNet Molecular Pages are available under the terms derived from the MIT License 
[Novere and Donizelli, 2004]. The MIT License, also called the X License or the X11 
License, originated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and is a license for the 
use of certain types of computer software; essentially, a non-copyleft (licenses that use 
copyright law to give permission instead of forbid, usually permission to copy, use, 
modify, and share) free software license. The license allows a user to deal with the 
software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, 
merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the software 
[www.opensource.org, 2007].  
 
Creative Commons license: The International Molecular Exchange Consortium applies 
the Creative Commons Attribution License. The Creative Commons offers licenses that 
enable researchers to keep their copyright but allow others to copy and distribute the 
work provided that credit is assigned and only in accordance with specified pre-
conditions including attribution plus non-commercial use only, attribution and non-
derivative use, or attribution and sharing with others that follow the same conditions set 
by the original researcher [imex.sourceforge.net, 2007; creativecommons.org, 2007].  
 
Biological Open Source license: Of particular interest is the Biological Innovation for 
Open Society (BIOS) Initiative License. Under a BiOS-compliant agreement, the user 
must agree to conditions that encourage cooperation and development of the technology 
in order to obtain the right to use the technology, instead of royalties or other conditions 




The conditions include a provision that licensees cannot exclusively appropriate the 
―fundamental essence of the technology or improvements‖ [www.bios.net, 2007]. The 
base technology remains the property of the entity that developed it, but improvements 
can be shared with others that support the development of a protected commons around 
the technology; participants who agree to the same terms of sharing obtain access to 
improvements and other information, such as regulatory and biosafety data 
[www.bios.net, 2007]. To maintain legal access to the technology, users must agree not to 
prevent others who have agreed to the same terms from using the technology and any 
improvements in the development of varied products. 
 
Click-wrap license: From the outset, the International HapMap Project followed the 
example of the Human Genome Project and made most of its data quickly and freely 
available through public databases on the Internet. However, there were concerns that 
outside groups might combine some HapMap data with their own knowledge to generate 
patentable inventions. To prevent this, the HapMap consortium required users to sign, 
using a simple mouse click from their computers, a free, non-exclusive, non-royalty-
bearing licensing agreement to obtain access to certain types of data the project had 
collected on individuals‘ DNA sequences—namely, genotypic information. Under terms 
of that license, users agreed not to prevent others from using the individual genotype data 
and to share data only with those who had also agreed to this condition 
[www.hapmap.org, 2007]. 
 
As of December 10th 2004, the HapMap Project dropped the click-wrap license. As a 
result, all of the consortium‘s data are now completely available to the public [NIH News 
Release, 12/10/2004]. 
 
Patent pool: It is anticipated that the Knockout Mouse Project will require the resolution 
of several intellectual property claims involving both the production and use of knockout 
mice. To gain access to existing intellectual property covering knockout technology, the 
researchers in the Knockout Mouse Project advocate the use of a patent pool. Researchers 
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from various organizations and institutions controlling such patents have agreed to the 
formation of a patent pool of mouse knockout technologies [Austin et al., 2004]. 
 
Geographic-based licensing: The Grand Challenges in Global Health, which funds 
MalariaGEN, has developed the Global Access Strategy. This system requires grantees to 
prepare both a strategy for commercialization of research and an intellectual property 
management policy. Key provisions of the Global Access Strategy include a requirement 
that the principles of the Strategy apply to licenses and contracts that use intellectual 
property of the consortium; that downstream licensees of the consortium‘s intellectual 
property not apply for secondary patents in the developing world that would prevent 
access to affordable health care solutions; and a stipulation that prohibits exclusive 
licensing of consortium‘s intellectual property except in cases where it is necessary to 
provide a marketing incentive. Chokshi, Parker, and Kwiatkowski (2006) further discuss 
the usage of geographic exclusivity or co-exclusivity by the NIH Office of Technology 
Transfer as an incentive for a licensee to develop a product for particular regional 
markets. Depending on the needs of the regional market, a license is therefore, non-




To manage the uncertainties of drug discovery in the systems paradigm, a new model of 
cooperation is emerging— the public-private consortium. The need for diverse skills in 
systems biology and the complexity of the experimental technologies require the 
formation of large-scale teams or consortia [Kitano, 2001; Chokshi et al., 2006]. In these 
consortia, the issues of data-sharing and intellectual property are closely related. As 
Chokshi, Parker, and Kwiatkowski discuss, consortia must decide in advance what data 
should be released to the public to ensure equitable downstream access to the data and 
open opportunities for the development of products; alternatively, in some cases, in may 
also be necessary to ensure, through the appropriation of data, that downstream incentives 
for product development are maintained for consortium members. Rules and policies will 




In our analysis, consortia differentiate between disembodied knowledge in the form of 
raw data and embodied knowledge created by consortium members in the form of tools, 
biomaterials, and reagents. Although data is mandated in most cases for almost 
immediate release, tools, biomaterials, and reagents may be appropriated and licensed to 
consortium members and the public at large. Interestingly, this appropriation is also 
regulated in most cases by the provision of rules regarding licensing terms. Supporting 
data and materials sharing policies provided by the NIH, the Wellcome Trust, the 
Creative Commons, the Biological Innovation for Open Society, and even private sector 
firms such as Open Biosystems enable for relatively easy access to disembodied and 
embodied knowledge created within consortia.  
 
Chapters 7 and 8 outline game models that study the incentive to participate in such 
strategic alliances, and the strategies used when appropriating knowledge jointly 
developed within strategic alliances respectively. Chapter 9 then outlines the 
development of a game model to address the strategic environment of licensing once 
knowledge has been appropriated. The aim of these systems is to ensure that a first 
innovator and a follow-on innovator are rewarded for their research contributions. It is 
critical to ensure that investments are made to develop first inventions permitting second 
generation products to be developed and profitable through the fair sharing of the 
bargaining surplus—the amount by which each innovator will be richer in total if 
licensing (the bargaining process) is successful. 
 
We anticipate that our analysis should provide a preliminary framework of knowledge 
management for emerging consortia. In the management of consortia, the research 
outcomes to be disseminated, the format for dissemination, and the knowledge to 
privatize for appropriation, should be clearly understood by all the participants. Internal 
rules or mechanisms used to promote cooperative behaviour can include: formalizing the 
requirements to join the knowledge network, ensuring frequent interactions, encouraging 
communication between participants, punishing defection, and setting the boundary for 
access to resources. An authority that regulates access to knowledge can ensure that a fair 
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and efficient knowledge governance strategy is used. The final outcome of these 
initiatives should be the rapid and cost-effective development of a knowledge domain or 












Affymetrix-National Alliance for Autism Research; 
Est. 1994 Open A,N,G,P I 
Agilent-Industry Open Microarray Design Program; 
Est. 2005 Open A,N,G I 
Alliance for Cellular Signaling (AfCS); Est. 2002 Open A,N I 
Beta Cell Biology Consortium (BCBC); Est. 2001 Open A,N,G I 
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS); Est. 
2004 Open A,N,P I 
Cancer Vaccine Consortium; Est. 2002 Open A,N,G,P I 
Cell Migration Consortium; Est. 2001 Open A,N I 
Collaborative Cross; Est. 2005 Open A,N,G U.S. 
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium; Est. 1996 Closed A,P I 
Consortium for Functional Glycomics (CFG); Est. 
2001 Open A,N,G I 
DopaNet; Est. 2002 Open A,N,G Europe 
Functional Proteomics Consortium; Est. 2000 Closed A,P I 
HepatoSys; Est. 2004 Open A,N,P Germany 
Human Epigenome Consortium; Est. 2003 Open A,N,P I 
Human Genome Consortium; Est. 1990 Open A,N,P I 
International Genomics Consortium; Est. 2004 Open A,N,P I 
International HapMap Project; Est. 2002 Open A,N,P I 
International Molecular Exchange Consortium; Est. 
2005 Open A,N I 
International Regulome Consortium; Est. 2004 Open A,N,G,P I 
International Rice Functional Genomics 
Consortium; Est. 2003 Open A,N I 
International Rice Genome Sequencing Project; Est. 
1997 Open A,N I 
International Sequencing Consortium; Est. 2002 Open A,N,G I 











MalariaGEN; Est. 2005 Open A,N,G I 
MitoCheck Consortium; Est. 2004 Open A,N,G,P Europe 
Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium (MGSC); 
Est. 2000 Open A,N,G,P I 
Mouse Models of Human Cancers Consortium 
(MMHCC); Est. 1999 Open A,N,G,P I 
Nanotechnology Consortium; Est. 2004 Closed A,P I 
Novartis Institutes for Biomedical Research- 
Broad Institute Alliance; Est. 2004 Open A,P I 
Osteoarthritis Initiative; Est. 2001 Open A,N,G,P I 
Public Population Project in Genomics; Est. 2004 Open A,N,G I 
Receptor Tyrosine Kinase (RTK) Networks 
Consortium; Est. 2005 Open A,N,G I 
Research Collaboratory for Structural 
BioInformatics (RCSB); Est. 1998 Open A U.S. 
RNAi Consortium (TRC); Est. 2005 Open A,N,P U.S. 
SNP Consortium; Est. 1999 Open A,N,P I 
Structural Genomics Consortium; Est. 2003 Open A, N, P I 
SYMBIONIC; Est. 2004 Open A,N,P Europe 
TB Structural Genomics Consortium; Est. 2000 Open A,N I 
The Lipid MAPS Consortium; Est. 2003 Open A,N,G,P U.S. 
Table 6.1: Analyzing Participant Type and Geographic Location 
A=Academic; N=Non-Profit Research Institutes; G=Government (including Government Funding Agencies and Government Laboratories);  













Special External  
Partner  
Role 
Affymetrix-National Alliance for Autism Research; 
Est. 1994 PB N  
Agilent-Industry Open Microarray Design Program; 
Est. 2005 PR/PB N  
Alliance for Cellular Signaling (AfCS); Est. 2002 PB Y Data Management 
Beta Cell Biology Consortium (BCBC); Est. 2001 PB N  
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS); Est. 
2004 - N  
Cancer Vaccine Consortium; Est. 2002 PR Y Research-Based Resources 
Cell Migration Consortium; Est. 2001 PB N  
Collaborative Cross; Est. 2005 PB N  
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium; Est. 1996 PR N  
Consortium for Functional Glycomics (CFG); Est. 
2001 PB Y Data Management 
DopaNet; Est. 2002 PB N  
Functional Proteomics Consortium; Est. 2000 PR N  
HepatoSys; Est. 2004 PB Y 
Research-Based Resources; 
Data Management 
Human Epigenome Consortium; Est. 2003 - N  
Human Genome Consortium; Est. 1990 PB N  
International Genomics Consortium; Est. 2004 PB/PR Y 
Financial Capital; 
Research-Based Resources 
International HapMap Project; Est. 2002 PB Y Research-Based Resources 
International Molecular Exchange Consortium; Est. 
2005 - N  
International Regulome Consortium; Est. 2004 PB/PR N  
International Rice Functional Genomics 
Consortium; Est. 2003 PB N  
















International Sequencing Consortium; Est. 2002 PB N  
Knockout Mouse Project; Est. 2006 PB Y Research-Based Resources 
MalariaGEN; Est. 2005 PB Y Financial Capital 
MitoCheck Consortium; Est. 2004 PB N  
Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium (MGSC); 
Est. 2000 PB/PR N  
Mouse Models of Human Cancers Consortium 
(MMHCC); Est. 1999 PB/PR Y Research-Based Resources 
Nanotechnology Consortium; Est. 2004 PR N  
Novartis Institutes for Biomedical Research- 
Broad Institute Alliance; Est. 2004 PB/PR N  
Osteoarthritis Initiative; Est. 2001 PB/PR Y 
Financial Capital; 
Research-Based Resources 
Public Population Project in Genomics; Est. 2004 PB/PR N  
Receptor Tyrosine Kinase (RTK) Networks 
Consortium; Est. 2005 PB Y Research-Based Resources 
Research Collaboratory for Structural 
BioInformatics (RCSB); Est. 1998 PB N  
RNAi Consortium (TRC); Est. 2005 PB/PR Y Research-Based Resources 
SNP Consortium; Est. 1999 PB/PR N  
Structural Genomics Consortium; Est. 2003 PB/PR Y 
Financial Capital; 
Research-Based Resources 
SYMBIONIC; Est. 2004 PB Y Research-Based Resources 
TB Structural Genomics Consortium; Est. 2000 PB N  
The Lipid MAPS Consortium; Est. 2003 PB Y Research-Based Resources 
Table 6.2: Analyzing Sources of Funding and External Partnerships 














Affymetrix-National Alliance for Autism Research; 
Est. 1994 Open Genomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
Agilent-Industry Open Microarray Design Program; 
Est. 2005 Open Tool Development Biological HC, S, HA 
Alliance for Cellular Signaling (AfCS); Est. 2002 Open Systems Biological HC, NS, HA 
Beta Cell Biology Consortium (BCBC); Est. 2001 Open Cell Biology Biological HC, NS, HA 
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS); Est. 
2004 Open 
Downstream 
Development Biological HC, S, HA 
Cancer Vaccine Consortium; Est. 2002 Open 
Downstream 
Development Biological HC, S, HA 
Cell Migration Consortium; Est. 2001 Open Systems Biological HC, NS, HA 
Collaborative Cross; Est. 2005 Open Tool Development Biological HC, S, HA 
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium; Est. 1996 Closed Tool Development Chemical HC, S, HA 
Consortium for Functional Glycomics (CFG); Est. 
2001 Open Systems Biological HC, NS, HA 
DopaNet; Est. 2002 Open Systems Biological HC, NS, HA 
Functional Proteomics Consortium; Est. 2000 Closed Proteomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
HepatoSys; Est. 2004 Open 
Systems/Tool 
Development Biological HC, NS, HA 
Human Epigenome Consortium; Est. 2003 Open Genomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
Human Genome Consortium; Est. 1990 Open Genomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
International Genomics Consortium; Est. 2004 Open 
Genomic/Pre-
Clinical Biological HC, NS, HA 
International HapMap Project; Est. 2002 Open Genomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
International Molecular Exchange Consortium; Est. 
2005 Open Tool Development Biological HC, S, HA 
International Regulome Consortium; Est. 2004 Open Genomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
International Rice Functional Genomics Consortium; 
Est. 2003 Open 
Genomic/Tool 
Development Biological HC, NS, HA 
International Rice Genome Sequencing Project; Est. 













International Sequencing Consortium; Est. 2002 Open Genomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
Knockout Mouse Project; Est. 2006 Open Tool Development Biological HC, S, HA 
MalariaGEN; Est. 2005 Open Genomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
MitoCheck Consortium; Est. 2004 Open Cell Biology Biological HC, NS, HA 
Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium (MGSC); 
Est. 2000 Open Genomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
Mouse Models of Human Cancers Consortium 
(MMHCC); Est. 1999 Open Tool Development Biological HC, S, HA 
Nanotechnology Consortium; Est. 2004 Closed Tool Development Other HC, S, HA 
Novartis Institutes for Biomedical Research- 
Broad Institute Alliance; Est. 2004 Open Genomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
Osteoarthritis Initiative; Est. 2001 Open Biochemical/Clinical Biological HC, NS, HA 
Public Population Project in Genomics; Est. 2004 Open Tool Development Biological HC, S, HA 
Receptor Tyrosine Kinase (RTK) Networks 
Consortium; Est. 2005 Open Systems Biological HC, NS, HA 
Research Collaboratory for Structural 
BioInformatics (RCSB); Est. 1998 Open Proteomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
RNAi Consortium (TRC); Est. 2005 Open Tool Development Biological HC, S, HA 
SNP Consortium; Est. 1999 Open Genomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
Structural Genomics Consortium; Est. 2003 Open Proteomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
SYMBIONIC; Est. 2004 Open Systems Biological HC, NS, HA 
TB Structural Genomics Consortium; Est. 2000 Open Proteomic Biological HC, NS, HA 
The Lipid MAPS Consortium; Est. 2003 Open Biochemical  Biological HC, NS, HA 
Table 6.3: Analyzing Consortium Structures and Knowledge Types 
C=Complementarity (H=High); S=Substitutable; NS=Non-substitutable; A=Applicability (H=High); 
Biological= Focus of alliance activities on biological knowledge; Chemical= Focus of alliance activities on chemical knowledge;  













Rules for  
Participation 
Affymetrix-National Alliance for Autism Research Open HC, NS, HA MC (Grants), Selection 
Agilent-Industry Open Microarray Design Program Open HC, S, HA Based on Consortium 
Cancer Vaccine Consortium Open HC, S, HA EC 
Cell Migration Consortium Open HC, NS, HA SC 
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium Closed HC, S, HA MC, License 
Consortium for Functional Glycomics (CFG) Open HC, NS, HA Application 
Functional Proteomics Consortium  Closed HC, NS, HA MC, License 
HepatoSys Open HC, NS, HA Invitation 
International Regulome Consortium Open HC, NS, HA By-laws 
Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium (MGSC) Open HC, NS, HA MC 
Mouse Models of Human Cancers Consortium 
(MMHCC) Open HC, S, HA MC (Grants)  
Nanotechnology Consortium Closed HC, S, HA MC, License 
Public Population Project in Genomics Open HC, S, HA MC 
Receptor Tyrosine Kinase (RTK) Networks 
Consortium Open HC, NS, HA EC 
RNAi Consortium (TRC) Open HC, S, HA MC 
SNP Consortium Open HC, NS, HA MC 
Structural Genomics Consortium Open HC, NS, HA MC 
TB Structural Genomics Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Application 
Table 6.4: Analyzing Consortium Structures and Rules for Participation 
C=Complementarity (H=High); S=Substitutable; NS=Non-substitutable; A=Applicability (H=High); 








Knowledge Characteristics Explicit Rules Used for 
Knowledge Dissemination 
Agilent-Industry Open Microarray Design Program Open HC, S, HA Based on Consortium 
Alliance for Cellular Signaling (AfCS) Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Beta Cell Biology Consortium (BCBC) Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS) Open HC, S, HA Yes 
Cancer Vaccine Consortium Open HC, S, HA Yes 
Cell Migration Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium Closed HC, S, HA Yes 
Consortium for Functional Glycomics (CFG) Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
DopaNet Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Functional Proteomics Consortium  Closed HC, NS, HA Yes 
Human Epigenome Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Human Genome Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
International Genomics Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
International HapMap Project Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
International Molecular Exchange Consortium Open HC, S, HA Yes 
International Regulome Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes  
International Rice Functional Genomics 
Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
International Rice Genome Sequencing Project Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
International Sequencing Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
MalariaGEN Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium (MGSC) Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Mouse Models of Human Cancers Consortium 
(MMHCC) Open HC, S, HA Yes 
Nanotechnology Consortium Closed HC, S, HA Yes  
Novartis Institutes for Biomedical Research-Broad 
Institute Alliance Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Osteoarthritis Initiative Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Public Population Project in Genomics Open HC, S, HA Yes  
Receptor Tyrosine Kinase (RTK) Networks 





Knowledge Characteristics Explicit Rules Used for 
Knowledge Dissemination 
Research Collaboratory for Structural 
BioInformatics (RCSB) Open HC, NS, HA Yes  
RNAi Consortium (TRC) Open HC, S, HA Yes 
SNP Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Structural Genomics Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
TB Structural Genomics Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
The Lipid MAPS Consortium Open HC, NS, HA Yes 
Table 6.5: Analyzing Consortium Structures and Explicit Rules for Knowledge Dissemination 












Rules or Mechanisms  
used to Disseminate Data 
  
Rules Regarding Sharing of 
Tools, Biomaterials, and 
Reagents 
Agilent-Industry Open Microarray Design 
Program HC, S, HA Based on Consortium Rules Based on Consortium Rules 
Alliance for Cellular Signaling (AfCS) HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication 
Reagent Sharing for AfCS 
Research 
Beta Cell Biology Consortium (BCBC) HC, NS, HA  
Freely Distributed to 
Academics for Non-
Commercial Use 
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS) HC, S, HA  
Royalty Free, Non-Exclusive 
Licenses Among Participants 
Cancer Vaccine Consortium HC, S, HA Publication  
Cell Migration Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication 
Royalty Free, Non-Exclusive 
Licenses for Non-Commercial 
Use 
Collaborative Cross  HC, S, HA Database Development 
Repository; Open Subscription 
to Mouse Repository 
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium HC, S, HA Exclusive Access to Data 
Exclusive Access to Licensed 
Software 
Consortium for Functional Glycomics (CFG) HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication 
Material Sharing for 
Consortium Research; Royalty 
Free, Non-Commercial Use 
DopaNet HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  
Functional Proteomics Consortium  HC, NS, HA 
Exclusive Access to Annotated 
Data  
HepatoSys HC, NS, HA 
Database Development; 
Publication  
Human Epigenome Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  
Human Genome Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  









Rules or Mechanisms  
used to Disseminate Data 
  
Rules Regarding Sharing of 
Tools, Biomaterials, and 
Reagents 
International HapMap Project HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  
International Molecular Exchange Consortium HC, S, HA Database Deposit/Management 
Creative Commons Copyright 
Licensing Advocated 
International Regulome Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  
International Rice Functional Genomics 
Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Development Sharing of Materials 
International Rice Genome Sequencing Project HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  
International Sequencing Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Deposit  
Knockout Mouse Project HC, S, HA Database Development 
Public Repository for 
Biomaterial; Patent Pooling 
Advocated 
MalariaGEN HC, NS, HA Data Management Addressed 
Restricted Licensing; 
Geographic Restrictions 
MitoCheck Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Development  
Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium 
(MGSC) HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  
Mouse Models of Human Cancers Consortium 
(MMHCC) HC, S, HA Database Deposit; Publication 
Repository for Biomaterials; 
Reagent Distribution through 
Open Biosystems 
Nanotechnology Consortium HC, S, HA Exclusive Access to Data 
Exclusive Access to Licensed 
Software 
Novartis Institutes for Biomedical Research-
Broad Institute Alliance HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  
Osteoarthritis Initiative HC, NS, HA Data Repository 
Research Tools Wide 
Available; Limited Materials 
Priority Distribution 
Public Population Project in Genomics HC, S, HA 
BioBanks-Database; 
Publication  









Rules or Mechanisms  
used to Disseminate Data 
  
Rules Regarding Sharing of 
Tools, Biomaterials, and 
Reagents 
Consortium 
Research Collaboratory for Structural 
BioInformatics (RCSB) HC, NS, HA Data Bank; Publication  
RNAi Consortium (TRC) HC, S, HA  
Distribution through Sigma 
Aldrich and Open Biosystems 
SNP Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  
Structural Genomics Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  




TB Structural Genomics Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  
The Lipid MAPS Consortium HC, NS, HA Database Deposit; Publication  
Table 6.6: Analyzing Consortium Structures and Rules for the  
Dissemination of Data and the Sharing of Tools, Biomaterials, and Reagents 









Licenses Advocated  
by Consortium 
Agilent-Industry Open Microarray Design 
Program Appropriation Possible Based on Consortium Rules 
Beta Cell Biology Consortium (BCBC) Appropriation Possible 
Freely Distributed to Academic for Non-
Commercial Use; NIH Grants Policy on Sharing 
of Unique Research Resources 
Biological Innovation for Open Society 
(BIOS) Appropriation Possible 
Royalty Free, Non-Exclusive Licenses Among 
Participants 
Cancer Vaccine Consortium Y(I), N(C)  
Cell Migration Consortium Y(I), N(C)  
Royalty Free, Non-Exclusive Licenses for Non-
Commercial Use 
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium Y Non-Exclusive License for Members Only  
Consortium for Functional Glycomics 
(CFG) Y(I), N(C)  Royalty Free, Non-Commercial Use 
DopaNet Copyright License for Dataset  MIT License 
Functional Proteomics Consortium  Appropriation Possible  
Human Epigenome Consortium Appropriation Possible Wellcome Trust Intellectual Property Policy 
International HapMap Project  
Initially Click-Wrap License to Access 
Genotypic Data 
International Molecular Exchange 
Consortium Copyright License for Dataset Creative Commons License 
International Regulome Consortium Y(As Approved by SC)  
Knockout Mouse Project   
Patent Pooling Advocated to Manage Existing 
Intellectual Property 
MalariaGEN Y(I), N(C) 
Restricted Licensing Based on Geographical 
Applicability 
Mouse Models of Human Cancers 
Consortium (MMHCC) Y(I), N(C)  Limited-Use License by Open Biosystems 
Nanotechnology Consortium Y Non-Exclusive License for Members Only 
Public Population Project in Genomics Y(I), N(C)   







Licenses Advocated  
by Consortium 
SNP Consortium Y(P), N(C) 
Upstream Provisional Patents (Prior Art 
Creation); Downstream Patents on Products 
Permitted 
Structural Genomics Consortium Y(P), N(C)  
Table 6.7: Appropriation of Knowledge and Licensing Strategies 
Y=Yes; N=No; C=Consortium; I=Institution that hosts researcher; SC=Steering Committee; P=Private; 
Y(X)=Appropriation possible by X party; N(X)=No Appropriation by X party
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Chapter 7: Modeling the Decision to Participate in Alliances 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the decision to participate in knowledge networks is affected 
by the degree of accessibility of the associated knowledge. Open access ensures that 
knowledge will be available to all participants in future downstream research regardless 
of participation. In this case, other participants may free-ride by enjoying knowledge 
disclosed at little or no cost, and without contributing knowledge to the alliance. Closed 
access, in contrast, ensures that knowledge is available only to contributing members of 
the alliance, network, or consortium; therefore, a researcher outside the alliance may be 
unable to pool its own knowledge with that of the alliance, or may do so only at a cost 
that varies according to the market power of the closed group. 
 
The ability to join a consortium or alliance is also tempered by the existence of informal 
or formal rules of participation [Ostrom et al., 1994]. Entrance fees may facilitate 
research and development activities and at the same time signal cooperation and 
commitment to the commons, network, or consortium. Entrance costs or participation 
rules can also create trust through a visible signal. For example, a commitment of 
resources in advance makes other participants and researchers considering future 
participation aware of a researcher‘s intentions [Gulati et al., 1994].  In scenarios where  
(1) cooperation occurs only when a researcher is assured that a partner will also cooperate 
and  
(2) the best choice for a researcher who believes that the partner will defect  is to defect 
as well,  
costly signals demonstrating participation can assure other participants that a researcher 
intends to cooperate [Kollock, 1998]. Several studies have analyzed the impact of 
unilateral benefits to group members. Partners who provide such a benefit to other group 
members, or who provide more of the benefit, signal their quality as allies. This signal 
can then alter the behaviour of other group members, encouraging them to act in ways 
that can provide a positive payoff to the signaler, for example by preferring signalers as 
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allies. Costly signaling may therefore provide a mechanism for the evolution of 
cooperation and provide stability against invasion by selfish participants or free-riders 
[Gintis et al., 2001].  
 
In this chapter, we model the decision to participate in a consortium when knowledge is 
accessible to the public at large (public access setting), and when knowledge is accessible 
only to consortium members (restricted access setting). Common benefits are those that 
accrue to each player that joins a consortium and adheres to the rules regarding 
knowledge dissemination. Therefore, the synthesis of knowledge in a consortium will 
create a common value, CV, related to the knowledge units jointly generated by or 
contributed to the consortium. Private benefits are those that a player can earn by 
unilaterally pursuing research (knowledge generation) activities. Knowledge that is 
unilaterally generated and held in secrecy will have a private value, PV, for its owner. 
The decision to patent knowledge is not considered in this model, but is modeled in 
Chapter 8. 
 
We consider how the decision to participate in a consortium and share knowledge depend 
on access. In the public access setting, which applies for the majority of the consortia 
analyzed in Chapter 6, knowledge is accessible by consortium members as well as the 
public at large (i.e. non-members); we assume that consortium rules determine how 
knowledge is shared with the public at large. Therefore, in the public access setting, a 
player that chooses not to participate in a consortium and share knowledge will still be 
able to pool consortium knowledge with internal firm knowledge, possibly gaining a 
competitive advantage in downstream activities. In contrast, in the restricted access 
setting, knowledge is accessible only to consortium members; this is the case for the 
Accelrys consortia analyzed in Chapter 6. Under restricted access, the player that chooses 
to cooperate by joining the consortium and adhering to the rules regarding internal 
knowledge dissemination, will continue to enjoy the common value CV related to the 
knowledge units jointly generated or contributed within the consortium. The player that 
chooses to pursue research activities unilaterally will, however, no longer have access to 
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consortium knowledge; therefore, this player will obtain private value only through 
unilateral activities.  
 
An interesting situation arises even when there are only two players. Each player must 
decide whether to participate in the consortium and share knowledge or not to participate 
and hold its knowledge in secrecy. Only when both players choose to cooperate can a 
consortium form; if both players choose to defect and not join the consortium, a 
consortium does not form. An obvious problem arises when one player wants to 
cooperate and the other player does not. While a consortium cannot form in this situation, 
we must still consider the strategic decision to cooperate. As technological complexities 
increase, it may be the case that the player who chooses unilateral cooperation will 
openly share knowledge to pre-empt a rival in downstream activities, signal a future need 
to cooperate, or facilitate the development of a technological standard around which this 
player can develop alternative products. In this case, the common value CV derives from 
disclosure and deposit of knowledge into an open or closed pool.  
 
A modified version of this two-player model is the game in which each player decides 
whether to participate in an existing consortium. The common value then derives from 
units jointly generated, contributed, and combined with existing consortium knowledge. 
In this case, an additional parameter may be required to encompass existing consortium 
knowledge to which a new participant can add. In the sections that follow, we validate 
our model using various case scenarios to explain firm behaviour, including the decision 
to participate in the consortia analyzed in Chapter 6. As we discussed in Chapter 6, these 
consortia are initiatives with the objectives of joint knowledge production and in most 
cases open knowledge dissemination. We use the models developed in this chapter to 
understand the strategic decisions made by firms to join and participate in these consortia 






7.2 Model Parameters  
We define the following notation for our model (Table 7.1).  
Notation Definition 
Index i and j. Two researchers 1 and 2. 
  Union. 
  Intersection. 
Ki    The knowledge contributed or held by researcher i.  
CVi (Ki) The payoff (utility) to researcher i for sharing knowledge (Ki).  
Kc Knowledge within an existing consortium, rather than one formed 
by i and j. 
PV i (Ki) The payoff (utility) to researcher i for withholding knowledge (Ki) 
through secrecy.  
Ki  -  Kj  =  {xKi: x Kj} Knowledge unilaterally available to researcher i. 
Ki  Kj   Knowledge jointly known by the researchers. 
Table 7.1: Participation Game Model Notation
 
 
In order to define the game models, we adopt the following set notation:  
We use the parameters X, Y, and Z to represent the knowledge held by the researchers.  
For example, the knowledge held by researcher 1 includes the union of what is known 
unilaterally (X) and what is jointly known with researcher 2 (Y). Similarly, the knowledge 
held by researcher 2 includes the union of what 2 knows unilaterally (Z) and what is 
jointly known with researcher 1 (Y). Y thus represents the intersection of researcher 1‘s 
and researcher‘s 2 knowledge sets. For knowledge in Y, what is known by one researcher 
is also known by the other, i.e., with no difference in perception.   
K1    K2   =   X     Y    Z    where X   Y = X   Z = Y   Z =   
K1   =   X      Y 
K2   =   Y     Z 
K1  –  K2   =   X 
K2  –  K1    =  Z  




These parameters are illustrated in the following Venn diagram: 
  
    =   
 
      K1     K2 
Figure 7.1: Graphical Representation of Knowledge in the Model 
 
We make the following assumptions: 
1. Decisions are simultaneous. 
2. The total value of knowledge in a set is equal to the sum of values of the 
individual knowledge units that comprise the set.  
3. CV1 (K1   K2) = CV1 (X) + CV1 (Y) + CV1 (Z) and CV2 (K1   K2) = CV2 (X) + 
CV2 (Y) + CV2 (Z) where X, Y, and Z are as defined in the Venn diagram. The 
payoff (utility) to researcher i for participating and contributing knowledge, is a 
function of the joint contribution by both players.  (By assumption 2, the payoff is 
a simple additive function: in other words, the common value of joint knowledge 
units derives from the addition of the individual common values of X, Y, and Z. 
Alternatively, the common value of joint knowledge could be greater than the 
sum of the individual common values, i.e., knowledge of all parts could be worth 
more than the sum of the worth of the individual parts.)  
4.  PV 1 (K1) = PV1 (X) + PV1 (Y) and that PV 2 (K2) = PV2 (Z) + PV2 (Y) where X, Y, 
and Z are as defined above. (Again by assumption 2, the payoff is a simple 
additive function, implying that the private value of knowledge units derives from 
the addition of the individual private values of X or Z for players 1 and 2 
respectively (knowledge that is known unilaterally and not disclosed) and Y 
(knowledge that is jointly known but not disclosed). Alternatively, the private 
value of knowledge could be greater than the sum of the individual private values, 
i.e., knowledge of all parts could be worth more than the sum of the worth of the 
individual parts.)  
X Z Y 
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7.3 Access Setting Models 
We consider the decision to participate in a consortium and share knowledge as a 
function of access setting. In the public access setting, knowledge is available to 
consortium members as well as the public at large (i.e. non-members); we assume that 
consortium rules will determine how knowledge is shared with the public at large. In 
contrast, in the restricted access setting, knowledge is available only to consortium 
members as determined by consortium rules.  
 
Model 7.1:  Public Access; No Existing Consortium  
Model 7.1 reflects the public access setting. We also assume that there are only two 
players and that no effective consortium is in existence.  
 
Strategies.  
Join=player enjoys the common value of the knowledge shared; we assume that sharing 
of knowledge is mandated by the rules of the consortium and is available as soon as a 
player joins. 
Does Not Join= player enjoys the private value of his/her knowledge. 
 Player 2 Joins2 Player 2 Does Not Join 
Player 1 
Joins 
CV1(K1  K2),  
CV2(K1  K2) 
CV1(K1),  








         Table 7.2: Participating in the Public Access Setting; No Existing Consortium 
 
Note on Strategic Form Games: Each player makes a choice. The choices by both players 
determine a cell representing an outcome. In the cells are written the players‘ values at 
the outcomes; player 1‘s values are first and player 2‘s values are second. In our analysis, 
we focus on whether players would prefer to join a consortium if the common values of 
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knowledge exceed their private values; we looks for the case where the choice of joining 
a consortium is a player‘s dominant strategy. Formally, we will look for strictly dominant 
strategies (for one or both players) or, failing that, Nash equilibria [Kilgour, 2006]. (See 
Chapter 3) 
  
First we analyze Player 1‘s preferences:  
Assume Player 2 Joins (Column 1) 
Row 1 is preferred to row 2 iff 
7A)  
CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  +   CV1(Z)  >  PV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  +   CV1(Z)   
which is equivalent to CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) that is, when the common value of knowledge X 
is greater than the private value of knowledge X, player 1 will prefer row 1 (cooperation). 
 
Assume Player 2 Does Not Join (Column 2) 
Row 1 is preferred to row 2 iff 
7B)  
CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y)   
that is, when the common value of knowledge X and Y (what is unilaterally known and 
what is jointly known, respectively) is greater than the private value of knowledge X and 
Y, player 1 will prefer row 1 (cooperation).    
  
The analysis of player 2‘s actions will be similar to what is given above for player 1, with 
the only change being the replacement of parameter X with parameter Z i.e., knowledge 
that is unilaterally known by player 2.  In each of the models that follow below, we only 
describe player 1‘s preferences keeping in mind that player 2‘s preferences will be 




Suppose that CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) and CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y).  Then CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y) >   
PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) so both 7A and 7B hold. Therefore, joining is a strictly dominant 
strategy for player 1; player 1 rationally joins regardless of player 2‘s choice.  
 
If however, CV1(X)  >  PV1(X)  but PV1(Y)  >  CV1(Y), joining may no longer be a strictly 
dominant strategy for player 1; 7A holds but 7B may not, so the outcome may depend on 
player 2‘s choice. The same condition follows if CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y)  but PV1(X)  >  
CV1(X). In both cases, however, CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) may still hold 
true, and if so, joining will be a strictly dominant strategy for player 1.   
 
If we consider the possible synergy between knowledge units, it may be possible to 
assume that CV1(X)  +  CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) , even if CV1(X)  >  PV1(X)  but 
PV1(Y)  >  CV1(Y) or CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y)  but PV1(X)  >  CV1(X) as the total value of 
knowledge in the set may greater than the sum of the values of the individual knowledge 
units that comprise the set. Future research will assess this synergy between knowledge 
units.  
 
However, in the simple case of no synergy, both joining is a Nash Equilibrium if CV1(X)  
>  PV1(X) and CV2(Z)  >  PV2(Z). Player 1 joins (strictly dominant strategy) if CV1(X)  >  
PV1(X) and CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y).  
 
Conclusion: CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) and CV2(Z)  >  PV2(Z) are (jointly) sufficient for both 
joining to be a Nash equilibrium. In other words, for both to join, each player‘s common 
value of knowledge is greater than his/her private value of knowledge; hence, greater 







Model 7.2:  Public Access; Acting Consortium in Existence 
A modified version of Model 7.1 may include an existing consortium, rather than the 
formation of a new consortium including only players 1 and 2. In this case, the parameter 
Kc is used to encompass existing consortium knowledge as follows: 
 
 Player 2 Joins2 Player 2 Does Not Join 
Player 1 
Joins 
CV1(K1  K2   Kc),  
CV2(K1  K2  Kc) 
CV1(K1  Kc),  




PV1(K1 - K2 )  +   CV1(K2  Kc),  
CV2(K2  Kc) 
PV1(K1) + CV1(Kc),  
PV2(K2) +  CV2(Kc) 
         Table 7.3: Participating in the Public Access Setting; Consortium in Existence 
 
These parameters are illustrated in the following Venn diagram: 
In this case Kc represents the knowledge that is held by the existing consortium and is 
isolated from the knowledge known by players 1 and 2. The common value of knowledge 
will therefore, derive from Kc as well knowledge contributed to the consortium by 
researchers 1 and 2 if they both join.  
 
  
    =   
 
      K1               K2 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Graphical Representation of Knowledge in the Modified Model 
 




In this case, the players‘ preferences remain the same; quantity CV(Kc) appears on both 
sides of each of the above inequalities and so has no effect (based on assumption 2 
assuming there is no synergy between individual units of knowledge held by researchers 
1 and 2).  Intuitively, given that the above situation reflects the public access setting, 
where what is known by the consortium is openly shared with members and the public at 
large, Kc is enjoyed by both players regardless of choice made, and as such, is not a 
factor in the decision taken by each player.  
 
Both joining is a Nash Equilibrium if CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) and CV2(Z)  >  PV2(Z). Player 1 
joins (strictly dominant strategy) if CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) and CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  
+   PV1(Y).  
 
Conclusion: CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) and CV2(Z)  >  PV2(Z) are (jointly) sufficient for both 
joining to be a Nash equilibrium. Hence, greater value is attained when knowledge is 
known to and shared by all players. 
 
Model 7.3:  Restricted Access; No Existing Consortium  
Model 7.3 reflects the restricted access setting. In this model, we assume that there are 
only two players and no existing consortium.  
 
Strategies.  
Join=player enjoys the common value of the knowledge shared; we assume that sharing 
of knowledge is mandated by the rules of the consortium and is available as soon as a 
player joins. 






 Player 2 Joins2 Player 2 Does Not Join 
Player 1 Joins CV1(K1  K2), 
CV2(K1  K2) 
CV1(K1),  
PV2(K2)     






Table 7.4: Participating in the Restricted Access Setting; No Existing Consortium 
 
Player 1‘s preferences:  
Assume Player 2 Joins (Column 1) 
Row 1 is preferred to row 2 iff 
7C)  
CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  +   CV1(Z)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y)    
that is, when the common value of pooled knowledge X, Y, and Z is greater than the 
private value of knowledge held by player 1 X and Y, player 1 will choose row 1 
(cooperation). 
 
Assume Player 2 Does Not Join  (Column 2) 
Row 1 is preferred to row 2 iff 
7D)  
CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y)   
that is, when the common value of knowledge held by player 1 X and Y is greater than the 
private value of knowledge X and Y, player 1 will choose row 1 (cooperation). 
 
The analysis of player 2‘s actions will be similar to what is given above for player 1, with 
the only change being the replacement of parameter X with parameter Z i.e., knowledge 
that is unilaterally known by player 2.  In each of the models that follow below, we only 
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describe player 1‘s preferences keeping in mind that player 2‘s preferences will be 
similar with the replacement of parameter X with Z where appropriate. 
 
Suppose that CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y). Then,  since CV1(Z)  > 0,  
CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y) +   CV1(Z)  >   PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) so both 7C and 7D hold. 
Therefore, joining is a strictly dominant strategy for player 1; player 1 joins regardless of 
player 2‘s choice.  
 
In particular, if CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) and CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y), then the condition  CV1(X)  +   
CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) holds, so joining is a strictly dominant strategy for player 
1. Note that this condition is necessary for joining to be a strictly dominant strategy in 
Model 7.1. Therefore, joining is at least as likely in the restricted access setting as in the 
public access setting.  
    
If however, CV1(X)  >  PV1(X)  but PV1(Y)  >  CV1(Y), joining may no longer be a strictly 
dominant strategy for player 1; in fact, both 7C and 7D may fail so the outcome generally 
depends on player 2‘s choice and on CV1(Z). The situation is similar if CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y)  
but PV1(X)  >  CV1(X). In both cases, if however, CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   
PV1(Y) still holds true, then joining will be a strictly dominant strategy for player 1; 
alternatively, as long as CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  +   CV1(Z)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) , given the 
value assigned to CV1(Z), then joining will continue to be a strictly dominant strategy for 
player 1.  
 
Again, if we consider the possible synergy between knowledge units, it may be possible 
to assume that CV1(X)  +  CV1(Y)  +  CV1(Z)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) , even if CV1(X)  >  
PV1(X)  but PV1(Y)  >  CV1(Y) or CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y)  but PV1(X)  >  CV1(X) given the 
value assigned to CV1(Z), as the total value of knowledge in the set may greater than the 




In the simple case of no synergy, both joining is a Nash Equilibrium if CV1(X)  +   
CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y)  and CV2(Z)  +   CV2(Y)  >  PV2(Z)  +   PV2(Y) .    
 
Conclusion: CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y)  and CV2(Z)  +   CV2(Y)  >  
PV2(Z)  +   PV2(Y) are (jointly) sufficient for both joining to be a Nash equilibrium. 
 
A modified version of Model 7.3 assumes an existing consortium, rather than a possible 
new consortium formed by players 1 and 2 only. In this case, the parameter Kc is used to 
encompass existing consortium knowledge as follows. 
 
Model 7.4:  Restricted Access; Acting Consortium in Existence 
A modified version of Model 7.3 may include an existing consortium rather than the 
formation of a new consortium including only players 1 and 2. In this case, the parameter 
Kc is used to encompass existing consortium knowledge as follows: 
 
 Player 2 Joins2 Player 2 Does Not 
Join 
Player 1 Joins CV1(K1  K2  Kc), 
CV2(K1  K2  Kc) 
CV1(K1  Kc), 
PV2(K2)     
Player 1 Does 
Not Join 
PV1(K1),  
CV2(K2  Kc) 
PV1(K1),  
PV2(K2) 
Table 7.5: Participating in the Restricted Access Setting; Consortium in Existence  
 
In the restricted access setting, as only members can enjoy the common value of 
consortium knowledge, the parameter Kc is mathematically significant and can be a 
factor in the decisions taken by each player. For simplicity, we assume that  
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Kc   (K1  K2) =  ; future research will consider the intersection of knowledge 
between a consortium of researchers and players 1 and 2.  
 
Player 1‘s Preferences:  
Assume Player 2 Joins (Column 1) 
Row 1 is preferred to Row 2 iff  
7E)  
CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  +   CV1(Z)  +   CV1(Kc)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y)    
that is, when the common value of pooled knowledge X, Y, Z, and Kc  is greater than the 
private value of knowledge X and Y held by player 1, player 1 will choose row 1 
(cooperation). 
 
Assume Player 2 Does Not Join (Column 2) 
Row 1 is preferred to Row 2 iff 
7F)  
CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  +   CV1(Kc)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y)   
that is, when the common value of knowledge X and Y held by player 1 and pooled with 
consortium knowledge Kc, is greater than the private value of knowledge X and Y, player 
1 will choose row 1  (cooperation). 
 
The analysis of player 2‘s actions will be similar to what is given above for player 1, with 
the only change being the replacement of parameter X with parameter Z i.e., knowledge 
that is unilaterally known by player 2.  In each of the models that follow below, we only 
describe player 1‘s preferences keeping in mind that player 2‘s preferences will be 




Suppose CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) and CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y). Since CV1(Z)  and CV1(Kc) > 0 then 
CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y) +   CV1(Z) +   CV1(Kc)   >   PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) , so both 7E and 7F 
hold. Therefore, joining is a strictly dominant strategy for player 1; player 1 joins 
regardless of player 2‘s choice.  
 
If however, CV1(X)  >  PV1(X)  but PV1(Y)  >  CV1(Y), joining may no longer be a strictly 
dominant strategy for player 1; now the outcome may depend on the common value of 
consortium knowledge Kc and/or the common value of Z or player 2‘s choice. The same 
conclusion follows if CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y)  but PV1(X)  >  CV1(X). In both cases, however, 
if CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  +   CV1(Kc)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) given the value assigned to 
CV1(Z),  still holds true, then joining will be a strictly dominant strategy for player 1.  
 
Again, if we consider the possible synergy between knowledge units, it may be possible 
to assume that CV1(X)  +  CV1(Y)  +  CV1(Kc)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) , even if CV1(X)  >  
PV1(X)  but PV1(Y)  >  CV1(Y) or CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y)  but PV1(X)  >  CV1(X) given the 
value assigned to CV1(Z), as the total value of knowledge in the set may greater than the 
sum of values of the individual knowledge units that comprise the set.  
 
 
In the simple case of no synergy, both joining is a Nash Equilibrium if CV1(X)  +   
CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y)  and CV2(Z)  +   CV2(Y)  >  PV2(Z)  +   PV2(Y) .    
 
Conclusion: CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y)  and CV2(Z)  +   CV2(Y)  >  
PV2(Z)  +   PV2(Y) are (jointly) sufficient for both joining to be a Nash equilibrium. 
 
In the sections that follow, we consider various scenarios where each quadrant is a 
possible stable equilibrium by changing the common and private values of knowledge. 
For simplicity, we evaluate decisions in the two-player setting where a consortium is not 
in existence (from the outset) i.e., Models 7.1 and 7.3. Players can cooperate (C) by 
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joining/forming a consortium and adhering to consortium rules regarding knowledge 
dissemination or can defect (D) by not joining/forming a consortium and withholding 
knowledge. We use numerical values for the common and private values of knowledge to 
demonstrate the utility of the models developed in section 7.3 to the biopharmaceutical 
industry—with specific reference to the formation of large-scale consortium in the post-
genome era.  
 
7.4 Signaling Intentions 
In this example, we consider the situation where the private value of knowledge is greater 
than the common value of knowledge. This might reflect the scenario where researchers 
have moved further downstream into product development and knowledge while high in 
complementarity, possibly high in applicability, is substitutable. Hence, researchers 
should avoid disclosing this knowledge for fear of providing competitors an advantage in 
downstream development. Once this knowledge is disclosed, a competitor may easily 
come up with an alternative solution or product that may not have been possible prior to 
disclosure. 
 PVi (X) > CVi (X) 
PVi (Y) > CVi (Y) 
PVi (Z) > CVi (Z) 
For simplicity, we assume that both players can equivalently exploit the knowledge—
hence the common and private values of knowledge are equivalently expressed for both 
players.  
CV(X) =5; CV(Y) =3; CV(Z) =6 







Example 1: PUBLIC ACCESS  
 C22 D2 
C1 14, 14 8, 16 
D1 18, 9 13, 12 * 
Table 7.6: Private Value of Knowledge Exceeds Common Value of  
Knowledge in the Public Access Setting 
Researcher 1 chooses C1 or D1; the first number in each cell is Researcher 1‘s payoff. 
Researcher 2 chooses C2 or D2; the second number in each cell is Researcher 2‘s payoff. 
C=Join; D=Does Not Join; * indicates Nash Equilibrium 
 
Example 2: RESTRICTED ACCESS  
 C22 D2 
C1 14, 14 * 8, 12 
D1 13, 9 13, 12 * 
Table 7.7: Private Value of Knowledge Exceeds Common Value of  
Knowledge in the Restricted Access Setting 
Researcher 1 chooses C1 or D1; the first number in each cell is Researcher 1‘s payoff. 
Researcher 2 chooses C2 or D2; the second number in each cell is Researcher 2‘s payoff. 
C=Join; D=Does Not Join; * indicates Nash Equilibrium 
 
In the public access setting (Example 1) where free-riding is possible with respect to an 
opponent‘s knowledge and the unilateral private value of knowledge exceeds the 
common value of knowledge both researchers can have an incentive to defect. 
Interestingly in the restricted access setting (Example 2), without the ability to free-ride, 
cooperation can be very attractive if it is mutual, but defecting is proof against being a 
―sucker‖ (ending up at one‘s worst outcome), which explains why players may defect 
unless the opponent‘s cooperation is assured. In this game known as Assurance, the 
greatest potential payoff is associated with mutual cooperation; both sides know that 
mutual cooperation is preferable to mutual defection. Therefore how can cooperation be 
stabilized? Credible signals that a researcher intends to cooperate are one approach 
[Kollock, 1998]. For example, researchers may signal their quality as allies by disclosing 
private knowledge without the assurance of reciprocal benefits. Costly signaling may not 
only provide a basis for cooperation, but can also help a relationship resist invasion by 
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selfish outsiders or free-riders [Gintis et al., 2001]. Sequences of alternating decisions 
often provide the opportunity to signal cooperation, and are the basis of the famous tit-
for-tat strategy [Axelrod, 1984; Kollock, 1998]. But sequences of signals depend for their 
success on repeated interactions by individuals who know each other‘s identities and 
maintain records of past behaviour. Hence, accountability reduces the temptation to 
behave selfishly [Axelrod, 1984; Kollock, 1998].  
 
Signaling Commitment: Monetary commitments, formal commitments to the mandate 
and policies of the consortium, and mandatory licensing of products used within the 
consortium, are all examples of signals of cooperation. Upfront monetary commitments 
tend to support large-scale research, consortium management, or data management. In 
some initiatives such as the SNP Consortium, large upfront payments were made to 
support research, in other instances, such as the International Structural Biology 
Consortium, membership fees are imposed. These membership fees entitle a member to 
access beta-version software, experimental instruments, and technology that are 
developed by associated research labs and institutions. From a game perspective, these 
provisions reduced the private value of knowledge for both players, enough so as to make 
cooperation a Nash equilibrium. A similar situation could arise with an exit fee; requiring 
members who prematurely exit a consortium to pay an exit fee would reduce the 
temptation of the private payoff from ―defecting‖.  
 
Where formal commitments are made to the mandate and policies of the initiative, as in 
the case of the International Regulome Consortium, a typical participation by-law reads 
as follows:  
 
―The applicants for incorporation of the Corporation, as well as any person from 
universities, university hospital centres, research institutes and centres, any 
government, funding agencies and organizations from the public and private 
sectors, that are committed to (i) complying with the objectives of the Corporation 
and to providing the Corporation with the benefit of his knowledge; (ii) respecting 
the confidentiality of contributors as well as all applicable legal and ethical 
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obligations; and (iii) satisfying the conditions of admission set forth in the present 
by-law and in any enacted membership policy of the Corporation, may become 
members of the Corporation, upon application to the Board of Directors and 
acceptance by the Board of Directors having full discretion in that respect, the 
whole subject to the provisions of the present by law with respect to the suspension 
and expulsion, and resignation of the members.‖ 
[www.internationalregulomeconsortium.ca, 2007]. 
 
In the case of the Accelrys Combinatorial Chemistry, Accelrys Functional Proteomics 
Consortium, and Accelrys Nanotechnology Consortia, members are required to maintain 
licenses to a number of products which form the core of Consortium technology 
 
 
7.5 Technological Complexities 
We now consider the situation where the common value of knowledge is greater than the 
private value of knowledge. This might reflect the scenario where researchers are 
pursuing upstream research i.e., discovery of upstream knowledge that is significantly 
high in complementarity, possibly high in applicability, and likely low in substitutability. 
Given the complementary nature of the knowledge, technological complexities associated 
with discovery research, and the need for technological standards to enable comparative 
upstream research to occur, researchers may benefit greatly from the collective 
production and dissemination of knowledge. This now assumes  
CVi (X) > PVi (X) 
CVi (Y) > PVi (Y) 
CVi (Z) > PVi (Z) 
 
For simplicity, we assume that both players can equivalently exploit the knowledge—





CV(X) =9; CV(Y) =4; CV(Z) =8 
PV(X) =5; PV(Y) =3; PV(Z) =6 
 
Example 3: PUBLIC ACCESS  
 C22 D2 
C1 21, 21* 13, 19 
D1 17, 12 8, 9  
Table 7.8: Common Value of Knowledge Exceeds Private Value of  
Knowledge in the Public Access Setting 
 
Example 4: RESTRICTED ACCESS  
 C22 D2 
C1 21, 21 * 13, 9 
D1 8, 12 8, 9  
Table 7.9: Common Value of Knowledge Exceeds Private Value of  
Knowledge in the Restricted Access Setting 
 
As the common value of knowledge is greater than the private value of knowledge, 
cooperation strictly dominates defection in examples 3 and 4, and a researcher always 
does better by cooperating regardless of access setting.  
 
Technological Uncertainties: Drug discovery research has become associated with a 
high level of complexity as the sources of knowledge are increasingly diverse and derive 
from a wide variety of scientific fields and technological competencies. Pharmaceutical 
companies and even the larger biotechnology companies adapting to the information 
paradigm, are forming alliances with academic institutions and the smaller biotechnology 
companies that are often significantly further down the molecular biology and genomics 
learning curves, accessing both disembodied knowledge and embodied knowledge in the 
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form of therapeutics or supportive tools [Bower and Whittaker, 1992; Liebeskind et al., 
1996; Powell et al., 1996; Blumenthal et al., 1997].  Pharmaceutical firms may also need 
to form strategic alliances with their traditional competitors to similarly manage the 
complexities associated with chemical-based technologies. 
 
From our analysis in Chapter 6, it is apparent given the interconnectivity between large 
biological datasets, the need to develop tools to support complex upstream discovery 
research, and the challenges associated with downstream product development, that the 
consortium enables geographically separated researchers to collectively pool human 
capital and resources to achieve pre-defined goals. (Table 7.10) Cooperation becomes a 
Nash equilibrium as the common value of pooled knowledge exceeds the private value 
associated with secrecy or non-disclosure of knowledge. Furthermore, given these 
complexities, it is anticpated that cooperation will continue to dominate regardless of 
completion of consortium goals, as participants move into drug discovery. As long as the 
common benefits of cooperation outweight the private benefits of unilateral knowledge 
production, these participants will choose to cooperate.  
Technological Uncertainty Driving 
Consortium Participation 
Example Consortium 
Scale of Analysis Functional Proteomics Consortium; HapMap 
Project; Human Epigenome Consortium; 
Human Genome Consortium; Mouse 
Genome Sequencing Project; Structural 
Genomics Consortium 
Interconnectivity of Biological 
Knowledge 
AfCS; Hepatosys; CFG; International 
Molecular Exchange Consortium; Lipid 
Maps Consortium 
Tool Development to Support 
Complex Upstream Discovery 
Research 
Collaborative Cross; Combinatorial 
Chemistry Consortium; Knockout Mouse 
Project; MMHCC 
Downstream Product Development 
Challenges 
Cancer Vaccine Consortium; International 
Genomics Consortium;  Osteoarthritis 
Initiative 




Establishing a Technology Standard: To encourage the adoption of supportive tools, 
companies such as Agilent are enabling the formation of open innovation communities 
via the Agilent shared-design microarray program. The program facilitates a novel way 
of doing business with Agilent; scientists share their custom microarray designs with 
designated groups while either maintaining control of their intellectual property or 
sharing knowledge with the scientific community at large. Although the technology is 
highly substitutable, Agilent‘s program hopes to lock researchers into its technology by 
developing complementary linkages to knowledge databases and convincing researchers 
of the breadth of application of its microarray technology [Arthur, 1989]. By ensuring 
compatibility with software and flexibility in microarray customization, and by 
encouraging adoption within research consortia, Agilent is effectively trying to tip the 
market toward its technology—assuring researchers that there are increasing returns to 
adoption of its microarray technology [Arthur, 1989]. In this case, Agilent is encouraging 
cooperation and increasing the common value of knowledge to establish a technology 
standard on the market.  
 
7.6 Differential Values for Knowledge 
We now modify our assumption that both players can equivalently exploit knowledge. 
Rather, the situation may arise that one player may not have the internal resources or 
capabilities to privately exploit knowledge or due to project planning issues may not 
equivalently value knowledge for private, downstream development. Then the common 
values of knowledge will be the same for both players, but the private values may differ.  
CV1(X) =7; CV1(Y) =4; CV1(Z) =9 
CV2(X) =7; CV2(Y) =4; CV2(Z) =9 
PV1(X) =5; PV1(Y) =2; PV1(Z) =6 






Example 5: PUBLIC ACCESS  
 C22 D2 
C1 20, 20 11, 21* 
D1 18, 13 7, 15 
Table 7.11: Differential Valuation of Knowledge in the Public Access Setting 
 
In this game (example 5), player 1 strongly prefers to cooperate whereas player 2 
strongly prefers to defect.  
 
Free-Riding: In the case of the Human Genome Project, public sector researchers agreed 
that by publicly disclosing genomic data, greater value would be created through the 
scrutiny and validation of knowledge. Celera on the other hand, was accountable to its 
private shareholders. For Celera, maintaining shareholder value did not include 
cooperation through openness of research data, but meant paid access to a proprietary 
sequence database and a set of tools to mine the information. In this case, Celera was 
better off defecting.  
 
With the formal release of two versions of the Human Genome sequence on February 
12th 2001, many viewers agreed that Celera‘s genome was more accurate, easier to read, 
and more complete than the public Human Genome version.  Scientists who had started 
using Celera‘s map further asserted that it is ―fast becoming the preferred way to search 
for genes…‖ [Hensley, 2001].   However, public sector researchers argued that Celera‘s 
database was clearly enriched by access to public databases and that without such access, 







Example 6: RESTRICTED ACCESS  
 C22 D2 
C1 20, 20* 11, 15 
D1 7, 13 7, 15  
Table 7.12: Differential Valuation of Knowledge in the Restricted Access Setting 
 
Continuing with the above example, if Celera‘s efforts were indeed made more effective 
by the public sector initiative, then in the restricted access setting—without access to 
public data—Celera may not have enjoyed the same private payoffs from defection. 
Hence, in example 6, both players‘ payoffs favour cooperation.  
 
 
7.7 Increasing the Common Value of Joint Knowledge  
In this case, we consider the impact of increasing the common value of what is jointly 
knowledge by both players.  
PVi (X) > CVi (X) 
PVi (Z) > CVi (Z) 
CVi (Y)>PVi (Y) 
 
For simplicity, we assume that both players can equivalently exploit the knowledge—
hence the common and private values of knowledge are equivalently expressed for both 
players.  
CV(X) =5; CV(Y) =10; CV(Z) =6 






Example 7: PUBLIC ACCESS  
 C22 D2 
C1 21, 21 15, 23* 
D1 25, 16* 13, 12  
Table 7.13: Increasing the Common Value of Joint  
Knowledge in the Public Access Setting 
 
In the above game (example 7), which is equivalent to Chicken, both players receive the 
largest payoff when unilaterally defecting.  While player 1 receives a payoff of 25 by 
unilaterally defecting, player 2 receives the payoff of 16 (more than he/she would receive 
if both defected). Similarly, when player 2 defects and receives the payoff of 23, player 1 
receives the payoff of 15 (again, larger than the payoff he/she would receive if both 
defected). Although both players would be better off cooperating, given the public access 
setting, each player can openly enjoy the common value of what is known by the other 
player, including what is jointly known, without having to disclose knowledge X or Z 
respectively. If however, we change the access setting, unilateral defection no longer 
pays as well.  
 
Example 8: RESTRICTED ACCESS  
 C22 D2 
C1 21, 21* 15, 12 
D1 13, 16 13, 12  
Table 7.14: Increasing the Common Value of Joint  
Knowledge in the Restricted Access Setting 
 
In the restricted access setting, should a player choose defection, this player can only 
enjoy the private value of knowledge i.e., the common value of knowledge including 
knowledge unit Y, can only be enjoyed by members. Hence, it no longer pays to defect 
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unilaterally. Mutual cooperation is instead a Nash equilibrium in this game; in fact, 
cooperation is a strictly dominant strategy for both players.    
 
Building Absorptive Capacity: Given the complexities associated with drug discovery 
and development technologies, members can have the opportunity to access knowledge 
and technology early in the discovery process through membership in knowledge 
networks. Accelerated access to complex technologies as well as the absorptive capacity 
developed in a collaborative learning-by-doing setting can enable members to 
competitively manage both their cost and time to market during product development 
[Cohen and Levinthal, 1990]. 
 
The Accelrys Nanotechnology Consortium for example (as is the case for all three 
Accelrys Consortia), provides a project framework that addresses the challenges of 
rational nanomaterials and nanodevice design. The Consortium gives members an edge in 
their R&D, increasing both its efficiency and effectiveness. It will further enhance the 
impact of software tools, contributing to R&D cost savings, supporting patent 
applications, facilitating interdisciplinary research, and supporting a smooth ongoing ‗lab 
to fab‘ transition. 
 
7.8 Discussion  
The game models developed and validated in this chapter provide an effective illustration 
of the implications of changing incentives to participate in cooperative alliances. (Table 
7.15) Interestingly, in most cases, the incentive is to cooperate via participation in an 
alliance in the restricted access setting—thereby accessing required knowledge. But when 
the private value of knowledge exceeds its common value, the incentive to cooperate is 
assured only if another researcher also cooperates (row 1, Table 7.15). Therefore, 
signaling one‘s intentions to cooperate may be necessary to ensure that mutual 




Understandably, if knowledge can be readily accessed without participation, and the 
private value of knowledge is greater than the common value of knowledge, defection is 
generally the outcome (row 1, Table 7.15); similarly, when the common value of 
knowledge exceeds the private value of knowledge, mutual cooperation is the preferred 
outcome (row 2, Table 7.15).  In the case where players 1 and 2 differentially value 
knowledge, i.e., for player 1 the common value of knowledge exceeds the private value 
of knowledge and vice versa for player 2 (row 3, Table 7.15), player 1 is the sole 
cooperator. When the common value of joint knowledge is increased (row 4 Table 7.15), 
and both players would benefit from mutual cooperation, a player that chooses unilateral 
cooperation still enjoys a larger payoff by cooperating rather than defecting; mutual 
cooperation is instead assured in the restricted access setting.  
 
Test Outcome of Game- 
Public Access 
Outcome of Game- 
Restricted Access 
PVi (X,Y,Z) > CVi (X,Y,Z) Defection Cooperation or Defection 
CVi (X,Y,Z) > PVi (X,Y,Z) Cooperation Cooperation 
CV1(X,Y,Z) > PV1(X,Y,Z);  
PV2(X,Y,Z) > CV2(X,Y,Z) 
Unilateral Defection by 
Player 2 
Cooperation 
PVi (X,Z) > CVi (X,Z);  
CVi (Y)>PVi (Y) 
Unilateral Defection  Cooperation 
Table 7.15: Summary of Outcomes from the Participation Game Model 
 
In this chapter, we have analyzed different incentives to join (form) a consortium given 
the knowledge access setting. Models 7.1 to 7.4 reflect changing payoffs as both the 
access setting is changed and whether or not players 1 and 2 form a new consortium or 
join an existing consortium. Using numerical examples to demonstrate the utility of these 
models, and with reference to the analysis conducted in Chapter 6, we better understand 
the behavioural and technological drivers for cooperation. Assuming that both players 
join a consortium, in Chapter 8, we consider the decision to privately appropriate 




Chapter 8: Modeling the Decision to Appropriate from Alliances 
 
8.1 Introduction  
Once a commitment is made to participate in a knowledge network, researchers will face 
the decision on whether and when to privately appropriate knowledge from the network. 
In the case of biotechnology, appropriation most often occurs through the filing of 
patents. The common benefits from contributing to versus the private benefits associated 
with appropriating knowledge will determine when a participant will choose to signal 
his/her departure from the alliance. For example, when the private benefits from filing 
patents are higher than the common benefits from open knowledge dissemination, 
researchers will likely choose depart from the alliance [Khanna et al., 1998].   
 
In our model, the synthesis of knowledge in an alliance will create a common value CV 
related to the knowledge units jointly generated and contributed to the alliance. Private 
benefits are those that a firm can obtain unilaterally by learning from another firm. By 
pooling a partner‘s knowledge with internal firm knowledge, a firm can gain a 
competitive advantage in downstream activities. The knowledge that is held unilaterally 
will have a private value PV for its owner. We assume in our model that a firm has the 
option of capturing these private benefits by seeking a patent on the knowledge. 
  
The probability of receiving a patent will depend on whether the knowledge is 
nonobvious, novel, and has utility assuming that the patent examiner can correctly assess 
this from the existing prior art; it can also be affected by a rival firm‘s disclosure through 
the creation of patent-defeating prior art [Parchomovsky, 2000]. From a knowledge 
perspective, the value CV will derive from the characteristics associated with the 
knowledge and the value from collectively holding all of the knowledge in the public 
domain. Equivalently, the value PV derives from the characteristics of knowledge—




In this chapter, we use our game model to understand the strategic decisions made by 
firms regarding the timing of appropriation activities. The game model not only models 
the decision to file a patent, but through the use of case studies as presented in Chapter 6, 
models the decision to pre-empt rivals through disclosure—thereby preventing firms 
from prematurely enclosing upstream knowledge. (Analysis 8.1) 
 
8.2 Model Parameters  
We define the following new notation for our model (Table 8.1; see Table 7.1 for 
additional notation):  
Notation Definition 
CVi (K1 K2)   The payoff (utility) to researcher i for contributing knowledge 
to the public domain is a function of the joint contribution by 
both researchers. 
PV i (Ki) The payoff (utility) to researcher i for withholding and 
patenting knowledge (Ki); this private payoff can derive from 
internal exploitation or licensing of the knowledge. 
pi Probability of researcher i receiving a patent on Ki or Ki - Kj   
(see assumption 4). 
qi Probability of researcher i receiving a patent on the 
intersection set Ki  Kj . (see assumption 5).  
Table 8.1: Appropriation Game Model Notation
 
 
In order to define the game models, we adopt the following set notation:  
We use the parameters X, Y, and Z to represent the knowledge held by the researchers.  
For example, the knowledge held by researcher 1 includes the union of what is known 
unilaterally (X) and what is jointly known with researcher 2 (Y). Similarly, the knowledge 
held by researcher 2 includes the union of what 2 knows unilaterally (Z) and what is 
jointly known with researcher 1 (Y). Y thus represents the intersection of researcher 1‘s 
and researcher‘s 2 knowledge sets. For knowledge in Y, what is known by one researcher 
is also known by the other, i.e., with no difference in perception.   
K1    K2   =   X     Y    Z    where X   Y = X   Z = Y   Z =   
K1   =   X      Y 
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K2   =   Y     Z 
K1  –  K2   =   X 
K2  –  K1    =  Z  
K1    K2   =  Y 
 
These parameters are illustrated in the following Venn diagram: 
  
    =   
 
      K1     K2 
Figure 8.1: Graphical Representation of Knowledge in the Model 
 
We make the following assumptions: 
1. Decisions are simultaneous. 
2. No communication takes place with the exception of the game presented in Table 
8.10.  
3. Each participant is able to appropriate the full value of the consortium‘s 
knowledge. 
4. The probability of receiving a patent depends on the researcher‘s probability of 
crossing the threshold to patent, i.e., knowledge is novel, nonobvious, and has 
utility. 
5. Only one firm wins the patent on knowledge K1   K2 ; in the event that both 
researchers file for patents, the patent is awarded to one winner for K1  K2, so   
q1  +   q2  =  1. 
6. The total value of knowledge in a set is equal to the sum of values of the 
individual knowledge units that comprise the set.  
X Z Y 
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7. CV1 (K1   K2) = CV1 (X) + CV1 (Y) + CV1 (Z) and CV2 (K1   K2) = CV2 (X) + 
CV2 (Y) + CV2 (Z) where X, Y, and Z are as defined in the Venn diagram. The 
payoff (utility) to researcher i for participating and contributing knowledge, is a 
function of the joint contribution by both players.  (By assumption 6, the payoff is 
a simple additive function: in other words, the common value of joint knowledge 
units derives from the addition of the individual common values of X, Y, and Z. 
Alternatively, the common value of joint knowledge could be greater than the 
sum of the individual common values, i.e., knowledge of all parts could be worth 
more than the sum of the worth of the individual parts.)  
8.  PV1 (K1) = PV1 (X) + PV1 (Y) and PV 2 (K2) = PV2 (Z) + PV2 (Y) where X, Y, and 
Z are as defined above. (Again by assumption 6, the payoff is a simple additive 
function, implying that the private value of knowledge units derives from the 
addition of the individual private values of X or Z for players 1 and 2 respectively 
(knowledge that is known unilaterally and not disclosed) and Y (knowledge that is 
jointly known but not disclosed). Alternatively, the private value of knowledge 
could be greater than the sum of the individual private values, i.e., knowledge of 
all parts could be worth more than the sum of the worth of the individual parts.)  
 
 
8.3 The Appropriation Model 
We propose the following game model to illustrate the payoffs available to players as a 
function of the characteristics associated with knowledge and the probabilities of 
appropriating knowledge.  
 
Model 8.1: Patenting Consortium Knowledge 
In this model, we consider the decision to patent consortium knowledge. As in Chapter 7, 
we consider a consortium with two players, researchers 1 and 2.  
Strategies.  
Share Knowledge=player enjoys the common value of the knowledge shared. 
Patent Knowledge= player enjoys the private value of his/her knowledge. 
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CV1 (K1   K2), CV2(K1   K2) p2CV1(K1)  +   (1 - p2)CV1(K2    K1),  
 
p2[PV2(K2  –  K1)  +   CV2(K1)]  +   (1 – 




p1[PV1(K1  –  K2)  +   CV1(K2)]  +   (1 
- p1)CV1(K1   K2),  
 
p1CV2(K2)  +   (1 – p1)CV2(K1    K2) 
p1 p2[q1PV1(K1)  +   (1-q1)PV1(K1 - K2)]  +    
p1(1 - p2)[PV1(K1 –  K2)  +   CV1(K2)]  +   (1 - 
p1) p2 CV1(K1)   +    (1 - p1)(1 - p2) CV1(K1   
K2),  
 
p2 p1[q2PV2(K2)  +   (1-q2)PV2(K2 - K1)]  +    
p2(1 - p1)[PV2(K2  –  K1) +   CV2(K1)]  +  (1 - 
p2) p1 CV2(K2)  +     (1 – p2)(1 - p1) CV2(K1 
  K2) 
Table 8.2: A Knowledge-Based Appropriation Game Model 
  
We first analyze Player 1‘s Preferences:  
Assume Player 2 Shares Knowledge (Column 1) 
Row 1 is preferred to row 2 iff  
8A)  
CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  +   CV1(Z)  >  p1 [PV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  +   CV1(Z)]  +   (1 - 
p1)[CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y)  +   CV1(Z)] 
which is equivalent to CV1(X) > PV1(X) (assuming p1=1 for simplicity) that is, when the 
when the common value of knowledge X is greater than the private value of knowledge 
X, player 1 will choose row 1 (cooperation). In the case that p1=0, player 1 will be 
indifferent to the choice of sharing knowledge vs. the choice of patenting knowledge 




Assume Player 2 Patents Knowledge (Column 2) 
Row 1 is preferred to row 2 iff 
8B)  
p2 [CV1(X)  + CV1(Y)]  +   (1 - p2) [CV1(X)  + CV1(Y) + CV1(Z)]    >   p1 p2[q1(PV1(X) +  
PV1(Y))  +   (1 - q1)PV1(X)]  +    p1 (1 - p2) [PV1(X) + CV1(Y) + CV1(Z)]  +   (1-p1) p2 
[CV1(X)  + CV1(Y)]     +    (1 - p1)(1 - p2) [CV1(X)  + CV1(Y) + CV1(Z)]     
which is equivalent to p1CV1(X)  +   p1p2 CV1(Y)  > p1PV1(X) + p1p2q1PV1(Y) and 
simplifies to CV1(X)  +   p2 CV1(Y)  > PV1(X) + p2q1PV1(Y) given assumptions 7 and 8.   
 
When p2=0 then player 1 chooses row 1 (cooperation) when the common value of X is 
greater than the private value of X. In this case, cooperation is a strictly dominant strategy 
for player 1; player 1 joins regardless of player 2‘s choice.  
 
When p2=1, but q1=0, then player 1 chooses row 1 (cooperation) when the common 
values of X and Y are greater than the private value of X. If CV1(X)  >  PV1(X), 
cooperation is a strictly dominant strategy for player 1 since CV1(Y)  >  0; player 1 shares 
knowledge regardless of player 2‘s choice. 
 
Finally, when p2 =1 and q1 =1, then player 1 chooses row 1 (cooperation) when the 
common values of X and Y are greater than the private values of X and Y. If CV1(X)  >  
PV1(X) and CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y), then CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y) >   PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y). 
Therefore, sharing knowledge is a strictly dominant strategy for player 1; player 1 shares 
knowledge regardless of player 2‘s choice.  
 
If however, CV1(X)  >  PV1(X)  but PV1(Y)  >  CV1(Y), sharing knowledge may no longer 
be a strictly dominant strategy for player 1; now the actual outcome may depend on 
player 2‘s choice. The situation is similar if CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y)  but PV1(X)  >  CV1(X).  
 
If we consider the possible synergy between knowledge units, it may be possible to 
assume that CV1(X)  +  CV1(Y)  >  PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) , even if CV1(X)  >  PV1(X)  but 
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PV1(Y)  >  CV1(Y) or CV1(Y)  >  PV1(Y)  but PV1(X)  >  CV1(X) as the total value of 
knowledge in the set may greater than the sum of values of the individual knowledge 
units that comprise the set. Future research will assess this synergy between knowledge 
units.  
 
Equivalently, Player 2‘s Preferences:   
 
When p1=0 then player 2 chooses column 1 (cooperation) when the common value of Z is 
greater than the private value of Z. In this case, cooperation is a strictly dominant strategy 
for player 2; player 2 shares knowledge regardless of player 1‘s choice.  
 
When p1=1, but q2=0, then player 2 chooses column 1 or cooperation when the common 
values of Z and Y are greater than the private value of Z. If CV2(Z)  >  PV2(Z) cooperation 
is a strictly dominant strategy for player 2 since CV2(Y)  >  0; player 2 shares knowledge 
regardless of player 1‘s choice. 
 
Finally, when p1=1 and q2=1, then player 2 chooses column 1 or cooperation when the 
common values of Z and Y are greater than the private values of Z and Y. If CV2(Z)  >  
PV2(Z) and CV2(Y)  >  PV2(Y), then CV2(Z)  +   CV2(Y)  >  PV2(Z)  +   PV2(Y). 
Therefore, sharing knowledge is a strictly dominant strategy for player 2; player 2 shares 
knowledge regardless of player 1‘s choice.  
 
If however, CV2(Z)  >  PV2(Z)  but PV2(Y)  >  CV2(Y), sharing knowledge may no longer 
be a strictly dominant strategy for player 2; now the actual outcome may depend on 
player 1‘s choice. The situation is similar if CV2(Y)  >  PV2(Y)  but PV2(Z)  >  CV2(Z).  
 
If we consider the possible synergy between knowledge units, it may be possible to 
assume that CV2(Z)  +  CV2(Y)  >  PV2(Z)  +   PV2(Y) , even if CV2(Z)  >  PV2(Z)  but 
PV2(Y)  >  CV2(Y) or CV2(Y)  >  PV2(Y)  but PV2(Z)  >  CV2(Z) as the total value of 
192 
 
knowledge in the set may greater than the sum of values of the individual knowledge 
units that comprise the set.   
 
When p1=0 and p2=0 players are indifferent to the choice of sharing knowledge vs. the 
choice of patenting knowledge as both strategies result in the same respective payoff. 
When p1=1, q1=1 (hence q2=0) and p2=1 both sharing knowledge is a Nash Equilibrium if 
CV1(X)  +   CV1(Y) >   PV1(X)  +   PV1(Y) and CV2(Z)  >  PV2(Z).  
When p1=1, q2 =1 (hence q1=0) and p2=1 both sharing knowledge is a Nash Equilibrium 
if CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) and CV2(Z)  +   CV2(Y) >   PV2(Z)  +   PV2(Y) 
When p1=1 and p2=0 both sharing knowledge is a Nash Equilibrium if CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) 
When p1=0 and p2=1 sharing knowledge is a Nash Equilibrium if CV2(Z)  >  PV2(Z) 
 
Conclusion: CV1(X)  >  PV1(X) and CV2(Z)  >  PV2(Z) are (jointly) sufficient for both 
sharing to be a Nash equilibrium 
 
Figure 8.2 provides an extensive form representation of the events in our model.  
[CV1 (K1   K2), CV2(K1   K2)]
(1-q)
















[CV1(K1), PV2(K2  –  K1)  +   CV2(K1)]
 
[PV1(K1  –  K2)  +   CV1(K2), CV2(K2)]
[PV1(K1), PV2(K2 - K1)] 
[PV1(K1 - K2), PV2(K2)]
[PV1(K1 –  K2)  +   CV1(K2),  CV2(K2)]

































We validate our model by showing that payoffs exist that are consistent with the previous 
discussion and that yield the outcomes observed in our case examples. In our models, two 
researchers can either cooperate (C) through full knowledge dissemination, or defect (D) 
by patenting and privatizing knowledge. Payoffs are expressed as numerical values. With 
respect to the probability of receiving a patent, for simplicity, we assume that both 
players can patent knowledge with probability 1 (although this is not always the case and 
future research will consider varied probabilities for patenting knowledge) and in most 
cases player 2 wins the right to patent knowledge that is jointly known.  
 
8.4 Enjoying the Private Value of Knowledge 
First, we study the implication of private values for knowledge that are higher than the 
corresponding common values.  
PVi (X) > CVi (X) 
PVi (Y) > CVi (Y) 
PVi (Z) > CVi (Z) 
For simplicity, we assume that both players can equivalently exploit the knowledge—






CV(X) =5; CV(Y) =2; CV(Z) =6 





 C22 D2 
C1 13, 13 7, 15 
 D1 17, 8 9, 12* 
Table 8.3: Private Knowledge Exceeds Common Knowledge  
Researcher 1 chooses C1 or D1; the first number in each cell is Researcher 1‘s numerical payoff. 
Researcher 2 chooses C2 or D2; the second number in each cell is Researcher 2‘s numerical payoff. 
C=Cooperate; D=Defect; * indicates Nash Equilibrium 
 
In example 1 (Table 8.3), both players can choose to file a patent on knowledge. Given 
that the private values of knowledge are greater than the common values, the best 
decision for both players is to defect. From the perspective of knowledge types, the above 
model is (at least we advocate should be) typical in the downstream development of 
drugs, diagnostics, and tools. In the genomics era, although drugs may be highly 
dependent on complementary upstream knowledge, drugs are substitutable by both 
competitor brands and generics. Interestingly, the incentive to race to market a drug first 
will be stronger as the market size (or applicability) increases.  
 
In the development phase, competition between firms with different approaches can be 
beneficial, especially if the exclusivity period for a first break-through drug is relatively 
short, with ―me-too‖ brand drugs rapidly available so that consumers have access to 
competitively-priced alternatives. As Table 8.3 shows, although each player may strongly 
prefer unilateral defection, both players are better off defecting. Of course both are better 
off cooperating, but it is no surprise that this outcome is highly unstable since the game is 
a version of Prisoner‘s Dilemma (see Chapters 1 and 2).  
 
Consider the example of Tagamet, a breakthrough drug in antiulcer therapies that was 
introduced in 1977. Tagamet was the first drug to relieve ulcers by blocking the 
histamine 2 (H2) receptors in the lining of the stomach from stimulating acid production 
by the parietal cells. Six years after Tagamet became available, a second H2 antagonist, 
Zantac, was approved; it eventually became the largest-selling drug in both the United 
States and the world. By 1989, two additional H2 antagonists, Pepcid and Axid, were 
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available. Thus, four slightly different drugs using the same therapeutic mechanism 
(blocking the H2 receptor) were all patentable, and the breakthrough drug had only six 
years of market exclusivity before being challenged by a competitor using a similar 
compound [Berndt et al., 1994]. According to the Pharmaceutical Care Management 
Association in Washington, as many as 70 brand-name drugs will lose their patent 
protection over the next five years, enabling for strong generic competition. Some 
popular drugs that are currently open to generic imitators include Ambien, a sleep aid, 
antidepressants Wellbutrin, Zoloft, and Xanax, and Zocor, a cholesterol-lowering drug 
[Mighty Statins, 2006]. 
 
Similarly, although tools that support drug discovery and development and diagnostics 
that predict drug response or identify disease may be highly dependent on complementary 
upstream knowledge, such as gene sequences, SNPs, or drug targets, these downstream 
products may be substituted by competing products. In each of these cases, we argue that 
competition may be beneficial since the target of knowledge appropriation will be 
downstream products and not the upstream knowledge itself. Interestingly, the Cancer 
Vaccine Consortium and the Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS) both focus 
on downstream product development, but have opted for collective knowledge 
production and dissemination.  
 
To address the networking, clinical, and regulatory needs of corporations, organizations, 
and researchers working in cancer vaccines, the Sabin Vaccine Institute organized the 
Cancer Vaccine Consortium. The goal of the consortium is to accelerate the process of 
bringing cancer vaccines from the development stage to the clinic. The members of the 
consortium benefit from dynamic exchanges of data, standardization of assays, potential 
identification of combination therapies, and shared knowledge management. Overall 
benefits also include accelerated vaccine development and reduced product development 





The BiOS Initiative enables open access to patented and patentable technologies for 
public benefit. Under a BiOS-compliant agreement, a user must agree to conditions that 
encourage cooperation and development of the technology instead of royalties or other 
conditions that discourage creation of products. For example, licensees cannot 
appropriate core technology and improvements exclusively.  The base technology 
remains the property of the original inventor, but improvements can be shared with others 
supporting the development of a protected commons around the technology; all those 
who agree to the terms of sharing obtain access to improvements and other information 
[www.bios.net, 2007].  
 
8.5 Enjoying the Common Value of Knowledge  
Here we study the implication of common values for knowledge that are higher than the 
corresponding private values.  
CVi (X) > PVi (X) 
CVi (Y) > PVi (Y) 
CVi (Z) > PVi (Z) 
 
For simplicity, we assume that both players can equivalently exploit the knowledge—






CV(X) =7; CV(Y) =4; CV(Z) =9 
PV(X) =5; PV(Y) =2; PV(Z) =6 
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 C22 D2 
C1 20, 20* 11, 17 
D1 18, 13 5, 8 
Table 8.4: Common Knowledge Exceeds Private Knowledge 
 
In example 2 (Table 8.4), both players can choose to file a patent on knowledge. 
However, given that the common values of knowledge are greater than the private values, 
the best decision for both players is to cooperate. From the perspective of knowledge 
types, the above model is (at least we advocate should be) typical of upstream discovery 
research. In the systems biology era, upstream knowledge has become increasingly 
complex, highly complementary, and applicable across multiple diseases and human 
biological processes. Furthermore, genomic sequences, protein sequences, and biological 
systems are not substitutable (despite being analyzed in artificial form). The knowledge 
embodied in these biological components cannot be duplicated. As such, we advocate 
that to ensure downstream technological opportunities are preserved for multiple 
researchers, this knowledge should be openly disclosed or at least readily accessible 
through favourable licensing terms as is the case for many of the consortia analyzed in 
Chapter 6 [Merges, 1996; Maurer, 2003; Nelson 2003; Walsh et al., 2003]. 
 
8.6 Differential Valuation of Knowledge 
In this example, we study the implication of differential values for the common and 
private values for knowledge for players 1 and 2.  
CV1 (X) > PV1 (X) 
CV1 (Y) > PV1 (Y) 
CV1 (Z) > PV1 (Z) 
PV2 (X) > CV2 (X) 
PV2 (Y) > CV2 (Y) 







CV1(X) =7; CV1(Y) =4; CV1(Z) =9 
CV2(X) =7; CV2(Y) =4; CV2(Z) =9 
PV1(X) =5; PV1(Y) =2; PV1(Z) =6 
PV2(X)=8; PV2(Y) =5; PV2(Z) =10 
 C22 D2 
C1 20, 20 11, 21* 
D1 18, 13 5, 15 
Table 8.5: Differential Values for Private Knowledge  
 
In example 3 (Table 8.5), we assume that the players are different, giving them different 
preferences over private and public knowledge. For player 1, the common value of 
knowledge exceeds the private value of knowledge. Consequently, player 1 strongly 
prefers cooperation. Conversely, for player 2, the private value of knowledge is greater 
than the common value of knowledge, so player 2 strongly prefers defection. At the 
unique Nash equilibrium, player 1 ends up being the sole cooperator.  
 
As an example, although gene sequences are complementary in nature, non-substitutable, 
and high in applicability in downstream research activities, researchers may differentially 
exploit them. In the above model, player 1 may not be able to privately use these 
sequences (or even perceive the private value given the current state of knowledge), 
whereas player 2 may be able to use these exact sequences to develop a genomic-based 
drug, a microarray tool with the sequences spotted on the solid matrix used in probing 
biological samples, or even a diagnostic that uses the sequences to predict drug response 
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or disease development. Player 2 will likely patent not only the drug, tool, or diagnostic, 
but also the sequences physically embodied in these products (or to be embodied at a 
future date) to maximize on (future) private value.  
 
In the case of Laboratory Corporation vs. Metabolite Laboratories, at stake is the 
validity of a patent held by Metabolite Laboratories that claims a monopoly over a basic 
scientific relationship used in diagnosis and medical treatment [Eisenberg, 2006]. Justice 
Breyer outlines in his Supreme Court Opinion:  
 
―This case involves a patent that claims a process for helping to diagnose 
deficiencies of two vitamins, folate and cobalamin. The process consists of using 
any test (whether patented or unpatented) to measure the level in a body fluid of an 
amino acid called homocysteine and then noticing whether its level is elevated 
above the norm; if so, a vitamin deficiency is likely. 
 
The lower courts held that the patent claim is valid. They also found the petitioner, 
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (LabCorp), liable for inducing 
infringement of the claim when it encouraged doctors to order diagnostic tests for 
measuring homocysteine. The courts assessed damages. And they enjoined 
LabCorp from using any tests that would lead the doctors it serves to find a vitamin 
deficiency by taking account of elevated homocysteine levels.‖ [Breyer, Supreme 
Court Opinion, 2006].  
 
Breyer argues that this is a matter of a correlation between the presence of homocysteine 
and the relevant vitamin deficiencies (clearly a natural phenomenon), and is not 
convinced by Metabolite‘s argument that the patent claim is actually an application of 
this unprotectable relationship [Breyer, Supreme Court Opinion, 2006]. On June 23rd
 
2006, the Supreme Court dismissed the case from its docket, saving the decision for 





8.7 The Dilemma of Defection in Upstream Discovery Research 
Where intellectual property rights are the major consideration, the timing of appropriation 
may determine whether all downstream medical opportunities can be exploited. Fully 
disclosing knowledge will facilitate future collaboration, while appropriating knowledge 
strengthens a researcher‘s bargaining position for trading knowledge. The former choice 
is cooperation—the researcher places knowledge in the public domain where it is readily 
accessible for downstream application development. The latter choice is defection—the 
researcher has the option of using enclosed knowledge as a bargaining tool, i.e., to trade 
for knowledge held by others.  
 
Example 4 (Table 8.6) is a game model that can be used to understand this dilemma. 
There are no particular gains to an individual who defects, but a researcher who is the 
sole cooperator risks being unable to bargain for access to enclosed knowledge, or may 
be forced to pay large royalties for access. Despite the greater payoff from cooperation, 
defecting is proof against the ―sucker‖ outcome (the lowest payoff) [Merges, 1996]. 
Minimax (sometimes minmax) is a strategy for minimizing the maximum possible loss. 
Alternatively, it can be thought of as maximizing the minimum gain (maximin). For 
example in the Prisoner‘s Dilemma, the minimax strategy for each prisoner is to betray 
the other even though they would each do better if neither confessed their guilt. In 
example 4, therefore, the minimax strategy is to defect as proof against receiving the 
sucker payoff, despite the higher payoff associated with cooperation.  
 
Example 4: 
 C22 D2 
C1 4, 4* 1, 3 
D1 3, 1 2, 2* 
Table 8.6: The Dilemma of Defection in Upstream Discovery Research 
 
As discovery knowledge becomes increasingly complementary and broadly applicable, 
patents provide a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis other researchers who need access 
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to the protected knowledge. The above dilemma becomes severe as the defector‘s 
uncertainty about the future increases. Although researchers may improve their 
bargaining position with respect to protected knowledge, researchers who defect earlier in 
time may be less able to bargain in the future, as researchers who remember past actions 
and who hold vital knowledge may not be so eager to bargain with the defector [Kollock, 
1998]. Hence, a defector‘s freedom to operate may be compromised in any case.    
 
The key to understanding the behaviour of research organizations is to recognize the 
transition point—when knowledge characteristics change to make the gains during 
downstream development activities from privatization more valuable than the benefits 
from knowledge disclosure. As discussed earlier, once the development of medical 
products and applications predominates, the greater gains associated with being first to 
market will make defection inevitable.  
 
 
8.8 Changing the Game 
Companies can unilaterally force other competitors to delay their appropriation activities 
to when the characteristics of knowledge change so that privatization of knowledge is of 
strategic value for all parties. During the Human Genome Project, Merck financed a 
separate program to identify sequences in May of 1994, making all sequences publicly 
available without delay or commitment regarding use.  Merck provided financing, in the 
range of $10 million to Washington University, to produce hundreds of thousands of 
human sequences [Kluge, 2003]. The development of the Merck Gene Index created prior 
art data with the intention of defeating competitor intentions to enclose human sequences.  
 
In October of 1994, Britain‘s Wellcome Trust hosted a meeting with genome leaders to 
discuss whether to use a private collection of sequences as part of the large-scale effort to 
map the location of genes. Leaders strongly opposed using these sequences and instead 
supported the initiative that had been proposed by Merck [Davies, 2001]. Analysts note 
that Merck‘s decision was not entirely ―altruistic‖; Merck wanted to challenge competitor 
SmithKline-Beecham‘s hold over a private database. Like other big pharma companies, 
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Merck did not have access to the private database [Marshall, 1996; Davies, 2001]. In this 
sense, Merck unilaterally moved the transition point by using a pre-emptive disclosure 





CV(X) =5; CV(Y) =3; CV(Z) =2 
PV(X) =6; PV(Y) =9; PV(Z) =4 
 
 C22 D2 
C1 10, 10 8, 12* 
D1 11, 5 6, 13 
Table 8.8: Pre-empting Rivals through Disclosure 
 
In example 5 (Table 8.8), both players can choose to patent. However, only player 2 
strongly prefers to do so. To prevent player 2 from achieving the payoff 13 via patenting 
both Y and Z knowledge units and leaving player 1 with the private payoff of 6 from X 
knowledge unit, player 1 pre-empts player 2 by disclosing X and Y and placing them in 
the public domain.  
 
Merck‘s pre-emptive strategy was a response to a competitor‘s defection. In other 
scenarios, players sometimes pre-empt rivals at the outset of research. An example of an 
upfront strategic move (to level the playing field in downstream research and 
development activities) is the Broad-Novartis Diabetes Initiative. In October 2004, 
Novartis, MIT‘s Broad Institute, and Harvard announced a joint project to decipher the 
genetic causes of type 2 diabetes. The Broad-Novartis Diabetes Initiative planned to 
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place all findings about type 2 diabetes directly onto the Internet. Novartis believed that 
the benefits of openness would outweigh those of secrecy: ―I‘m doing this to make a 
statement in the world of medical science that the patient should come first. You gain 
much more by being open‖, stated Mark Fishman, President of Novartis‘ biomedical 
efforts. While the team would not file patents on the database, it would allow others to 
patent new therapies or diagnostic tests (delaying appropriation to downstream activities) 
based on the shared information [Lawler, 2004].  
 
An interesting situation also arises when we simply reverse the common and private 
payoffs for knowledge unit Y as shown in Table 8.9.  
 
Example 6:  
p1=1; p2=1 
q1=0; q2=1 
CV(X) =5; CV(Y) =9; CV(Z) =2 
PV(X) =6; PV(Y) =3; PV(Z) =4 
 
 C22 D2 
C1 16, 16 14, 18* 
D1 17, 11* 6, 7 
Table 8.9: Multiple Equilibria 
 
In example 6 (Table 8.9), with an increase in the common value of knowledge unit Y, we 
have multiple equilibria. If player 1 chooses defection, player 2‘s best strategy is to 
choose cooperation, placing both knowledge units Y and Z into the public domain. 
Alternatively, if player 2 chooses defection, player 1‘s best strategy is to choose 
cooperation, placing both knowledge units X and Y into the public domain. It is the 
common value of Y that encourages a player to seek cooperation when the opponent 
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chooses privatization. Player 1 enjoys the payoff of 14 from the common values of X and 
Y when choosing cooperation against player 2‘s decision to defect, rather than also 
defecting to receive the payoff of 6.  
 
 
8.9 Changing the Rules 
Cooperative enterprises such as consortia have explicit rules about sharing research. The 
use of binding agreements ensures that the incentive to cooperate dominates the incentive 
to defect as shown in example 7 (Table 8.10).  
Example 7: 
 C22 D2 
C1 4, 4* 3, 1 
D1 1, 3 2, 2 
Table 8.10: Jointly Moving the Transition Point 
 
The success of the Human Genome Project highlighted the advantages of the consortium 
structure. Ostrom et al. (1994) discusses the role in consortia of deontological statements, 
which define what is obligatory, permitted, or forbidden. Obligations can affect the 
structure of an interaction, producing incentives that change the outcome. Rules may 
reflect conscious choices by actors, or may evolve with time as participants develop a 
shared understanding of which actions led to better outcomes in the past [Ostrom, et al., 
1994]. 
 
In the Human Genome Project, for instance, the accelerated timetable for entry of new 
DNA sequences into a publicly accessible database under the ―Bermuda rules‖ (within 24 
hours of discovery), made it difficult for grantees to file patent applications prior to 
public disclosure [Marshall, 2001]. Eisenberg uses a similar idea to explain the 
motivation of the SNP Consortium, whose members could not obtain access to any 
components of the SNP map prior to their public release. The Consortium members filed 
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provisional patents to record the date of each SNP at the United States Patent and Trade 
Office (USPTO), serving as proof of priority in the event of any future claims for 
ownership [Eisenberg, 2000; Kluge 2003]. However, others argue that the SNP 
Consortium pre-emptively chose to place the SNPs into the public domain and mark the 
dates of priority so that competitors such as Abbott Laboratories of Chicago and Genset 
of Paris could not enclose this vital knowledge.  
 
Fears that this promising new technology might be tied up in commercial claims were 
discussed at a meeting of the advisory council to the National Human Genome Research 
Institute (NHGRI) in 1997. In a session moderated by Alan Williamson, Vice President 
for research strategy worldwide of Merck, the group discussed what Williamson called a 
―pre-emptive strike‖ against the commercialization of SNPs. While some panelists 
wanted NHGRI to issue a manifesto aimed at discouraging such patents, the majority 
suggested that NHGRI simply assemble a new repository of human genetic SNPs and 
release them unconditionally to the public [Marshall, 1997]. 
 
In Chapter 6, we discussed the strategies used by 39 consortia to manage complex 
knowledge production. The rules and agreements used by selected consortia, essentially 
seek to level the playing field for downstream researchers both inside and outside the 
consortia. In other cases, while members exclusively enjoy the benefits of collective 
knowledge production, the object of these consortia is enable members to gain early 
access to complex technologies while pre-empting rivals outside the consortia during 
product development.  
  
Table 8.11 compares the knowledge management strategies adopted by various consortia 
from the perspective of our appropriation model. In the majority of cases, consortia have 
as their objective the cooperative generation and dissemination of upstream knowledge. 
In a few cases, consortia appear to have been established to pre-empt downstream rivals. 
For example, the Accelrys Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium, the Accelrys 
Functional Proteomics Consortium, and the Accelrys Nanotechnology Consortia seem to 
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Table 8.11: Analyzing the Knowledge Management Strategies Adopted by Consortia from the Perspective of our 
Appropriation Model 
Consortium Knowledge Management Strategy Adopted 
Agilent-Industry Open Microarray Design Program; Est. 2005 Pre-empting Rivals and Standard Creation via Cooperation 
Alliance for Cellular Signaling (AfCS); Est. 2002 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Beta Cell Biology Consortium (BCBC); Est. 2001 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS); Est. 2004 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Cancer Vaccine Consortium; Est. 2002 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Cell Migration Consortium; Est. 2001 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Collaborative Cross; Est. 2005 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium; Est. 1996 Pre-empting Rivals during Downstream Development via Selective Cooperation 
Consortium for Functional Glycomics (CFG); Est. 2001 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Functional Proteomics Consortium; Est. 2000 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Selective Cooperation 
Human Epigenome Consortium; Est. 2003 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Human Genome Consortium; Est. 1990 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
International Genomics Consortium; Est. 2004 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
International HapMap Project; Est. 2002 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
International Regulome Consortium; Est. 2004 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Knockout Mouse Project; Est. 2006 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
MalariaGEN; Est. 2005 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium (MGSC); Est. 2000 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Mouse Models of Human Cancers Consortium (MMHCC); 
Est. 1999 
Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Nanotechnology Consortium; Est. 2004 Pre-empting Rivals during Downstream Development via Selective Cooperation 
Novartis Institutes for Biomedical Research- 
Broad Institute Alliance; Est. 2004 
Pre-empting Rivals;  Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via 
Cooperation 
Osteoarthritis Initiative; Est. 2001 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
Public Population Project in Genomics; Est. 2004 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
RNAi Consortium (TRC); Est. 2005 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
SNP Consortium; Est. 1999 
Pre-empting Rivals;  Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via 
Cooperation 
Structural Genomics Consortium; Est. 2003 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
The Lipid MAPS Consortium; Est. 2003 Increasing the Common Value of Knowledge via Cooperation 
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8.10 Discussion  
The game models developed and validated in this chapter provide an effective illustration 
of changing incentives to cooperate or defect in knowledge production and dissemination 
as knowledge structures evolve. (Table 8.12)  
 
Example Outcome of Game  








CV1(X,Y,Z) > PV1(X,Y, Z) 
PV2(X,Y,Z) > CV2(X,Y, Z) 
p1=1; p2=1 
q1=0; q2=1 
Player 1 sole cooperator 
PVi (X,Y,Z) > CVi (X,Y,Z) 








Table 8.12: Summary of Outcomes from the Appropriation Game Model 
  
It is our contention that as biological knowledge structures become complex, researchers 
and firms should cautiously determine their strategies with respect to upstream discovery 
research. The greater the complementarity between knowledge structures and 
applicability across systems, models, or diseases, the greater the need for multiple 
researchers to access these knowledge structures for downstream product development.  
 
Cognitive biases can lead to the overvaluation of knowledge, specifically, its private 
value in future downstream activities [Heller and Eisenberg, 1998]. Furthermore, firms 
with stronger financial resources and human capital may be in a better position to exploit 
upstream knowledge in downstream activities [Heller and Eisenberg, 1998]. Although 
these firms may not be in position to exploit the knowledge immediately, the anticipation 
of its future value to the firm may drive the firm to overestimate the private value of 
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upstream knowledge. This overvaluation would provide the incentive to defect. However, 
if the overvaluation is incorrect, knowledge may be prematurely appropriated and a 
downstream user may decline any license to the overvalued patent (and associated 
knowledge) [Merges, 1994]. 
 
In their analysis of patents on biological research tools, Walsh et al. also discuss the 
concept of ―defensive patenting‖ [Walsh, et al., 2003]. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
executives have confirmed that patenting programs are sometimes defensive with respect 
to genomics-based technology, as follows:  
 
We have a defensive patent program in genomics. It is the same as in the Japanese 
electronics industry. There they patent every nut and screw on a copier, camera, and 
build a huge portfolio, so Sony never sues Panasonic and Panasonic never sues Sony. 
There is a little of that going on in genomics. That way, if an IP issue ever arose, we 
have some cards in our hand.… 
 
I supposed because we see everyone else doing it in part. Sort of like the great 
Oklahoma Land Rush. If you don‘t do it you‘re not going to have any place to set up 
a tent, eventually [Walsh et al., 2003]. 
 
Overall, about a third of industry respondents reported increased patenting of gene 
sequences, assays, and other research tools as a response to the patenting behaviour of 
other researchers, so as to augment their own freedom to engage in downstream activities 
[Walsh et al., 2003]. 
 
Merges (1996) argues that each researcher may find defection in his or her own interest, 
and will therefore expect a partner to similarly defect, unless cooperation is assured.  
However, unlike the tit-for-tat strategy in the Prisoner‘s Dilemma game, where a player 
will always cooperate unless provoked and will retaliate, but quickly forgives the 
opponent if provoked, the player who is ―suckered‖ may not be so forgiving [Axelrod, 
1984]. Players who defect earlier in time may meet reduced success in bargaining with 
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others who remember past actions. Pre-emptive disclosure as shown in Table 8.8 may be 
one option to ensure the freedom to operate in downstream development for both players. 
 
An interesting situation arises however, when the common value of what is jointly known 
increases. In this case, multiple equilibria exist in our game model (Table 8.9). If player 1 
chooses defection, player 2‘s best strategy is to cooperate, and vice versa. Similar to the 
game of Chicken, if both players choose to defect, both are worse off, receiving the lower 
payoffs (despite the fact that the private value of what is unilaterally known may be 
higher than the common value of this knowledge).  
 
While our model begins to demonstrate the importance of evaluating biological 
knowledge structures as driving the strategic behaviour of firms during knowledge 
production and dissemination activities, future research is required to augment the model. 
We need to determine how best to evaluate private and collective knowledge units. 
Furthermore, we have assumed that the collective value of knowledge is simply the sum 
of the individual parts; our model may provide alternative insight if we modify the 
collective value of knowledge to derive from not only the individual parts, but also from 
the synergy between knowledge units.  
 
In Chapter 9, we assume that knowledge has been patented and consider the licensing 









9.1 Introduction  
Our model of the strategic licensing environment is adapted from Scotchmer (2004). 
Figure 9.1 is an extensive form game model of the licensing environment where first 
inventions have commercial value and are complementary to second generation product 
development.  In other cases, first inventions may have no commercial value (e.g. 
upstream discoveries) and therefore, the first inventor can only derive value from 
licensing the technology. In our model, we consider the impact of changing knowledge 
structures on the licensing decisions taken by the licensor and licensee.  
 
In the model, two players conduct research in sequence. Player 1 develops an invention at 
a cost of c1. If the invention is patented for time period T, the discounted private value of 
this first invention (profit) is xT (where xT is only a simple parameter to capture the value 
of the first invention; future research will consider issues such as the period over the life 
of the patent during which profits are actually earned and the impact of other competitor 
products on profits earned). This will be the patent holder‘s profit. But if the first 
invention is basic research (upstream research) and will enable downstream product 
development, it may have no commercial value and therefore xT=0.  
 
Suppose that player 2 has an idea (y, c2) for a second generation product that builds on 
the first invention, where yT is the discounted private value (profit) of the second 
generation product (where is yT only a simple parameter to capture the value of the 
second generation product), patented for time period T at development cost c2. In reality, 
although patents are for 20 years from the date of application, profits may not be earned 
immediately; products will have to be tested and then manufactured before profits can be 
earned on the market. Since the second generation invention is facilitated by the first 
invention, the second invention although patentable, may infringe on the first patent. In 
this case, player 2 can develop the second generation product without a license on the 
first invention, but cannot commercialize it. Only if player 2 can substitute for player 1‘s 
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invention without infringing the associated patent, can player 2 commercialize the second 
generation product without a license. In this case, there will be no incentive to bargain 
with player 1, and player 2 may cut into player 1‘s profits. If player 2 is able to substitute 
for the first invention, player 1‘s profits are now βxT, where β is the fraction of the market 
captured by player 1, so that player 2‘s profits are augmented by (1-β)xT.  
 
The two players can either sign a license agreement ex-ante, that is, before player 2 
invests c2 (but after the first innovation has been made) or ex-post, after player 2 invests 
c2. The terms of the license will be the outcome of bargaining, which will depend on the 
threat points for each player and bargaining surplus. The threat point, each player‘s 
BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement), is the expected profit it can 
guarantee if it leaves the bargaining table. The bargaining surplus is the total amount by 
which the players will be richer if bargaining is successful. For example, ex-post, the two 
players‘ threat points are xT- c1 and -c2 respectively because, without a license, the second 
generation product cannot come to market as it is blocked by the patent on the first 
invention. On the other hand, if a license is issued, player 1 and 2 can add αyT and (1-α)yT 
respectively to their profits, where α is the fraction of the bargaining surplus going to  
player 1. Each player can guarantee itself at least the amount of the threat point. 
However, central to a successful outcome (where success refers to the option of pursuing 
downstream product development) is how to divide the bargaining surplus. In our model, 
this bargaining surplus will vary with type of license issued (non-exclusive or exclusive) 
and the timing of the license (ex-ante or ex-post). Ideally, a system should ensure that 
both players are rewarded for their contributions. In particular, the investment made to 
develop the first invention should permit the second generation product to be developed 
and profitable.  
 
Whether or not a license is issued and accepted ex-ante will be depend on the division of 
the bargaining surplus, the cost of developing the second generation product, and the 
ability of player 2 to substitute for the first invention. Furthermore, if player 1 is 
relatively uninformed about the value and costs associated with the development of the 




In our model, we explore the impact of knowledge characteristics on the licensing 
process. (Analysis 9.1) We consider various scenarios in which the first invention has no 
commercial value alone, in which the first invention is substitutable without 
infringement, in which the cost of production of the second generation is high and the 
market applicability low, and in which there is asymmetric information regarding the 
value of the second generation product.  We present the case where xT>0 in Figure 9.1; 
however, by setting xT=0 in Figure 9.1, we can derive the licensing model where the first 
invention has no commercial value. 
 
9.2 Model Parameters  
We define the following notation in our model (Table 9.1):  
Notation Definition 
xT Discounted Value of First Invention (Private 
Profit earned over the Life of the Patent) 
yT Discounted Value of Second Generation Product 
(Private Profit earned over the Life of the Patent)  
T Length of Patent 
α Fraction of Bargaining Surplus 
NE Non-Exclusive 
E Exclusive 
αNE(ex-ante/ex-post) Fraction of Bargaining Surplus from a  
Non-Exclusive license  
(assigned either ex-ante or ex-post) 
αE(ex-ante/ex-post) Fraction of Bargaining Surplus from an  
Exclusive license  
(assigned either ex-ante or ex-post) 
c1 Cost of First Invention 
c2 Cost of Second Generation Product 




HA High Applicability 
LA Low Applicability 
β Fraction of Market Captured by Player 1 
pd Probability of Duplication 


















N [xT - c1,0]




[xT - c1,-cd - c2]

















[xT + αyT - c1, (1-α)yT - c2]
[αyT - c1, (1-α)yT - c2]



















































[βxT - c1, (1-β)xT + yT - cd -c2]
[βxT - c1, (1-β)xT + yT - cd -c2]
[xT - c1,-cd - c2]
[xT - c1,-cd - c2]
 
 
Figure 9.1: Strategic Licensing Process where xT>0 
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9.3 Model Analysis 
In this section, we analyze possible outcomes if player 1 offers a license ex-ante (before 
player 2 makes an investment), if player 1 offers a license ex-post (after player 2 makes 
an investment), or if player 1 chooses not to offer a license.  
 
9.3.1 Ex-ante Licensing 
If player 1 chooses to offer a non-exclusive license to player 2 for the first invention, then 
player 2 will accept this license if (1 - αNE)yT - c2 > 0.  
 
If player 1 chooses to offer an exclusive license to player 2 for the first invention, then 
player 2 will accept this license if (1 - αE)yT - c2 > 0.  
 
We assume that the fraction of the bargaining surplus offered to player 2 will be different 
in the non-exclusive (NE) vs. exclusive (E) license setting. Generally, player 1 will 
demand a larger fraction of the bargaining surplus if an exclusive license is offered.  
 
Player 1 will choose to offer a non-exclusive license rather than an exclusive license if  
xT  - α NEyT-c1  >  αEyT - c1, which is equivalent to xT  - αNEyT  >  αEyT ; player 1 will offer an 
exclusive license if the reverse inequality is true.  
 
9.3.2 Player 2‘s Decision to Invest Ex-post 
If player 1 opts not to offer an ex-ante license (assuming that he/she will be able to 
receive a larger fraction of the bargaining surplus once player 2 invests c2), player 2 will 
have to decide whether to invest in research on the second invention assuming that the 
first invention is complementary to the second invention and a license will be required (in 
order to commercialize the second invention). We assume that player 2 will not know if 
duplication of or a work-around solution for the first invention is possible until an 
investment is made and research is conducted. 
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In the case that duplication is not possible and a license is required from player 1, player 
2 will invest in research if (1 - αNE)yT - c2 > 0 in the case that a non-exclusive license is 
issued; or if (1 - αE)yT - c2 > 0 in the case that an exclusive license is issue.  
 
In the case that duplication or a work-around solution is possible, player 2 will invest in 
research as long as (1 - β)xT + yT - cd - c2 > 0, where if β is the fraction of the market that is 
captured by player 1 and (1-β) is the fraction of the market that is captured by player 2 for 
the (duplicated, non-fringing) first invention.  
 
9.3.3 Ex-post Licensing 
Once player 2 decides to make an investment in research, player 1 will either offer an ex-
post exclusive license, an ex-post non-exclusive license, or will opt not to offer an ex-
post license altogether.  
  
In the case that duplication is not possible and a license is required for the first invention, 
if player 1 chooses to offer a non-exclusive license to player 2 for the first invention, then 
player 2 will accept this license if (1 - αNE)yT - c2 > 0.  
 
In the case that duplication is possible, in the simple case we assume the probability of 
duplication or work-around (pd) equals 1, as long as (1 - β)xT + yT - cd - c2 > (1 - αNE)yT - 
c2, which is equivalent to  (1 - β)xT + yT  - cd  >  (1 - αNE)yT, then there is no incentive for 
player 2 to bargain for a non-exclusive license with player 2.  However, as the cost of 
duplication rises and the probability of duplication decreases, then player 2‘s incentive to 
bargain for a license will likely increase. 
 
In the case that duplication is not possible and a license is required for the first invention, 
if player 1 chooses to offer an exclusive license to player 2 for the first invention, then 
player 2 will accept this license if (1 - αE)yT - c2 > 0.  
 
In the case that duplication is possible, in the simple case we assume the probability of 
duplication or work-around (pd) equals 1, as long as (1 - β)xT + yT - cd - c2 >  (1-αE)yT - c2, 
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which is equivalent to  (1 - β)xT + yT  - cd >  (1 - αE)yT, then there is no incentive for player 
2 to bargain for an exclusive license with player 2.  However, as the cost of duplication 
rises and the probability of duplication decreases, then player 2‘s incentive to bargain for 
a license will likely increase. 
 
Player 1 will choose to offer a non-exclusive license rather than an exclusive license 
(assuming that duplication by player 2 is not possible) if  xT - αNEyT - c1 > αEyT - c1, which 
is equivalent to xT - αNEyT > αEyT; player 1 will offer an exclusive license if the reverse 
inequality is true.  
 
In the case that player 2 is able to duplicate or work-around the first invention without 
infringing it, then player 1 will be left with the payoff of βxT - c1 regardless of license 
setting (non-exclusive vs. exclusive).  
  
9.3.4 Player 1‘s Decision to Not Offer an Ex-Post License 
Assuming that duplication is not possible, player 1 may opt not to offer a license to the 
first invention even ex-post after player 2 has made an investment. This may be the case 
when the first invention has high stand-alone commercial value or will have high 
commercial value once player 1 completes further development work. In either case, the 
first invention can be assumed to have high value for player 1.  
 
In the case of opting not to offer an ex-post exclusive license, this will be true when  
xT - c1 > αEyT - c1, which is equivalent to xT > αEyT; therefore, as long as the payoff 
attained by player 1 from internal commercial exploitation is greater than the payoff 
attained through exclusive licensing, then player 1 will opt to not offer an ex-post 
exclusive license.  
 
In the case of an ex-post non-exclusive license, player 1 will have to choose whether the 
additional income gained from licensing is of value in comparison to just internal 
commercial exploitation of the first invention, since xT + αNEyT - c1 will always be greater 




9.3.5 Player 1‘s Decision to Offer an Ex-Ante vs. Ex-Post License  
Player 1 will have to decide whether to offer an ex-ante license, an ex-post license, or no 
license (these are the decisions available to player 1 at the first node).  
 
An ex-ante non-exclusive license will be offered if  
(xT + αNE ex-ante yT - c1)  > (αE ex-ante yT  - c1) and 
(xT + αNE ex-ante yT  - c1)  > (xT + αNE ex-post yT - c1) or > (αE ex-post yT  -  c1) or > (xT - c1) or > 
(βxT - c1) 
 
An ex-ante exclusive license will be offered if  
 (αE ex-ante  yT  - c1)  > (xT + αNE ex-ante yT - c1) and 
(αE ex-ante yT  - c1)  > (xT + αNE ex-post yT - c1) or > (αE ex-post yT  -  c1) or > (xT - c1) or > (βxT - 
c1) 
 
An ex-post non-exclusive license will be offered assuming player 2 invests in research, 
but duplication of the first invention is not possible, if  
(xT + αNE ex-post yT - c1)  > (αE ex-post yT  - c1) or  > (xT - c1)  and 
(xT + αNE ex-post yT - c1)  > (xT + αNE ex-ante yT - c1) or > (αE ex-ante yT  - c1) 
 
An ex-post exclusive license will be offered assuming player 2 invests in research but 
duplication of the first invention is not possible, if  
 (αE ex-post yT  -  c1)  > (xT + αNE ex-post yT - c1)  >  or  > (xT - c1)  and 
(αE ex-post yT  -  c1)  > (xT + αNE ex-ante yT - c1)    or > (αEex-ante yT - c1)  
 
If duplication is possible, then the outcome will depend on pd. If pd equals 1, then player 
1 will have no choice but to accept (βxT - c1) ex-post. Player 1 will then have to analyze 
which payoff is greater—an ex-ante non-exclusive license or an ex-ante exclusive 
license, given that player 2 can duplicate or work-around the first invention. As pd 
decreases or the cost of duplication (cd) increases, an ex-post license may be accepted by 
player 2 as described in section 9.3.3. 
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9.4 Bargaining for Upstream Knowledge 
In this section, we analyze the licensing strategy adopted for upstream knowledge as we 
vary the underlying knowledge characteristics of the first invention—namely, 
substitutability, and applicability. We assign values to the parameters outlined in Table 
9.1 to illustrate the bargaining process when the initial discovery has no commercial 
value.  
 
A first invention may represent a research input e.g. gene or drug target. The follow-on 
inventor may use the research input to develop a downstream product e.g., diagnostic 
based on the gene, or a drug that binds to the target discovered by the first innovator. In 
this case, the first invention has high complementarity, high applicability, and is non-
substitutable. Therefore, the follow-on innovator will require a license in order to 
progress downstream into product development. Given these knowledge characteristics, it 
would be in player 1‘s best interests to issue an exclusive license after player 2 has made 
an investment into product development. In this case, player 1 will be able to demand a 
larger share of the bargaining surplus by issuing an ex-post exclusive license. In Model 1 
(Figure 9.2), given the values set for the model parameters, player 1 indeed receives the 
largest payoff by offering an ex-post exclusive license to player 2.  
 
If this game model is broken into ―sub-games‖ containing a sub-set of all the available 
choices in the main game, it is possible to find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
strategy. In this case, if the players play any smaller game that consists of only one part 
of the larger game and their behaviour represents a Nash equilibrium of the smaller game, 
then their behaviour is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the larger game. A subgame 
perfect equilibrium is a prescription for rational behaviour. [Kilgour, 2006] In model 1, 
the subgame perfect equilibrium is the path through player 1 not offering an ex-ante 
license, but player 2 making an investment, player 1 then offering an exclusive license 
and player 2 accepting the ex-post exclusive license with utility [21, 1]. This outcome 
then assumes that both players are behaving rationally from a game perspective. Given 
the characteristics of knowledge in this game model, the decision to offer an ex-post 
exclusive license should indeed be the strategy chosen by the players.  
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In contrast, 30 out of the 39 consortia analyzed in Chapter 6, use or plan to use databases 
to provide access to upstream genomic, proteomic, systems, biochemical and/or cell 
biology information. As this data is often high in complementarity, non-substitutable, and 
high in downstream applicability, these consortia address the open dissemination of data 
as part of their rules for the sharing of information with members and with the public at 
large. (Table 6.6) 
 
In Model 2 (Figure 9.3), the first invention represents a research input with no 
commercial value—highly complementary and non-substitutable, however in this case, 
the target market to which the follow-on innovator can apply this knowledge in 
downstream products is small. Hence, the first invention has low applicability. In this 
case, player 2 may choose not to invest in the development of the second-generation 
product. Hence, player 1 will be left with a loss since the first invention does not have 
commercial value on its own. Consequently, player 1 may have to bargain with player 2 
over the surplus to be shared, i.e., to provide player 2 with an incentive to invest in 
downstream product development.  In model 2, the subgame perfect equilibrium is the 
path through player 2 not accepting an ex-ante non-exclusive or exclusive license or the 
path through player 2 not investing with utility [-10, 0]. Given the characteristics of 
knowledge and the costs associated with development of invention 2, player 2 should not 
invest in this innovation; unless player 1 provides an incentive that will be enable player 
2 to recoup his/her costs and enjoy a positive return, player 2 will not invest in any R&D 
activities, leaving player 1 with a payoff of -10.  
 
In the United States, an orphan drug is a drug developed to treat rare diseases (―orphan 
diseases‖), defined as diseases affecting fewer than 200,000 people in the United States 
[www.fda.gov, 2007]. Since developing drugs to treat such diseases is financially 
disadvantageous, companies engaging in such development activities are rewarded with 
tax reductions and marketing exclusivity on such drugs for an extended time period 
(seven years post-approval). These incentives are thought to encourage companies to 
invest in research activities targeting these small markets. The model we present in 
Figure 9.4 demonstrates this need to provide incentives to player 2 to engage in 
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downstream product development given the high costs and likely low profits associated 











































































Figure 9.2: Licensing a Non-Substitutable Research Input 
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 Figure 9.3: Licensing a Non-Substitutable  
Research Input with Low Applicability 
Model 2 























In Model 3 (Figure 9.4), once again the first invention represents a research input with no 
commercial value—high in complementarity and applicability, but now substitutable by 
player 2. Here we introduce the possibility that player 2 can duplicate the first invention 
(or develop a work-around solution without infringing on player 1‘s patent) with 
probability pd. When pd equals 1, there is no uncertainty associated with duplicating or 
creating a work-around solution for the first invention; thus, player 2 no longer has an 
incentive to bargain with player 1 for a license. When pd equals 0.5, player 1 has an 
incentive to offer an ex-ante non-exclusive license to player 2 for the research input—
thereby ensuring a share of the large private value (profits) associated with the follow-on 
invention. In model 3, interestingly, the subgame perfect equilibrium is the path through 
player 1 offering an ex-ante exclusive license and player 2 accepting this license with 
utility [35, 50]. If player 1 however, chooses to instead offer an ex-ante non-exclusive 
license for the above reasons, player 1 is off the equilibrium pathway. [Kilgour, 2006] 
 
From our consortium analysis, we identified 16 consortia where tools, biomaterials, 
and/or reagents (high in complementarity, in applicability, and in substitutability) are a 
either a direct outcome or byproduct of consortia member research. In these consortia, 
rules exist to address the sharing of these items with members and the public at large.  
These rules advocate sharing of materials for consortium research, ensuring access to 
open repositories where animal models are housed, or providing for the wide, public 
dissemination of materials via non-exclusive, royalty-free licenses; only in a few cases is 



































































































Figure 9.4: Licensing a Substitutable Research Input 





















xT=0; C, S, HA 
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While player 1 may be better off by offering an ex-post exclusive license in the case 
where the first invention has no commercial value but is high in applicability and is non-
substitutable,  this option is not the best one when the size of the market changes and if 
player 2 can substitute for the first invention. As the market size changes in Model 2, 
with higher costs and lower profits associated with downstream development, player 1 
may be better off to offer an ex-ante license with a bargaining surplus that favours 
downstream development. If player 2 can substitute for the first invention—the case for 
Model 3, assuming that there is some uncertainty associated with duplication—player 1 is 
better off by offering an ex-ante non-exclusive license to player 2. Clearly, player 1 needs 
to evaluate the knowledge characteristics associated with the first invention in deciding 
the best licensing approach. As the only source of revenue from the first invention in 
these cases is licensing, player 1 needs to set licensing terms that encourages downstream 
product development.  
 
In section 9.5 we now consider licensing scenarios where the first invention has 
commercial value for both player 1 and player 2.  
 
 
9.5 Bargaining for Downstream Knowledge  
Models 4 through to Models 7 (Figures 9.5 to 9.8) analyze the bargaining process when 
the first invention has commercial value. In some cases the first invention is non-
substitutable, whereas in others player 2 can substitute for the first invention. We also 
analyze the impact of the licensing strategy adopted when the technologies are 
compatible with each other and are appropriate for joint marketing, and by giving players 
asymmetric information regarding the value of the second invention.  
 
In Model 4 (Figure 9.5) we assume that a downstream technology is being licensed by 
player 2. For example, player 2 may be licensing the right to develop and use a slightly 
different diagnostic that depends on a technology patented by player 1. In this case, 
player 1 is better off offering an ex-post non-exclusive license—whereby he/she can 
generate additional rent from player 2. It is the non-substitutability of the first invention 
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and the fact that player 1 can also pursue downstream development that allows player 1 to 
demand an ex-post non-exclusive license. In model 4, the subgame perfect equilibrium is 
the path through player 1 not offering an ex-ante license, but player 2 investing, player 1 
then offering an ex-post non-exclusive license and player 2 accepting this license with 
utility [43, 5].  
 
In Model 5 (Figure 9.6), the first invention is substitutable. We set pd to 1—indicating 
that player 2 is guaranteed a successful outcome from duplication or a work-around 
strategy. In this case, we assume that player 2 will operate in the same market as player 1 
with the understanding that there may be a fraction of this market split between the two 
players—with player 2 able to tap into player 1‘s profits. With the threat of guaranteed 
duplication by player 2, player 1 will have to be flexible on the bargaining surplus split 
between the two players, as there is no real incentive for player 2 to enter into bargaining. 
We anticipate, however that as the cost of duplication increases, the incentive to enter 
into bargaining will increase as well. Player 1 is better off in this case by offering an ex-
ante non-exclusive license. In model 5 with pd set to 1, the subgame perfect equilibrium is 
the path through player 1 not offering an ex-ante non-exclusive or exclusive license, but 
player 2 investing and duplicating or working-around the first invention with utility [26, 
39]. If player 1 chooses to offer an ex-ante non-exclusive license, although he/she is off 
the equilibrium pathway, player 1 may make plans at this node in order to ensure that 
bargaining can take place between the two players. If we set pd set to 0.5, interestingly the 
subgame perfect equilibrium is the path through player 1 not offering an ex-ante non-
exclusive or exclusive license, but player 2 investing, player 1 then offering an ex-post 
non-exclusive license and player 2 accepting this license with utility [50, 19]. 
 
Therefore, in Models 4 and 5 while player 1 is better by offering a non-exclusive license 
so that he/she can also develop and market the first invention, the substitutability of the 












































































Figure 9.5: Licensing a Non-Substitutable Downstream Technology 
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Figure 9.6: Licensing a Substitutable Downstream Technology 


































As medical treatment becomes more complex, a situation may arise where multiple 
technologies are used by a doctor to diagnose and then treat a disease. 
Pharmacogenomics is the study of the genetic variations or single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNP) between individuals that are associated with common diseases and 
linked to drug responses [Akhtar, 2002]. Pharmacogenomics will identify candidate 
genes and polymorphisms, predict drug responses and clinical outcomes in order to 
reduce adverse reaction events, and enable for doses of therapeutic drugs to be decided 
on the basis of a patient‘s genotype [Akhtar, 2002]. Pharmacogenomics will change the 
current drug discovery and development process as customized drugs are developed for 
defined sub-populations of patients and perhaps even tailored for specific individuals. In 
the age of personalized medicine, there may soon be a market where patients are first 
screened for disease susceptibility based on genomic profile and then treated accordingly. 
Consequently, medical diagnostic and biopharmaceutical companies may align to jointly 
develop and market the appropriate technologies. In Model 6 (Figure 9.7), we assume 
that greater value is attained through the joint marketing of the first invention and follow-
on invention. With yT also large, player 1 receives a larger payoff by offering an ex-post 
exclusive license to player 2, so that he/she can jointly market the two products. In Model 
6, the subgame perfect equilibrium is the path through player 1 not offering an ex-ante 
license, but player 2 making an investment, player 1 then offering an exclusive license 






























































































xT>0; C, NS, HA 







In Model 7 (Figure 9.8) player 1 has private information regarding the value of yT. Player 
1 knows that the follow-on invention has high applicability and hence high profit 
potential. As a result of this prior information, player 1‘s probability that the second 
invention has high applicability and high profit is greater than player 2‘s probability. As a 
result of this asymmetry, and based on our assumptions regarding parameter values, 
player 1 may choose to offer an exclusive license while player 2 expects a non-exclusive 
license. Player 1 must handle this asymmetry in information carefully in order to 
maximize his payoff—as player 2 will be expecting a payoff of 33 from a non-exclusive 
license versus a payoff of 17 from an exclusive license. In Model 7, from player 1‘s 
perspective the subgame perfect equilibrium is the path through player 1 offering an 
exclusive license with player 2 accepting this license with utility [230 (38), 145(17); 
depending on player perspective]. From player 2‘s perspective the subgame perfect 
equilibrium is the path through player 1 offering a non-exclusive license and player 2 
accepting this license with utility [190 (62), 225 (33); depending on player perspective]. 
 
Differences in the ability to tolerate the transaction costs associated with licensing 
complicate the bargaining process. Large corporations with substantial resources will be 
in a better position to negotiate licenses on a case-by-case basis than public sector 
institutions or small startup firms. This asymmetry may make it difficult to develop 
mutually advantageous licensing agreements [Heller and Eisenberg, 1998]. Heller and 
Eisenberg also discuss that ―cognitive biases‖ can cause a patent holder to overvalue 
his/her patent for future downstream research [Heller and Eisenberg, 1998].  The 
downstream user may decline the knowledge, with the possibility that critical 
technological opportunities will not be exploited in downstream research and product 
development. 
 
The majority of consortia studied in Chapter 6 have as their objective the collective 
production of upstream disembodied or upstream embodied knowledge in the form of 
research inputs or tools.  The models in this chapter, however, provide insight on how 
consortium members individually or collectively focus on downstream product 
development. Once consortium objectives are achieved and membership is terminated, 
233 
 
firms can easily become competitors on the product marketplace. It is at this transition 
point that the licensing strategies adopted by firms can be expected to maximize the 
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The sequence of bargaining models is our attempt to explore the implications of licensing 
as knowledge structures and paradigms evolve.  Table 9.2 summarizes outcomes of 
various licensing scenarios according to our analysis, given our assumption regarding the 
value of first innovations and second-generation products, as well ex-ante and ex-post 
bargaining surplus divisions.  
 
Licensing Scenario Outcome 
Licensing a Non-substitutable Research 
Input;  
xT=0; C, NS, HA 
Ex-post exclusive license 
Licensing a Non-substitutable Research 
Input with Low Downstream Applicability; 
xT=0; C, NS, LA 
No investment by player 2; Room for 
bargaining by player 1 
Licensing a Substitutable Research Input; 
xT=0; C, S, HA 
Ex-ante non-exclusive license 
Licensing a Non-substitutable Downstream 
Technology; xT>0; C, NS, HA 
Ex-post non-exclusive license 
Licensing Substitutable Downstream 
Technology; xT>0; C, S, HA 
Ex-ante non-exclusive license 
Licensing Downstream Compatible 
Technology; xT>0; C, NS, HA 
Ex-post exclusive license 
Licensing Downstream Technology with 
Asymmetric Information; xT>0; C, NS, HA 
Player 1 offers an exclusive license; Player 
2 expects a non-exclusive license 
Table 9.2: Summary of Outcomes from the Bargaining Model 
 
From the consortium analysis, we determined how various licensing agreements are 
employed to disseminate (in most cases) embodied knowledge in the form of tools, 
biomaterials, and reagents, as well as copyrighted material. Options include: the 
nonexclusive license to share tools, biomaterials, and reagents; the MIT license or 
Creative Commons license to share copyrighted materials such as software code or 
databases; the BIOS license to enable downstream product development; the Click-wrap 
license to indicate agreement to the terms set by a consortium; the Patent pool as a means 
of bypassing the complexities associated with intellectual property negotiations; and 
geographic-based licensing to provide an incentive for a licensee to develop a product for 




Table 9.3 compares and contrasts the strategies used by the consortia to manage various 
knowledge structures and the strategies suggested by our bargaining model as a function 
of these knowledge structures. From this analysis, it appears that the consortia are using 
rules that encourage licensing strategies with the greatest collective value (and in turn 
greatest social value), rather than providing the greatest unilateral, private value to a 





Table 9.3: Comparing Licensing Strategies Suggested by Consortia and By Bargaining Models 
Consortium Knowledge 
Characteristic 
Licenses Advocated by 
Consortium 
Licenses Advocated by  
Bargaining Model 
Beta Cell Biology Consortium 
(BCBC) 
HC, NS, HA Freely Distributed to Academic for Non-
Commercial Use 
Licensing a Research Input;  
xT=0; C, NS, HA; Ex-Post, Exclusive License 
Biological Innovation for Open 
Society (BIOS) 
HC, S, HA 
Royalty Free, Non-Exclusive Licenses 
Among Participants 
Licensing Substitutable Downstream Technology 
for Use in Different Markets; xT>0; C, S, HA; Ex-
Ante, Non-Exclusive License 
Cell Migration Consortium 
HC, NS, HA Royalty Free, Non-Exclusive Licenses for 
Non-Commercial Use 
Licensing a Research Input;  
xT=0; C, NS, HA; Ex-Post, Exclusive License 
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium 
HC, S, HA 
Non-Exclusive License for Members Only  
Licensing Substitutable Downstream Technology 
for Use in Different Markets; xT>0; C, S, HA; Ex-
Ante, Non-Exclusive License 
Consortium for Functional Glycomics 
(CFG) 
HC, NS, HA 
Royalty Free, Non-Commercial Use 
Licensing a Research Input;  
xT=0; C, NS, HA; Ex-Post, Exclusive License 
DopaNet 
HC, NS, HA 
MIT License 
Licensing a Research Input;  
xT=0; C, NS, HA; Ex-Post, Exclusive License 
International HapMap Project 
HC, NS, HA Initially Click-Wrap License to Access 
Genotypic Data 
Licensing a Research Input;  
xT=0; C, NS, HA; Ex-Post, Exclusive License 
International Molecular Exchange 
Consortium 
HC, S, HA 
Creative Commons License 
Licensing a Substitutable Research Input; xT=0; 
C, S, HA; Ex-Ante, Non-Exclusive License 
Knockout Mouse Project 
HC, S, HA Patent Pooling Advocated to Manage 
Existing IP 
Licensing a Substitutable Research Input; xT=0; 
C, S, HA; Ex-Ante, Non-Exclusive License 
MalariaGEN 
HC, NS, HA Restricted Licensing Based on 
Geographical Applicability 
Licensing a Research Input;  
xT=0; C, NS, HA; Ex-Post, Exclusive License 
Mouse Models of Human Cancers 
Consortium (MMHCC) 
HC, S, HA 
Limited-Use License by Open Biosystems 
Licensing a Substitutable Research Input; xT=0; 
C, S, HA; Ex-Ante, Non-Exclusive License 
Nanotechnology Consortium 
HC, S, HA 
Non-Exclusive License for Members Only 
Licensing Substitutable Downstream Technology 
for Use in Different Markets; xT>0; C, S, HA; Ex-
Ante, Non-Exclusive License 
RNAi Consortium (TRC) 
HC, S, HA 
Limited-Use License by Open Biosystems 
Licensing a Substitutable Research Input; xT=0; 
C, S, HA; Ex-Ante, Non-Exclusive License 
SNP Consortium 
HC, NS, HA Upstream Provisional Patents (Prior Art 
Creation) 
Licensing a Research Input;  
xT=0; C, NS, HA; Ex-Post, Exclusive License 
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Chapter 10: Discussion 
 
 
10.1 The Knowledge Framework 
From the review in Chapter 2, it is evident that the current literature is filled with many insightful 
contributions regarding the economics of knowledge and intellectual property. However, in this 
thesis, we make a novel contribution to the existing literature by linking knowledge structures 
and intellectual property. We expand the notion of knowledge as being a public good or a quasi 
private good and consider the underlying characteristics of knowledge as impacting downstream 
opportunities for product development. Specifically, we consider the complementarity, 
substitutability, and applicability of knowledge as impacting knowledge production processes 
and knowledge dissemination practices. By looking more closely at the classes of knowledge—
research inputs, tools, drugs, and diagnostics, we are also better able to understand the 
motivation of strategic alliances increasingly sought to generate and manage upstream (both 
disembodied information and embodied in the form of research tools) and downstream 
knowledge (embodied as products such as drugs and diagnostics). Finally, we consider the 
evolution of strategic alliance formation and intellectual property practices across major drug 
discovery and development paradigms—the chemical, the biological, and the information 
paradigms. Across paradigms, as new sources of profit have emerged for the firm, the focus of 
knowledge generation as well as intellectual property has evolved—from new medicinal entities 
to research tools and data, and now possibly new life forms as the synthetic biology paradigm 
emerges. Table 10.1 outlines the use of the above knowledge parameters in this thesis. 
 
In Chapter 4, we discuss the current systems biology paradigm extensively and analyze current 
intellectual property strategies. By selecting seven biologically significant systems, we hoped to 
uncover problems on the horizon as a result of the application of the traditional ―chemical‖ 
intellectual property doctrine. We categorized patents according to phase of research and 
paradigm focus. While the majority of patents filed on these biological systems focus on 
downstream applications and with a mixture of paradigm focus—chemical, biological and in 
some cases information, the most alarming case is that of the GPCR cell signaling system. More 
than half of the patents on the GPCR cell signaling systems are upstream-based, and discovery 
oriented patent applications; hence the dominance of the information paradigm. Of the 133 
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GPCR patents analyzed, 77 focus on the structural aspects of the systems thereby adhering to the 
information paradigm. Of further concern, is the fact that almost half of the patents on these 
systems are owned by a concentrated number of private organizations and public institutions. 
GPCRs constitute a large and diverse family of proteins whose primary function is to transduce 
extracellular stimuli into intracellular signals. They are among the largest and most diverse 
protein families in mammalian genomes and are the largest class of targets for modern drug 
development [Beaumont and Negulescu, 1999]. 
Table 10.1: Use of Knowledge Framework to Understand Strategic Firm Behaviour 
 
As we see in the case of the NF-κB cell signaling system, where Ariad Pharmaceuticals is able to 
reach into the past to claim that Eli Lilly‘s drugs that act along the cell signaling system infringe 
their 2002 patent, the case may exist that a GPCR patent holder could similarly reach not only 
into the past but also the future to exploit the product development of other researchers. The 
completion of the Human Genome Project is proving to be a driving force for the growing role of 
GPCRs in drug discovery. This project has yielded a treasure trove of putative GPCRs with 
unknown functions and ligands, better known as ―orphan GPCRs‖. Given that nearly 70% of all 
drugs currently marketed worldwide are targeted against GPCRs, clearly there is enormous 
potential to validate these ―orphan GPCR‘s‖ as drug targets and reap the benefits of the 
blockbuster drugs of the past and tomorrow [GPCRs, 2002]. 
Knowledge Parameter  Analysis 
Knowledge Characteristics Complementarity Impact on Participation, 




Knowledge Class Research Input Impact on Participation, 





Knowledge Form Disembodied Value of Knowledge (Anticipated 
Transition Point) Embodied 
Knowledge Phase Upstream Timing and Focus of Appropriation 
Downstream 
Knowledge Paradigm Chemical Focus of Knowledge Generation 







While lawmakers and the USPTO are revising the utility and obviousness bars for patents, and 
changes are on the horizon with respect to the Patent Reform Act, industry stakeholders should 
be cautious in this current paradigm with their intellectual property strategies. It is 
understandable that firms will need to acquire intellectual property in the systems paradigm to 
ensure the possibility of downstream product development via internal development efforts or 
through external licensing. However, these firms should be flexible with respect to their own 
licensing strategies. The shadow of the future should be kept in mind as multiple licenses may be 
required to progress into downstream development in the systems paradigm. If critical cell 
signaling system patents are held by one or two major firms, and if these firms are unable to fully 
exploit all opportunities associated with a cell signaling system, private and social benefits may 
warrant a broad licensing strategy. If cell signaling system patents are held by multiple firms, a 
cooperative licensing strategy can minimize both the licensing fees and any other associated 
transactions.  However, we contend that by understanding the transition point—where the 
characteristics of knowledge warrant privatization of knowledge, firms may opt to wait to patent 
biological and/or chemical therapeutics that can act along the cell signaling systems, rather than 
simply the structures associated with the systems and putative functions.  
 
In Chapter 5, a knowledge structures perspective of upstream strategic alliances provides 
interesting results. While strategic alliances have traditionally been analyzed from a resource-
based theory perspective, a knowledge acquisition, or a knowledge access perspective, we 
contribute to the literature on strategic alliances by considering a nuanced, knowledge structures 
perspective. Here we specifically consider the paradigm, phase, and subject matter focus of 
upstream public-private and private strategic alliances as well as the associated licenses.  
 
By analyzing the paradigm focus across strategic alliances and periods, we were able to 
determine the focus of knowledge generation activities in each type of alliance. While the 
biological paradigm and increasingly the information paradigm are the focus of public-private 
alliances, the chemical paradigm appears to continue to be of importance in private alliances. Of 
concern within public-private alliances, however, is the number of licenses issued to upstream 
oriented knowledge when the focus is on the information paradigm. This is not surprising given 
241 
 
the trends observed during the Human Genome Project with the patenting of gene fragments and 
genes, the patenting of drug target families, and the patenting of structural aspects of cell 
signaling systems in the current paradigm [Allarakhia 2001; Allarakhia and Wensley, 2005]. We 
find further support from our subject matter analysis for the notion that in the current information 
paradigm, the focus of research is on pre-discovery (upstream research) within public-private 
alliances. Hence, it may be the case that given the current state of knowledge, the patents that are 
currently being issued in the information paradigm are on upstream knowledge. Interestingly, 
within private alliances, although pre-discovery is a notable subject matter for these alliances 
(with the majority of pre-discovery research following the information paradigm), tool 
development dominates within the information paradigm. It is therefore possible that the private 
sector has progressed further downstream into product development albeit even if the focus is on 
supportive upstream tool development. The fact that an equivalent number of licenses are issued 
to upstream and downstream research when alliances adhere to the information paradigm, may 
be supportive of this notion that the private sector has moved further downstream.   
 
 
10.2 The Consortium Analysis 
Systems biology will transform biological research into a more quantitative discipline, needing 
even more sophisticated tools to measure biological processes and manage the resulting data. 
Discoveries are made at the intersection of once disparate disciplines [Gershon, 2000]. The 
intellectual and technological challenges associated with understanding biological systems 
require collective effort from multiple research arenas. As such, the scope of these interactions 
has broadened considerably since the completion of the Human Genome Project.  
 
Managing the various scientific and technical cultures of systems biology is in itself a challenge. 
New initiatives and programs dedicated to systems biology are enabling for networking and 
collaboration between the disparate disciplines. Institutions are physically bringing together 
scientists and engineers from various laboratories located within their boundaries. Other 
networks are enabling for virtual collaboration between researchers dispersed globally through 
the use of information technologies. These institutions and networks are charged with the 
responsibility of breaking down the traditional cultural and bureaucratic barriers associated with 
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the disciplines. At the heart of the matter is the need to enable for knowledge production, 
communication between disciplines based on a common scientific language, and the need for 
knowledge dissemination. Within communities of interdisciplinary researchers, all participants 
must understand conventions regarding knowledge production and dissemination.   
 
Several funding agencies including the NIH, Genome Canada, and the Wellcome Trust have 
played a significant role in enabling large-scale collaborative projects such as those discussed in 
Chapter 6. For example, the National Institute of General Medical Sciences Glue Grant provides 
resources for the formation of research teams to tackle complex problems that are of central 
importance to biomedical science, but that are beyond the means of any one research group. 
Resources may be requested to allow participating investigators to form a consortium to address 
the research problem in a comprehensive and highly integrated fashion [www.nigms.nih.gov, 
2007]. 
 
Genome Canada‘s International Consortium Initiative (ICI) was established in October 2002. 
The ICI similarly provides an opportunity to fund unique international projects that will have 
significant impact on Canadian science and further enhance the status of Canada and Canadian 
scientists in the global community. Proposed projects must involve a formally constituted 
international consortium of research partners [Genome Canada, 2004]. 
 
By supporting such collaborations, funding agencies can indirectly encourage the norm of 
disclosure.  Guarantees of disclosure and descriptions of mechanisms for knowledge 
dissemination are often components of the grant application. The Wellcome Trust for example, 
sponsored a meeting in January 2003 to discuss how pre-publication data release can promote the 
best interests of science and help to maximize the public benefit to be gained from genomics 
research. In attendance were large-scale sequence producers, sequence users including 
computational biologists, representatives of the major nucleotide sequence databases, journal 
editors, and scientists interested in other large-scale data sets [Wellcome Trust, 2003]. 
 
The meeting concluded that pre-publication release of sequence data by the International Human 
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Genome Sequencing Consortium, and other sequence producers, has been of tremendous benefit 
to the scientific research community in general. While not all were in a position to make 
commitments for their funding agencies, the meeting attendees were in broad agreement that, to 
encourage the continuation of such benefits, sequence producers, sequence users, and funding 





 The meeting attendees reaffirmed the 1996 Bermuda Principles, which expressly called 
for rapid release to the public international DNA sequence databases (GenBank, EMBL, 
and DDBJ) of sequence assemblies of 2 Kb or greater by large-scale sequencing efforts 
and recommended that that agreement be extended to apply to all sequence data 
[Wellcome Trust, 2003]. 
  The attendees recommended that the principle of rapid pre-publication release should 
apply to other types of data from other large-scale production centres specifically 
established as ―community resource projects‖. A community resource project is a 
research project specifically devised and implemented to create a set of data, reagents or 
other material whose primary utility will be as a resource for the broad scientific 
community [Wellcome Trust, 2003]. 
  The attendees recognized that pre-publication data release might conflict with a 
fundamental scientific incentive—publishing the first analysis of one‘s own data. The 
attendees noted that it would not be possible to absolutely guarantee this incentive 
without applying restrictions that would undermine the rationale for rapid, unrestricted 
release of data from community resources. Therefore, it was understood that the 
contributions and interests of the large-scale data producers should be recognized and 
respected by the users of the data, and the ability of production centres to analyze and 





From our own analysis of research consortia in Chapter 6, we determined that many of the 
consortia themselves use rules and binding agreements to defer appropriation until the 
characteristics of knowledge warrant patenting to ensure that downstream products are 
developed. Consortia differentiate between disembodied knowledge in the form of raw data and 
embodied knowledge created by consortium members in the form of tools, biomaterials, and 
reagents. Although data that is high in complementarity and applicability, but low in 
substitutability is mandated in most cases for almost immediate release, tools, biomaterials, and 
reagents (in most cases, high in complementarity and applicability, as well as in substitutability) 
may be appropriated and licensed to consortium members and the public at large. Interestingly in 
most cases, appropriation is also regulated by the provision of rules regarding licensing terms. 
Specifically, by adhering to data and materials sharing policies provided by the NIH, the 
Wellcome Trust, the Creative Commons, the Biological Innovation for Open Society, and even 
private sector firms such as Open Biosystems, has enabled for relatively easy access to 
disembodied and embodied knowledge created within consortia. Table 10.2 comparatively 
analyzes the recommendations made by participants at the Wellcome Trust meeting held in 2003 
and the recommendations (including rules) implemented by the consortia discussed in Chapter 6. 
We see from this analysis that the recommendations suggested at the meeting are being followed 
(in some form) by the various consortia dedicated to large-scale scientific research.  
Consortium/Community 
Resource Project Issue 
Wellcome Trust 2003 
Meeting Outcome  
Consortium Analysis 
Outcome 
Resource Producers Timeline for data production 
goals and publication should 
be established. 
Rules established in most 
cases with respect to 
participation, knowledge 
production, and dissemination.  
Resource Users No restriction on use of data; 
Citation of data. 
Infrastructure established in 
most cases to enable open data 
access; Citation of data 
required by users.  
Data Data generated by community 
project should be released 
immediately. 
Data mandated in most cases 
for almost immediate release. 
Research Materials and Tools Develop practical approaches 
to use timely and rapid access 
to materials and tools. 
Materials and tools may be 
appropriated and licensed in 
most cases via royalty-free, 
non-exclusive licensing. 
Table 10.2: Comparatively Analyzing Funding Agency Recommendations and Rule 
Implementation by Consortia 
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While the consortia in Chapter 6 use rules to encourage licensing that provides the greatest 
collective value (and in turn greatest social value) to members and/or the public at large, the 
participants in our bargaining game model will rationally choose the outcome with the greatest 
unilateral value. For example, many of the consortia analyzed advocate the use of royalty-free 
non-exclusive licenses, whereas our game model advocates the use of non-exclusive licenses 
where the characteristics of knowledge—namely complementarity, substitutability, and 
applicability warrant such licenses. Where technology has commercial value on its own, a patent 
holder may choose a non-exclusive license so as to be able to sell the technology on the product 
marketplace alongside licensees. Furthermore, where technology can be substituted through non-
infringing work-around solutions, a patent holder will also have an incentive to offer a non-
exclusive license, rather than face competition without any possible compensation for his/her 
initial discovery. Alternatively, in cases where the market for technology is relatively small with 
technology having zero standalone commercial value, a patent holder may need to offer a non-
exclusive license to ensure that a downstream developer will use the technology in products, 
thereby enabling the patent holder to reap the rewards of his/her original discovery. In each case, 
the strategy chosen will rationally maximize the benefits reaped by the patent holder or the first 
discover. Perhaps however, through the use of similar binding agreements regarding the division 
of the bargaining surplus and/or the costs of research, as issued by the consortia, the NIH, and 
the Wellcome Trust, the players in our bargaining game model may choose strategies that will 
maximize the collective value for both players.  
 
 
10.3 The Games 
 
 
10.3.1 The Participation Games 
The game models developed and validated in Chapter 7 provide an effective illustration of the 
implications of changing incentives to participate in cooperative alliances including large-scale 
research consortia. By using numerical values for the common and private values of knowledge, 
we demonstrate the utility of the models to the biopharmaceutical industry—with specific 




Interestingly in most cases, in our two-player model, the incentive is to cooperate via 
participation in an alliance in the restricted access setting—thereby accessing required 
knowledge. But when the private value of knowledge exceeds its common value, the incentive to 
cooperate is assured only if another researcher also cooperates. Understandably, if knowledge 
can be readily accessed without participation, and the private value of knowledge is greater than 
the common value of knowledge, defection is generally the outcome; similarly, when the 
common value of knowledge exceeds the private value of knowledge, mutual cooperation is the 
preferred outcome. When the common value of joint knowledge is increased, and both players 
would benefit from mutual cooperation, although a player that chooses unilateral cooperation 
still enjoys a larger payoff by cooperating rather than defecting—mutual cooperation is instead 
only assured in the restricted access setting. (Table 7.15) 
 
A modified version of our two-player model involves a game of two players who each decide 
whether to participate in an existing consortium. The common value derives from units jointly 
generated, contributed, and combined with existing consortium knowledge. In this case, an 
additional parameter (Kc) is required to encompass existing consortium knowledge to which a 
new participant can add. We see from our model that in the public access setting, where what is 
known by the consortium is openly shared with members and the public at large, Kc is enjoyed 
by both players regardless of choice made and as such, not a factor in the decision taken by each 
player. In the restricted access setting however, as only members can enjoy the common value of 
consortium knowledge, the parameter Kc is (mathematically) significant and can be a factor in 
the decisions taken by each player.  Future models should therefore consider the decision to join 
an existing consortium in the restricted access setting.  
 
10.3.2 The Appropriation Game  
In Chapter 8, we developed a two-player game model to understand the strategic decisions made 
by firms regarding the timing of appropriation activities. The game model not only models the 
decision to file a patent, but through the use of case studies as presented in Chapter 6, models the 
decision to pre-empt rivals through disclosure—thereby preventing firms from prematurely 
enclosing upstream knowledge. It is our contention that as biological knowledge structures 
become complex, researchers and firms should cautiously determine their strategies with respect 
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to upstream discovery research. The greater the complementarity between knowledge structures 
and applicability across systems, models, or diseases, the greater the need for multiple 
researchers to access these knowledge structures for downstream product development.  
 
Merges (1996) argues that each researcher may find defection in his or her own interest, and will 
therefore expect a partner to similarly defect, unless cooperation is assured.  (Table 8.12) 
However, unlike the tit-for-tat strategy in the Prisoner‘s Dilemma game, where a player will 
always cooperate unless provoked and will retaliate, but quickly forgives the opponent if 
provoked, the player who is ―suckered‖ may not be so forgiving [Axelrod, 1984]. Players who 
defect earlier in time may meet reduced success in bargaining with others who remember past 
actions. In this case, pre-emptive disclosure may be one option to ensure the freedom to operate 
in downstream development for both players. (Table 8.8) 
 
From our consortium analysis, we determined that the majority of consortia have as their 
objective the cooperative generation and dissemination of upstream knowledge. In a few cases, 
consortia appear to have been established to pre-empt downstream rivals. For example, the 
Accelrys Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium, the Accelrys Functional Proteomics Consortium, 
and the Accelrys Nanotechnology Consortia appear to have been established to pre-empt 
downstream rivals through selective cooperation and knowledge dissemination. 
 
An interesting situation arises however, when the common value of what is jointly known 
increases. In this case, multiple equilibria exist in our game model. If player 1 chooses defection, 
player 2‘s best strategy is to cooperate, and vice versa. Similar to the game of Chicken, if both 
players choose to defect, both are worse off, receiving the lower payoffs (despite the fact that the 
private value of what is unilaterally known may be higher than the common value of this 
knowledge). (Table 8.9) 
 
While our model begins to demonstrate the importance of evaluating biological knowledge 
structures as driving strategic behaviour of firms during knowledge production and 
dissemination activities, future research is required to augment the model. We need to assess 
how best to evaluate private and collective knowledge units. Furthermore, we have assumed that 
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the collective value of knowledge is simply the sum of the individual parts; our model may 
provide alternative insight if we modify the collective value of knowledge to derive from not 
only the individual parts, but also from the synergy between knowledge units. (See Chapters 7 
and 8 for a preliminary analysis.) 
 
10.3.3 The Bargaining Game  
In Chapter 9, we assume that knowledge has been patented and consider the licensing options 
available to both the licensor and potential licensee as knowledge structures change. Figure 9.1 is 
an extensive form game model of the licensing environment where a first invention has 
commercial value and is complementary to second generation product development.   
 
The threat point, each player‘s BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement), is the 
expected profit it can guarantee if it leaves the bargaining table. The bargaining surplus is the 
total amount by which the players will be richer if bargaining is successful. Each player can 
guarantee itself at least the amount of the threat point. However, central to a successful outcome 
(where success refers to the option of pursuing downstream product development) is how to 
divide the bargaining surplus. In our model, this bargaining surplus will vary with type of license 
issued (non-exclusive or exclusive) and whether the license is issued ex-ante or ex-post. Ideally, 
a system should ensure that both players are rewarded for their contributions and in particular, 
that the investment made to develop the first invention permits the second generation product to 
be developed and profitable.  
 
Whether or not a license is issued and accepted ex-ante will be depend on the division of the 
bargaining surplus, the cost of developing the second generation product, and the ability of 
player 2 to substitute for the first invention. Furthermore, if player 1 is relatively uninformed 
about the value and costs associated with the development of the second generation product ex-
ante, he/she may be unwilling to allow ex-ante licensing. With the threat of duplication by player 
2, player 1 will have to be flexible on the bargaining surplus split between the two players, as 
there is no real incentive for player 2 to enter into bargaining. We anticipate that however, as the 
cost of duplication increases, the incentive to enter into bargaining will equivalently increase. 
Similarly, if the downstream product market size is small, our model demonstrates that player 1 
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may need to provide player 2 an incentive to engage in product development particularly as the 
costs of development rise in relation to profits. 
 
The models in Chapter 9 provide insight on how consortium members individually or 
collectively focus on downstream product development. Once consortium objectives are 
achieved and membership is terminated, firms can easily become competitors on the product 
marketplace. It is at this transition point that the licensing strategies adopted by firms can be 
expected to maximize the private value of their knowledge.   
 
Future models should enable for cross-licensing to understand the change in licensing strategy 
adopted by the licensor or licensee as knowledge is traded. A particularly interesting scenario 
will arise with the cross-licensing of asymmetrically valued knowledge.  Complementarity 
between the sale of disembodied knowledge and internal embodiment occurs when knowledge 
possesses high applicability and it is possible to operate in different markets from other licensees 
of the knowledge [Teece, 1986; Arora and Fosfuri, 2003, Foray, 2004]. In this case, cross-
licensing may also be an effective strategy [Shapiro, 2001]. With downstream activities 
dependent on the recombination of a variety of knowledge, the cost of the coordination including 
accumulation of the full range of required knowledge may be too high for one researcher 
[Antonelli, 2003; Burk and Lemley, 2003]. Specifically, the capabilities of the one researcher 
may only cover a portion of the research domain. Consequently, researchers may find it 
profitable to engage in cross-licensing for knowledge. However, the ability for each researcher to 
access knowledge depends of the amount and type of proprietary knowledge each one is able to 
contribute in any bargaining event [Antonelli, 2003].   
 
Shapiro (2001) also discusses that when two or more companies control patents necessary to 
make a given product, a patent pool or a package license can be the solution. Under a patent 
pool, an entire group of patents is licensed in a package, either by one of the patent holders or by 
a new entity established for this purpose, usually to anyone willing to pay the associated royalties 
[Shapiro, 2001]. Under a package license, two or more patent holders agree to the terms on 




10.4 Understanding the Future from the Past 
Dyes that preferentially stained tissues led to the birth of chemotherapy. Chemical affinities 
between dyes and tissues—cells or cellular components, led to the exploration of the binding 
properties of biological structures and chemical compounds in living organisms. Researchers 
postulated that cells carry on their surfaces and then eventually in their interior, receptors that 
preferentially bind to certain chemical compounds. The challenge for chemotherapy would be to 
find chemical compounds that would only bind to cells that a therapist would hope to eliminate 
from the body of a diseased patient [Drews, 1998; Dutfield, 2003; PhRMA 2007].  
 
From the perspective of pharmacology, receptors are viewed as signal receivers. These targets 
interact selectively with a signal and transmit the signal information to intracellular effector 
organelles. It is this biochemical understanding of receptors, enzymes, and even ion channels (all 
targets for intervention by pharmaceuticals) that was responsible for the drug revolution in the 
1950s and 1960s, resulting in the production of numerous medicines [Drews, 1998; Dutfield, 
2003]. 
 
The biotechnology industry originated in the 1970s, based largely on new recombinant DNA 
techniques developed by Stanley Cohen of Stanford University and Herbert Boyer of the 
University of California, San Francisco [BIO.org, 2007]. The understanding of disease from a 
molecular perspective and the use of molecular techniques to create recombinant DNA has 
produced a vast number of drugs such as vaccines, monoclonal antibodies, recombinant 
products, and gene-based drugs [BIO.org, 2007]. 
 
Biotechnology companies have come to play a significant role in discovering an ever-increasing 
proportion of the new molecular entities (NMEs) launched every year. In the past, most drugs 
have been discovered either by isolating the active ingredient from traditional remedies or by 
serendipitous discovery. Modern biotechnology often focuses on understanding the metabolic 
pathways related to a disease state, and manipulating these pathways using molecular biology or 
biochemistry. Therefore, biotechnology companies assist in bringing not only the traditional 
chemical based—new small-molecule drugs to market, but also biological based products 




Once researchers understand the underlying cause of a disease, researchers select a ―target‖ for a 
potential new medicine. A target is generally a single molecule, such as a gene or protein, which 
is involved in a particular disease. Even at this early stage in drug discovery, it is critical that 
researchers pick a target that is ―druggable,‖ i.e., one that can potentially interact with and be 
affected by a drug molecule [PhRMA, 2007]. Researchers search for a molecule, or ―lead 
compound,‖ that may act on their target to alter the disease course. There are a few ways to find 
a lead compound: 
 
 Nature: Until recently, scientists usually turned to nature to find compounds. Bacteria 
found in soil and moldy plants have both served as sources of new compounds. While, 
nature still offers many useful substances, there are other approaches to drug discovery 
[PhRMA, 2007]. 
 De novo: Given advances in chemistry, scientists can create molecules from scratch. 
Using sophisticated computer modeling researchers are able to predict what type of 
molecule may serve as a lead [PhRMA, 2007]. 
 High-throughput Screening: This process is the most common technique used to 
discover leads. Advances in robotics and computational power allow researchers to test 
hundreds of thousands of compounds against the target to identify any that might be 
promising. Based on the results, several lead compounds are usually selected for further 
study [PhRMA, 2007]. 
 Biotechnology: Scientists can also genetically engineer living systems to produce 
biological molecules [PhRMA, 2007]. 
 
While small-molecule drugs have chemical compositions, biologics include recombinant 
proteins, monoclonal antibodies, vaccines, antisense products, as well as cell and gene therapies. 
A 2006 report from the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) found 
418 medicines and vaccines—developed through biotechnology—were being tested to treat more 
than 100 diseases. These biotechnology medicines include 210 medicines to treat cancer, 50 to 
treat infectious disease, 44 to treat autoimmune disorders, 22 to treat HIV Infection and related-
conditions, and 22 to treat cardiovascular diseases [PhRMA, 2006]. These potential medicines, 
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all of which are either in human clinical trials or under review by the Food and Drug 
Administration, will add to the list of 125 biotechnology medicines already approved and 
available to patients [PhRMA, 2006]. In fact, in 2006, 29 new medicines were approved by FDA. 
These new medicines include 18 new chemical-based drugs, four new therapeutic biologics, and 
seven other biologics [PhRMA, 2006]. 
 
From the above analysis, we see the evolution of profits models for the pharmaceutical and now 
biopharmaceutical industry—from chemical-based drugs discovered from nature or 
serendipitously, to chemical-based drugs discovered through modern biotechnology, to both 
chemical- and biological-based drugs arising from traditional chemical techniques and novel 
biotechnology processes.  
 
To complete the sequence map of the Human Genome also required breakthroughs in 
understanding computational sciences, measurement technologies, statistics, and data 
management [Hood, 2000; Kitano, 2001]. Tool companies have therefore enabled high-through 
quantitative measurements of biological information based on computer science, mathematics, 
and statistics. Biotechnology is also responsible for hundreds of medical diagnostic tests used in 
health care management and disease diagnosis.  
 
In parallel, during the sequencing of the Human Genome, several proprietary genomic databases 
were created by the private sector. These databases contained genomic information and the 
necessary tools and software to view, browse, and analyze genetic data, for the purposes of 
finding new discoveries and breakthroughs in medicine. Bioinformatics companies provided the 
necessary high performance software and scientific expertise for biological sequence data 
mining.  
 
As the industry evolves to incorporate the systems paradigm, it is anticipated that the drug 
discovery and development feedback cycle will further incorporate novel technologies and 
disciplines. Global observations made during discovery research will be matched to model 
predictions or hypotheses in an iterative manner, leading to new patient models, predictions, and 
methods of patient experimentation [Ideker et al., 2001]. Computational experiments will 
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identify and virtually screen lead compounds. Successful leads will be synthesized and then 
tested via in vitro and in vivo experiments as well as clinical studies [Kitano, 2002]. 
 
As shown in Figure 10.1, we contend that with paradigm shifts, new profit models have 
emerged. To capture new market shares, the targets of intellectual property have also evolved 
with paradigms—from chemical compositions, to biologics, to biological materials and 
genomics-based tools, diagnostics, and now biological information. Unfortunately, patent 
examiners are increasingly finding it difficult to apply the chemical patent law doctrines to 
biological information. As such, the time has come to re-evaluate the current patent system to not 
only accommodate new processes as is the case with the 2007 U.S. Patent Reform Act, but new 
categories of goods. With the move toward ―synthetic biology‖ i.e., the creation of new life 
forms by starting at the genetic level, this re-evaluation has reached a stage of urgency. Rai and 
Boyle (2007) discuss that synthetic biologists hope to create an array of modular biological parts 
that can be easily synthesized and mixed in different combinations. Synthetic biology will further 
bring together various systems, devices, parts, and DNA to create new products and hence 
targets for intellectual property. These components occupy various levels in the knowledge 
hierarchy to be associated with synthetic biology. Systems for example consist of devices and 
devices may consist of parts composed of DNA [Rai and Boyle, 2007]. Once again, as is the case 
for systems biology, complicating the matter is the hierarchical nature of synthetic biology 
knowledge. At any level in this hierarchy, patents may exist. Depending on the breadth of patents 
filed at a particular level, these patents can dominate over other hierarchical levels of 
information.  Unfortunately, the combination of synthetic and non-synthetic materials 
(depending on perspective taken with respect to DNA) will add new complexities for a patent 
system that already needs reform. Rai and Boyle (2007) discuss one solution—the MIT Registry 
of Standard Biological Parts—an open initiative to place parts into the public domain—that 
makes parts not only unpatentable, but will also prevent the patenting of trivial improvements. 
Such open initiatives may be just as effective for managing the complexities of this new 
paradigm as they appear to be for the systems paradigm, particularly in the early stages of 






Figure 10.1: Evolving Profit Models and Targets of Intellectual Property  


























Chapter 11: Current Outlook 
 
11.1 Changing Incentives and the Bayh Dole Act 
Powell and Owen-Smith (1998) argue that the separation of the scientist in the academic world 
and the technologist in the private arena no longer holds in the life sciences. Universities have 
become much more oriented to the commercialization of research. The shift is argued to be a 
result of changing incentives favouring the commercialization of research. With the 1980 Patent 
and Trademark Law Amendments Act, also known as the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, universities were 
given the right to retain property rights to inventions derived from federally funded research. The 
intent of Congress was to promote collaboration between commercial enterprises and academic 
institutions. In 1984, the rights of universities were more broadly expanded to permit universities 
to assign their property rights to others [Powell and Owen-Smith, 1998]. Powell and Owen-
Smith (1998) explain that many of the legislative changes of the 1980s and 1990s sparked a 
considerable upsurge in licensing, as well as the growth in the number of university-industry 
research centres, consortia, and agreements. Universities were given the right to grant licenses 
including exclusive licenses to their inventions to private firms. It was anticipated that such 
licenses were necessary to provide private firms the incentive to invest in the downstream 
development of commercial products [Rai and Eisenberg, 2003]. 
 
Encouraged by the success of the Bayh-Dole Act, the Japanese Government enacted the Law for 
Promoting University-Industry Technology Transfer in 1998. The law provided for the 
establishment of Technology Licensing Offices (TLOs), which would receive financial 
assistance from the government to encourage technology transfer partnerships between 
universities and the private sector [Institute of Intellectual Property, 2001]. In Canada, while 
many universities retain ownership of intellectual property generated from public funds or share 
it with researchers, other universities turn over full rights to the researchers. The concern is that 
legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act might not be effective in maintaining the open scholarship 
stance of Canadian universities; as well, it is not entirely clear whether spending on 
commercialization might be the best solution with respect to benefiting more from Canadian 
investment in university-based research [Kondro, 1999]. 
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Rai and Eisenberg (2003) also argue that the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act should be reformed to give 
funding agencies greater discretion to determine when to mandate that publicly-funded research 
discoveries be placed into the public domain. These authors explain that the Bayh-Dole Act does 
not presume that patents are necessary to motivate grantees to perform research with federal 
funds, but rather that patents will promote the usage and commercialization of inventions arising 
from federally supported research. The reasoning behind this presumption is that patents and 
exclusive licenses are essential to attract the private investment for product development. 
However, no distinction has been made between knowledge types—upstream research inputs and 
upstream tools versus downstream diagnostics and drugs—and knowledge form—disembodied, 
pure knowledge versus embodied knowledge. As well, the Bayh-Dole Act does not encompass 
the notion of changing paradigms and knowledge structures and the impact of patents or 
exclusive licenses on downstream opportunities. Clearly, discussion is required to understand 
under what circumstances adherence to the Bayh-Dole Act is required to provide incentives for 
downstream product development and alternatively, when the private and public sectors are 
better served by the broad dissemination of knowledge.  
 
On a number of occasions, the NIH has been able to use strategies to convince academic 
institutions to act collectively to keep basic research information in the public domain. For 
example, leaders of the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), together with the 
Wellcome Trust, and academic researchers at the major human genome mapping centres, 
resolved in February 1996 that ―all human genomic DNA sequence information generated by 
centres funded for large-scale human sequencing should be freely available and in the public 
domain in order to encourage research and development‖ [Marshall, 1996]. NHGRI followed up 
with an April 1996 policy statement making ―rapid release of data into public databases‖ a 
condition for grants for large-scale human genome sequencing [NHGRI, 1996]. NHGRI also 
warned that it would monitor whether grantees were patenting ―large blocks of primary human 
genomic DNA sequence‖ and might invoke the ―exceptional circumstances‖ limitation (to 
restrict patenting) in future grants [NHGRI, 1996]. A more general statement of ―Principles and 
Guidelines for Sharing of Biomedical Research Resources,‖ adopted by NIH in December 1999, 
also attempted to guide NIH grantees in their appropriation activities. We determined from our 
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consortium study that many consortia opted to use these guidelines to guide their members‘ 
patenting and licensing activities. These principles state that: 
 
The use of patents and exclusive licenses is not the only, nor in some cases the most 
appropriate means of implementing the Bayh-Dole Act. Where the subject invention is 
useful primarily as a research tool, inappropriate licensing practices are likely to thwart 
rather than promote utilization, commercialization, and public availability [NIH 1999]. 
 
These guidelines and statements seek to encourage cooperation during knowledge production 
and dissemination. Of further encouragement is the National Institute of General Medical 
Sciences Glue Grant—providing resources for the formation of research teams to tackle complex 
problems that are of central importance to biomedical science, but that are beyond the means of 
any one research group. Resources may be requested to allow participating investigators to form 
a consortium to address the research problem in a comprehensive and highly integrated fashion. 
Such grants provide researchers with incentives to cooperate earlier in time—during knowledge 
production.  
 
Similarly, on September 4th 2007, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) announced 
a new policy to promote public access to the results of funded research. CIHR will require its 
researchers to ensure that their original research articles are freely available online within six 
months of publication. Researchers can deposit their article in an archive, such as PubMed 
Central or an institutional repository, and/or by publishing results in an open access journal. In 
addition, grant recipients are now required to deposit bioinformatics, atomic, and molecular 
coordinate data, already required by most journals, into the most appropriate public database 
immediately upon publication of research results [CIHR, 2007]. ―Timely and unrestricted access 
to research findings is a defining feature of science, and is essential for advancing knowledge 
and accelerating our understanding of human health and disease‖, stated Dr. Alan Bernstein, 






11.2 Reforming the Patent System  
Earlier this year, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), and 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), a senior member of the panel, joined with Rep. Howard Berman 
(D-Calif.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee‘s Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property and Rep. Lamar Smith (R-Texas), ranking member of the House 
Judiciary Committee, introduced the Patent Reform Act of 2007. These changes serve as legal 
mechanisms to change the incentives for appropriation and the probabilities associated with 
receiving patents.  
 
The bill will create a pure ―first-to-file‖ patent system. The American system is the only one in 
the world that still grants patents to the first inventor rather than the first to file an application.  
The bill also creates a more streamlined and effective way of challenging the validity and 
enforceability of patents [Leahy, 2007]. ―If we are to maintain our position at the forefront of the 
world‘s economy and continue to lead the globe in innovation and production, then we must 
have an efficient and streamlined patent system to allow for high quality patents that limits 
counterproductive litigation,‖ said Leahy. ―This bill is an important step towards achieving that 
goal.‖ [Leahy, 2007]. 
 
The United States Patent Office  currently uses an interference proceeding to determine which 
party was first to ―invent‖ the claimed invention where competing claims arise.  The 
determination is apparently intensely fact-specific and costly to resolve [Leahy, 2007]. The bill 
converts the United States‘ patent system into a first-to-file system, giving priority to the earlier-
filed application for a claimed invention.  Interference proceedings will be replaced with 
derivation proceedings to determine whether the applicant of an earlier-filed application was not 
the proper applicant for the claimed invention. It is hoped that a derivation proceeding will be 
faster and less expensive than the interference proceeding.  This bill also encourages the sharing 
of information by providing a grace period for publicly disclosing the subject matter of the 
claimed invention without losing priority [Leahy, 2007]. The Biotechnology Industry 
Organization (BIO)—the largest advocacy group representing the industry—supports this 
transition to the first-to-file system [BIO, 2007]. While this reform is expected to bring 
consistency and clarity to the U.S. system in comparison to global patent systems, we argue that 
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it may also change the perception of the ―transition point‖. Inventors will have to reconsider 
when they apply for patents. The change could encourage inventors to file patent applications 
earlier than they would presently do, and file applications more often to preserve downstream 
product development opportunities including a seat at the bargaining table. 
 
Leahy, Berman, and Smith indicate in the bill, that as products have become more complex, 
often involving hundreds or even thousands of patents, litigation has not reliably produced 
damages awards in infringement cases that correspond to the true value of the infringed 
patent. While the bill preserves the current rule that mandates that damages award shall not be 
less than a ―reasonable royalty‖ for the infringed patent, it further requires the court to conduct 
an analysis to ensure that, when a ―reasonable royalty‖ is the award, it reflects only the economic 
value of the patent‘s ―specific contribution over the prior art‖, i.e., ―the truly new thing that the 
patent reflects‖ [Leahy, 2007]. Interestingly, the court is encouraged to consider any non-
exclusive marketplace licensing of the invention, if there is such a history, in determining a 
reasonable royalty [Leahy, 2007].  
 
BIO opposes these provisions, arguing that this approach ignores the fundamental facts that 
virtually all inventions are, to some degree, based on prior art, and that many patented 
components may be essential to the functionality of the overall infringing product [BIO, 2007]. 
We offer the same argument regarding the complementarity of knowledge in this thesis to limit 
the scope and timing of patenting. From a game perspective, the limitation of damages to the 
―true new thing of the patent‖ is expected to decrease the private value of appropriation. While 
BIO argues that the resulting royalties would be lower than the reasonable royalties calculated 
under current law and would compensate patent owners for only a portion of their invention, 
rather than its‘ whole, thereby making infringement cheaper and perhaps ultimately discouraging 
investment into R&D, we argue that the private and social impacts are yet to be seen.  
 
This bill also creates a new, post-grant review that provides an effective and efficient system for 
considering challenges to the validity of patents. The bill specifically amends the reexamination 
procedures to provide that, within three months of a request for reexamination of a patent by the 
patent owner, or at any time on the Director‘s own initiative, the Director may determine 
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whether a substantial new question of patentability is raised by patents discovered by him/her or 
cited by any other person [Leahy, 2007]. BIO opposes provisions that would create a limitless 
opportunity to broadly challenge a patent administratively at any time during the life of the 
patent—claiming that this post-grant review provision would cast a cloud of uncertainty over 
issued patents [BIO, 2007]. In BIO‘s view, in order to prevent abuse and misuse of any new 
post-grant opposition system, any administrative alternative to patent validity litigation must 
maintain the presumption of validity of patent claims that were issued by the USPTO. Further, 
any post-grant opposition system must include incentives to bring validity challenges early in 
patent life, and contain limits on the ability of challengers [BIO, 2007]. Such a post-grant system 
again could limit the private value of appropriation, prompting firms to cautiously craft out 
patent claims; perhaps the problems associated with the first-to-file transition could then be 
mitigated by this post-grant review system. Although, the U.S. House of Representatives passed, 
in a 220 to 175 vote on September 7th
 
2007, its version of the Patent Reform Act of 2007, 
several changes are expected to the House bill before the Bush administration authorizes full 
passage.  
 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding utility and recently, obviousness, have also raised the 
bar for receiving patents—and from a game perspective have likely decreased the probability of 
receiving the patent. The key issue in patenting genetic material has always revolved around the 
utility of the claimed genes and fragments. The 1999 Revised Interim Utility Guidelines 
established a heightened standard for utility [USPTO, 1999]. Under the 1999 standard, ―credible 
utility‖ was not sufficient without an additional indication of ―specific‖ and ―substantial‖ utility 
[USPTO, 1999]. The policy of this heightened standard was based on the USPTO‘s adoption of 
the U.S. Supreme Court‘s position in Brenner vs. Manson that a patent is not given as a reward 
for the search of an invention‘s utility but, rather, a reward for actually discovering that utility 
[Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536, 1966]. 
 
In its KSR vs. Teleflex decision, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that nearly all 
innovations rely upon building blocks discovered in the past, but ruled that patentability requires 
more than predictable combinations of prior art [Nature Drug Discovery, 2007]. The impact of 
this change in obviousness definition is already being felt in the biopharmaceutical industry. In 
261 
 
an opinion released in June of this year, Judge William H. Pauley III of the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York ruled that Merck‘s (MRK) patent on the formulation for 
Pepcid Complete is invalid as obvious, clearing the way for Perrigo Co. (PRGO) to sell its own 
generic version of the medication [Nature Drug Discovery, 2007]. The decision is one of the first 
pharmaceutical patent decisions to rely on, and quote extensively from the Supreme Court‘s 
April 30th 2007 decision in KSR v. Teleflex (TFX). Pepcid Complete is an over-the-counter 
product intended for the treatment of heartburn. Judge Pauley refers to the following in his 
decision:  
 
Under KSR, the combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to 
be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. The ‗340 patent does no 
more than combine the predictable results of Davis and Wolfe with the predictable results 
of the ‗072 and ‗114 patents (two prior art patents) [Barkoff, 2007]. 
 
While innovators in the life sciences and chemical industries often cannot reasonably predict the 
outcome from a combination of particular elements from prior art, we have yet to see the full 
impact on the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries [Kintisch, 2007]. Currently, it is 
anticipated that closely related imitation drugs may be deemed obvious even if they offer 
substantial improvement, and drug companies may be limited in their attempt to extend patents 
and the life of their drugs with minor improvements.  
 
Dr. Richard Gold and Tina Piper of the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy (CIPP; 2006) also 
recommend revisions to Canadian patent law. Dr. Gold states for example that the Australian 
Law Reform Commission has recommended 50 changes to Australian patent law to meet 
challenges posed by new technologies. The European Union has also doggedly attempted to 
streamline its patent process to create a European-wide patent. Japan similarly revamped its 
patent laws in the 1980s [Gold and Piper, 2006]. While innovators seeking protection for their 
inventions in Canada, the U.S., Europe, and Japan must file for a patent in each place, most 
Canadian companies are likely to first patent inventions in the much larger U.S. market and may 
not even bother patenting in Canada at all [Gold, 2006]. Gold and Piper explain that American 
262 
 
companies both invent and sell in the U.S., while Canadian companies typically invent at home 
and sell abroad. Keeping this in mind, Gold and Piper propose the following:  
 
First, because Canada‘s strategic advantage lies in research and not the size of the market it 
offers, our patent laws should encourage public and private sector researchers to invent in 
Canada and sell abroad. Canadians patents should be carefully scrutinized before they are 
granted to ensure that the monopoly they create does not restrict access to knowledge and 
research tools. In other words, our researchers should be left free to innovate with 
relatively few impediments [Gold and Piper, 2006]. 
 
Second, patent law should not obstruct the administration of our public health care system. 
Since Canada‘s share of the technology market is so small, it is unlikely that broader patent 
rights would attract outside investors seeking to profit on new medical technologies created 
in this country. On the other hand, expanded patent rights would lead to more medical 
products being sold to the Canadian health system at monopoly prices. Canada should 
therefore be capable of weighing potential benefits associated with increased patent 
protection against costs to the health care system that would be created if such protection 




11.3 Patients Changing the Rules of the Game 
In Federal District Court in Chicago on October 30th, 2000, the law offices of Chicago-Kent 
College of Law filed a lawsuit against Miami Children‘s Hospital (MCH) and Dr. Reuben 
Matalon on behalf of parents of children afflicted with Canavan disease and Canavan 
Foundation, Dor Yeshorim, and National Tay-Sachs and Allied Diseases Association, Inc. 
(NTSAD). The case involves an alliance between parents and not-for-profit organizations who 
sought the help of researchers to develop prenatal and carrier testing for Canavan disease to be 
made accessible and affordable to the public [caravanfoundation.org, 2007]. The suit alleges that 
unbeknownst to the Canavan families and organizations, Dr. Matalon and his employer—the 
Miami Children‘s Hospital, secretly obtained a patent for the Canavan disease gene they 
discovered using the genetic information and financial resources provided by the Canavan 
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families and organizations [caravanfoundation.org, 2007]. Upon receiving the patent, Dr. 
Matalon and MCH started to charge royalties and limit the availability of testing. The six-count 
lawsuit, the first of its kind, alleges breach of informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust 
enrichment, fraudulent concealment, conversion, and misappropriation of trade secrets 
[caravanfoundation.org, 2007]. 
 
Based on the patent, doctors were prohibited from testing or examining patients for the Canavan 
disease gene despite the fact that the doctors could do so using traditional medical practices and 
such testing or examination would not require the use of any product or device invented by Dr. 
Matalon or MCH [caravanfoundation.org, 2007]. At stake was the possibility that royalties for 
the Canavan test would either cause a price increase in the series of tests doctors offered in their 
testing program or force its removal from any premarital screening program. In the lawsuit, the 
Canavan families and organizations primarily sought injunctive relief to prevent Miami 
Children‘s Hospital from restricting access to prenatal and carrier testing for Canavan disease 
and from impeding research on finding a cure or therapies for Canavan disease through 
enforcement of its patent [caravanfoundation.org, 2007].  
 
The case was eventually settled between the parties. The patient group agreed not to further 
challenge the patent. While Miami Children‘s Hospital would continue to license and collect 
royalty fees for clinical testing for the Canavan gene mutation, the settlement also allowed 
license free use of the Canavan gene in research to cure Canavan disease, including gene therapy 
research, genetic testing in pure research, and in mice used to research Canavan disease 
[caravanfoundation.org, 2007]. 
 
Interestingly in another case, involving a genetic disorder that causes connective tissue in the 
skins, eyes, and arteries to calcify, a disorder known as pseudoxanthoma elasticum (PXE), PXE 
International received a joint patent with the researchers who isolated the disease causing gene. 
PXE International provided scientists at the University of Hawaii with blood and tissue samples 
from patients with the disorder [Smaglik, 2000]. In return, the patient advocacy group received 
joint patent rights to the disease causing gene. Sharon Terry, president of PXE International 
stated that the group sought joint patent rights to ensure that licenses for any resulting gene tests 
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would be widely available and at a low cost [Smaglik, 2000]. The Canavan case clearly raised 
concerns regarding the ownership of discoveries made with the assistance of subjects afflicted 
with the disease. The U.S. National Bioethics Advisory Commission also started encouraging the 
sharing of benefits with subjects who enabled discoveries [Smaglik, 2000]. Smaglik (2000) also 
anticipated that other genetic disease groups would follow the PXE model. 
 
In both of these cases, the power of social groups is evident. From a game perspective, these 
social groups reduced the payoff associated with unilateral defection through the use of lawsuits 
and negative publicity. Social groups can therefore, encourage cooperation by threatening to 
punish defectors. The patient advocacy groups involved in the Canavan case was retroactively 
able to change the rules associated with appropriation of research results. Alternatively, the PXE 
alliance could become a model for proactively handling intellectual property rights emerging 
from cooperations between patient groups and researchers [Smaglik, 2000].  
 
 
11.4 The Developing Market 
As economies such India, China, Brazil, South Africa enter the biopharmaceutical arena, it is 
essential that developed economies share not only technology expertise, but also their 
experiences regarding collaborative knowledge production, technology transfer, and intellectual 
property management. The goal should be to enable these economies to participate on a level 
playing field to protect local knowledge and enable access to global knowledge as well as 
technology. It is anticipated that North-South partnerships will enable these emerging economies 
to better understand international technology transfer, licensing, and commercialization of 
technologies, as well as effective cross-broader public–private partnerships. Regional 
partnerships will be necessary to enable for capacity building namely via bioscience cluster 
development including public institutions, government laboratories, incubators, local and 
international private sector firms.  
 
Beyond North-South partnerships and local capacity building, it is necessary that researchers and 
technology transfer officers take greater caution in the patenting and licensing of technologies 
that have significant application in developing and under-developed markets. Maintaining and 
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building the public domain with particular attention to knowledge that is of benefit to these 
economics can enable researchers to quickly and cost-effectively access knowledge. Open 
licensing, geographic-based licensing, assigning fair-royalties are all options being employed to 
assist researchers in developing economies access technologies that address for example 
neglected diseases or local health needs.  
 
Local governments also have a role to play. Through the development of innovation policies 
with reference to patenting publicly funded research, governments can ensure not only the 
protection of local resources and local capacity building, but also a seat for these researchers at 
the international bargaining table.  
 
An example of the role of government in balancing the needs of its local researchers and firms 
with its obligations as member of the World Trade Organization (and the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights) is the case of Novartis vs. the Government of India. In August of 
2007, an Indian court ruled that the country‘s pharmaceutical industry could continue producing 
cheap generic drugs for diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis [Ward, 2007]. The 
case stemmed from the Indian Government‘s rejection of a patent application submitted by the 
pharmaceutical company Novartis for its new leukemia drug, Gleevec. In issuing its rejection, 
the Indian government asserted that the leukemia drug Gleevec does not differ sufficiently from 
earlier versions of the drug [Ward, 2007]. Under current Indian patent law, pharmaceuticals must 
be either a new invention or offer a significant improvement on existing medications to qualify 
for patent. A victory for Novartis in the Gleevec case would have set an important precedent 
preventing the production of many other generic medicines, greatly reducing the $5 billion 
Indian pharmaceutical industry‘s ability to supply drugs to aid agencies and low income 
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America [Ward, 2007]. 
 
We anticipate that our knowledge perspective and game models will provide a preliminary 
framework for understanding the increased complexities associated with product development 
for developed, developing, and even under-developed markets. Through the correct management 
of novel strategic alliances and the knowledge assets developed within such alliances, 
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biopharmaceutical companies can gain access to new economies with the objectives of gaining 
private benefits as well as providing social benefits to their new consumers.  
 
 
11.5 Theoretical and Practical Outcomes 
The knowledge framework developed in this thesis should enable firms to better understand the 
underlying structure and state of knowledge. While we discuss the chemical, biological, and 
information paradigms in this thesis, this framework has considerable applicability as the 
synthetic biology paradigm evolves—where the biological, information, and devices paradigms 
intersect. Many of the issues discussed for the information paradigm will have even more serious 
consequence as these firms seek patents over biological materials that may be placed into 
synthetic devices or as genomic information is manipulated to develop new organisms. 
Furthermore, as new theories underlying biological processes emerge and researchers re-evaluate 
their assumptions regarding the value of old knowledge, the strength of patents filed on older 
knowledge may change. For example, what was once thought of as ―junk‖ DNA may become 
critical in our understanding of biological and disease processes. Patents that have placed little 
value on this upstream knowledge may not offer as strong protection over downstream product 
domains. In other cases, broad patents including claims on such knowledge may now offer new 
players a stronger seat at the bargaining table. Hence, we contend that researchers and firms 
should bear in mind that the state of knowledge is constantly changing and as such, our 
knowledge framework provides a first glance at the strategies that should be used to evaluate 
biological knowledge structures and the types of alliances that can be formed to acquire, access, 
and generate new knowledge.  
 
As new paradigms and knowledge structures emerge, we should also keep in mind that 
developing markets and new industries will offer once isolated firms the opportunity to develop 
products. Here, government including public funding agencies and patent systems, may need to 
work together in order to ensure an equitable opportunity for these weaker players to enter 
research arenas. Programs that enable for cross-border research alliances and train researchers in 
the areas of technology transfer and commercialization can use the lessons learned from our 
consortium analysis to determine the best alliance structures, the rules for knowledge production 
267 
 
and dissemination, as well as the best strategies for appropriating knowledge. Of interest will be 
the continued use of the open source strategies analyzed in Chapter 6 as the biotechnology 
industry expands its focus on new energy sources and sustainable development.   
 
Patent systems can provide support as paradigms and knowledge structures evolve in terms of 1) 
breadth of claims approved in patent applications—ensuring that high standards of utility, 
obviousness, and written enablement are used, 2) the pre-grant and post-grant review processes 
used to contest new patent applications—ensuring that uncertainty surrounding patents is 
resolved earlier in time, and 3) the information available to patent officers regarding the 
characteristics of knowledge underlying patent applications—keeping knowledge domains open 
for multiple researchers and firms through the mechanisms outlined above. The use of open 
source strategies by various stakeholders, including the private sector, is perhaps a signal to 
patent authorities that the time has come to reform not only the U.S., but perhaps also global 
patent systems.  
 
Our game models provide a simple but elegant framework for understanding the impact of 
changing knowledge structures on the payoffs associated with cooperation and defection in 
knowledge production and appropriation. As new paradigms and knowledges structures emerge, 
we anticipate that our game models will continue to provide valuable insight. A comparative 
analysis of the management of common pool resources should closely observe the underlying 
structures associated with each resource as well as the mechanisms and payoffs associated with 
cooperation. As the structures underlying these resources change, we contend that the source of 
profits will also evolve. While some model will be adopted permanently, others profit models 
will change as knowledge structures change. Of interest therefore, will be observing the 
evolution of these profit models and the impact on the payoffs associated with cooperation and 
defection including the occurrence of the transition point. From a social perspective, the 
transition point can be defined as the moment when the characteristics associated with upstream 
knowledge change so that downstream competitive behaviour will in fact increase the 
substitutive value of products for consumers. Therefore, with a correctly timed transition point, 
we suggest that both the private and social benefits of downstream product development should 





CELL SIGNALING SYSTEMS  
PATENT ANALYSIS DATA 
Appendix Table 1: Patent Analysis of the Akt Cell Signaling System 
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Use of antisense oligonucleotides 
to inhibit the expression of human 
Akt-1 USE Downstream Biological 
Rexahn Corporation 
(Potomac, MD) 
7,098,208 Inhibitors of Akt activity INH Downstream Chemical 
Merck & Co., Inc. 
(Rahway, NJ) 
7,071,316 Human Akt-3 STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Janssen Pharmaceutica 
N.V. (Beerse, BE) 
7,034,026 Inhibitors of Akt activity INH Downstream Chemical 
Merck & Co., Inc. 
(Rahway, NJ) 
6,960,584 Inhibitors of Akt activity INH Downstream Chemical 
Merck & Co., Inc. 
(Rahway, NJ) 
6,958,334 Inhibitors of Akt activity INH Downstream Chemical 
Merck & Co., Inc. 
(Rahway, NJ) 
6,881,555 
AKT nucleic acids, polypeptides, 
and uses thereof USE Downstream Biological 
Aventis Pharmaceuticals 
Inc. (Bridgewater, NJ) 
6,187,586 
Antisense modulation of AKT-3 
expression MOD Downstream Biological 
Isis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Carlsbad, CA) 
6,043,090 
Antisense inhibition of human Akt-2 
expression INH Downstream Biological 
Isis Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
(Carlsbad, CA) 
5,958,773 
Antisense modulation of AKT-1 
expression MOD Downstream Biological 


















BCR-ABL directed compositions 
and uses for inhibiting Philadelphia 
chromesome stimulated cell growth INH Downstream Biological 
Board of Regents, The 
University of Texas 
Systems (Austin, TX) 
6,107,457 
Bcr-Abl directed compositions and 
uses for inhibiting Philadelphia 
chromosome stimulated cell growth INH Downstream Biological 
Board of Regents, The 
University of Texas 
System (Austin, TX)  
6,066,463 
Method and compositions for 
treatment of BCR-ABL associated 
leukemias and other cell 
proliferative disorders USE Downstream Biological 
New York University (New 
York, NY); Duke 
University (Durham, NC); 
Sugen, Inc. (South San 
Francisco, CA)  
5,652,222 
Selective inhibition of leukemic cell 
proliferation by bcr-abl antisense 
oligonucleotides USE Downstream Biological 
Temple University-of The 
Commonwealth System of 
Higher Education 
(Philadelphia, PA)  
5,369,008 
Methods for the detection of BCR-
ABL and abnormal ABL proteins in 
leukemia patients METHOD Downstream Biological 
Board of Regents, The 
University of Texas 
System (Austin, TX)  


















Nucleic acids encoding G protein-
coupled receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Affymetrix, Inc. (Santa 
Clara, CA) 
7,122,570 
Tetrahydrocarbazol derivatives as 
ligands for G-protein-coupled 
receptors (GPCR)  USE Downstream Chemical 
Zentaris AG (Frankfurt, 
DE) 
7,119,190 
Endogenous and non-endogenous 
versions of human G protein-
coupled receptors  STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Arena Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (San Diego, CA)  
7,115,724 
Murine genomic polynucleotide 
sequence encoding a G-protein 
coupled receptor and methods of 
use therefor  USE Downstream Biological Wyeth (Madison, NJ)  
7,115,377 
Cell-based assays for G-protein-
coupled receptor-mediated 
activities  METHOD Downstream Biological 
Atto Bioscience, Inc. 
(Rockville, MD)  
7,108,991 
Human orphan G protein-coupled 
receptors  STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Arena Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (San Diego, CA)  
7,105,488 
G protein-coupled receptor 
antagonists  INH Downstream Biological 
The United States of 
America as represented 
by the Department of 





activated known G protein-coupled 
receptors  MOD Downstream Chemical 
Arena Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (San Diego, CA)  
7,094,593 
Method for improving the function 
of heterologous G protein-coupled 
receptors  METHOD Downstream Biological 
BASF Aktiengesellschaft 
(DE)/The United States of 
America as represented 
by the Department of 
Health (Washington, DC)  
7,094,572 
Polynucleotide encoding a novel 
human G-protein coupled receptor 
variant of HM74, HGPRBMY74  STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
(Princeton, NJ)  
7,087,735 
Bivalent binding molecules of 7 
transmembrane G protein-coupled 
receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 
(Foster City, CA)  
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7,084,259 G-protein coupled receptors  STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Amgen Inc. (Thousand 
Oaks, CA)  
7,081,360 
Expression of G protein-coupled 
receptors with altered ligand 
binding and/or coupling properties  USE Downstream Biological 
Cadus Technologies, Inc. 
(New York, NY) 
7,063,966 
Chimeric G protein coupled 
receptors  STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
SRI International (Menlo 
Park, CA) 
7,057,028 
14273 Receptor, a novel G-protein 
coupled receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Cambridge, MA)  
7,049,096 
Polynucleotides encoding a novel 
human G-protein coupled receptor 
splice variant HGPRBMY29sv1  STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Bristol-Meyers Squibb 
Company (Princeton, NJ) 
7,037,891 
Methods of modulating G-protein-
coupled receptor kinase-associated 
signal transduction MOD Downstream Biological 




(Jerusalem, IL)  
7,033,773 
Screening assays for G protein 
coupled receptor agonists and 
antagonists  METHOD Downstream Biological 
The General Hospital 
Corporation (Boston, MA) 
7,018,812 
Modified G-protein coupled 
receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Duke University (Durham, 
NC)  
6,998,255 Human G-protein coupled receptor  STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Solvay Pharmaceuticals 
B.V. (CP Weesp, NL) 
6,902,902 
Human G protein-coupled receptors 
and modulators thereof for the 
treatment of metabolic-related 
disorders USE Downstream Chemical 
Arena Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (San Diego, CA)  
6,893,827 
Receptor function assay for G-
protein coupled receptors and 
orphan receptors by reporter 
enzyme mutant complementation ASSAY Downstream Biological 
Applera Corporation 
(Bedford, MA)  
6,890,731 
Isolated human G-protein coupled 
receptors that are members of the 
aminergic subfamily, nucleic acid 
molecules encoding human GPCR 
proteins, and uses thereof STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Applera Corporation 
(Bedford, MA)  
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6,887,683 Human G-protein coupled receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Human Genome 
Sciences, Inc. (Rockville, 
MD)  
6,864,229 
G protein coupled receptor (GPCR) 
agonists and antagonists and 
methods of activating and inhibiting 
GPCR using the same INH Downstream Chemical 
New England Medical 
Center Hospitals, Inc. 
(Boston, MA)  
6,855,807 
Heterodimeric opioid G-protein 
coupled receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
New York University (New 
York, NY)  
6,855,550 
Expression of G protein coupled 
receptors in yeast USE Downstream Biological 
Duke University (Durham, 
NC)  
6,838,275 
Human G-coupled protein receptor 
kinases and polynucleotides 
encoding the same STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Lexicon Genetics 
Incorporated (The 
Woodlands, TX)  
6,838,258 
G protein-coupled receptor up-
regulated in prostate cancer and 
uses thereof USE Downstream Biological 
Agensys, Inc. (Santa 
Monica, CA)  
6,835,546 
Drosophila G protein coupled 
receptors, nucleic acids, and 
methods related to the same STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 




Methods of detecting and 
modulating oligomerization of G 
protein-coupled receptors METHOD Downstream Biological 
Washington University 
(St. Louis, MO)  
6,821,950 
Cyclic agonists and antagonists of 
C5a receptors and G protein-
coupled receptors MOD Downstream Chemical 




G protein-coupled receptor gene 
and methods of use therefor USE Downstream Biological 
Children’s Medical Center 




Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital (Boston, MA)  
6,806,054 
Non-endogenous, constitutively 
activated known G protein-coupled 
receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Arena Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (San Diego, CA)  
6,800,749 G-protein coupled receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. 
(Mississauga, CA)  
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Systems for sensitive detection of 
G-protein coupled receptor and 
orphan receptor function using 
reporter enzyme mutant 
complementation METHOD Downstream Biological 
Applera Corporation 
(Bedford, MA)  
6,790,631 
G protein-coupled receptor up-
regulated in prostate cancer and 
uses thereof USE Downstream Biological 
Agensys, Inc. (Santa 
Monica, CA) 
6,733,990 
Nucleic acid encoding 15571, a 
GPCR-like molecule of the secretin-





Methods for modulating the 
activation of a lymphocyte 
expressed G protein coupled 
receptor involved in cell 
proliferation, autoimmunity and 
inflammation MOD Downstream Biological 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA)  
6,699,965 
Peptides that activate the G-protein 
coupled receptor protein, 0T7T175 ACTIVATOR Downstream Biological 
Takeda Chemical 
Industries, Ltd. (Osaka, 
JP)  
6,696,257 
G protein-coupled receptors from 
the rat and human STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
National Research 
Council of Canada 
(Ottawa, CA)  
6,696,244 
G-coupled receptors associated 
with retroviral entry into cells, and 
therapeutic uses thereof USE Downstream Biological 
New York University (New 
York, NY)  
6,682,886 
Bivalent binding molecules of 7 
transmembrane G protein-coupled 
receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 
(Foster City, CA)  
6,653,086 
Endogenous constitutively activated 
G protein-coupled orphan receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Arena Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (San Diego, CA)  
6,638,733 
G-protein coupled receptors 
amplified in breast cancer STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Tularik Inc. (South San 
Francisco, CA)  
6,635,741 
G-protein coupled receptor BCA-
GPCR-3 STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Tularik Inc. (South San 
Francisco, CA) 
6,632,621 
G protein-coupled receptor-like 
receptors and modulators thereof MOD Downstream Biological 



















encoding nucleic acids STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
CuraGen Corporation 
(New Haven, CT)  
6,607,906 
Heterologous G protein coupled 
receptors expressed in yeast, their 
fusion with G proteins and use 
thereof in bioassay USE Downstream Biological 
BASF Aktiengesellschaft 
(Ludwigshafen, DE)  
6,602,699 
Promotor for functional 
characterization of G-protein 
coupled receptors in the yeast 





43239 a novel GPCR-like molecule 
and uses thereof USE Downstream Biological 
Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Cambridge, MA)  
6,569,995 
Identification of a G protein-coupled 
receptor transcriptionally regulated 
by protein tyrosine kinase signaling 
in hematopoietic cells METHOD Downstream Biological 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA)  
6,538,107 
G protein coupled receptor protein 
production, and use thereof USE Downstream Biological 
Takeda Chemical 
Industries, Ltd. (Osaka, 
JP)  
6,521,418 
G protein-coupled receptor with an 
enlarged extracellular domain STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
The Scripps Research 
Institute (La Jolla, CA)  
6,518,480 
Selective target cell activation by 
expression of a G protein-coupled 
receptor activated superiorly by 
synthetic ligand ACTIVATOR Downstream Biological 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA)  
6,518,414 
Molecular cloning and expression 
of G-protein coupled receptors USE Downstream Biological Individual 
6,514,696 
Transcriptionally regulated G 
protein-coupled receptor G2A STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
The Regents of The 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA) 
6,500,934 
Bivalent agonists for G-protein 
coupled receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information Individual 
6,448,005 
14723 Receptor, a novel G-protein 





Human G-coupled protein receptor 

















encoding the same Woodlands, TX)  
6,420,563 
Small molecule modulators of G 
protein-coupled receptor six MOD Downstream Chemical 
Arena Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (San Diego, CA)  
6,406,871 
Method for detecting ligand binding 
to G protein coupled receptors METHOD Downstream Biological 
BASF Aktiengesellschaft 
(Ludwigshafen, DE)  
6,403,767 
Polypeptide molecules of the G 
protein-coupled heptahelical 
receptor superfamily and uses 
therefor USE Downstream Biological 
Millenium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Cambridge, MA); CRC 
Technology Limited 
(London, GB)  
6,403,305 
Methods of identifying peptide 
agonists or negative antagonists of 
a G protein coupled receptor METHOD Downstream Biological 
Cornell Research 
Foundation, Inc. (Ithaca, 
NY)  
6,395,877 
14273 receptor, a novel G-protein 
coupled receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Cambridge, MA)  
6,383,778 
Nucleic acids encoding a G-protein 
coupled receptor involved in 
sensory transduction STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA)  
6,383,761 
Methods and compositions for 
identifying modulators of G-protein-
coupled receptors METHOD Downstream Biological 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA); National 
Institutes of Health 
(Rockville, MD) 
6,383,760 
Transcriptionally regulated G 
protein-coupled receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA)  
6,368,848 
Compositions to identify plant 
proteins that function in G-protein 




Axor10, a g-protein coupled 
receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
SmithKline Beecham 
Corporation (Philadelphia, 
PA); SmithKline Beecham 
plc (Brentford, GB)  
6,344,342 
Human G protein coupled 



















Antagonists of G-protein-coupled 
receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Hôpital Sainte-Justine 
(Montreal, CA)  
6,291,177 
Assay for agents which alter G-
protein coupled receptor activity ASSAY Downstream Biological 
Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Cambridge, MA)  
6,287,801 
Nucleic acids encoding the G-





Assay for agents which alter G-
protein coupled receptor activity ASSAY Downstream Biological 
Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Cambridge, MA)  
6,258,527 
Methods of identifying g-coupled 
receptors associated with 
macrophage-trophic HIV, and 
diagnostic and therapeutic uses 
thereof METHOD Downstream Biological 
The Aaron Diamond Aids 
Research Center (New 
York, NY); New York 
University (New York, NY)  
6,255,069 
Compositions and methods for 
modulating the activity of G protein-
coupled receptor kinases GPK5 





Methods for identifying G protein 





Alternative G-coupled receptors 
associated with retroviral entry into 
cells, methods of identifying the 
same, and diagnostic and 
therapeutic uses thereof USE Downstream Biological 
New York University (New 
York, NY)  
6,242,572 
Human G protein coupled 





Monoclonal antibodies against 
leucocyte-specific G protein-
coupled receptors USE Downstream Biological Individual 
6,218,376 
Uracil compounds as P2-
purinoreceptor 7-transmembrane 
G-protein coupled receptor 
antagonists USE Downstream Chemical 

















Transcriptionally regualted G 
protein-coupled receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA)  
6,207,412 
Identification of a G protein-coupled 
receptor transcriptionally regulated 
by protein tyrosine kinase signaling 
in hematopoietic cells USE Downstream Biological 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA)  
6,183,974 
Screening assays for G protein 
coupled receptor agonists and 
antagonists ASSAY Downstream Biological 
The General Hospital 
Corporation (Boston, MA)  
6,168,927 
Expression of G protein coupled 
receptors in yeast USE Downstream Biological 
Duke University (Durham, 
NC)  
6,114,139 
G-protein coupled receptor protein 
and a DNA encoding the receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Takeda Chemical 
Industries, Ltd. (Osaka, 
JP)  
6,111,076 
Human G-protein coupled receptor 
(HIBCD07) STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Takeda Chemical 
Industries, Ltd. (Osaka, 
JP)  
6,096,868 
ECR 673: A 7-transmembrane G-





Polynucleotides encoding human 
G-protein coupled receptor GPR1 STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Human Genome 
Sciences, Inc. (Rockville, 
MD)  
6,087,115 
Methods of identifying negative 
antagonists for G protein coupled 
receptors METHOD Downstream Biological 
Cornell Research 
Foundation, Inc. (Ithaca, 
NY)  
6,071,722 
Nucleic acids encoding a G-protein 





DNA encoding ECR 673: A 7-
transmembrane G-protein coupled 





G-protein coupled receptors 
associated with immune response STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Incyte Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (Palo Alto, CA)  
6,060,272 Human G-protein coupled receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Human Genome 

















Human G-protein coupled receptor 
polynucleotides STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Takeda Chemical 
Industries, Ltd. (Tsukuba 
Ibaraki, JP)  
6,020,158 
Isolated polynucleotide for novel G-
protein coupled receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Allelix 
Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Ontario, CA)  
6,013,479 
Human Emr1-like G protein coupled 
receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Incyte Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (Palo Alto, CA)  
6,001,972 
Splicing variant of the epstein-barr 
virus-induced G-protein coupled 





Polynucleotides encoding human 
G-protein coupled receptor GPRZ STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Human Genome 
Sciences, Inc. (Rockville, 
MD)  
5,994,097 
Polynucleotide encoding human G-
protein coupled receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Incyte Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (Palo Alto, CA)  
5,985,584 
Method to identify plant proteins 
that function in G protein coupled 
systems and compositions therefor METHOD Downstream Biological 
American Cyanamid 
Company (Madison, NY) 
5,955,575 
Antagonists of G-protein-coupled 
receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Hopital Sainte-Justine 
(Montreal, CA)  
5,955,309 
Polynucleotide encoding G-protein 





Isolated nucleic acid molecules 
encoding a G-protein coupled 
receptor showing homology to the 
5HT family of receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Cambridge, MA)  
5,942,414 
Polynucleotides encoding human 
G-protein coupled receptor 
HIBEF51 STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Human Genome 
Sciences, Inc. (Rockville, 
MD)  
5,939,320 
G-coupled receptors associated 
with macrophage-trophic HIV, and 
diagnostic and therapeutic uses 
thereof USE Downstream Biological 
New York University (New 
York, NY); The Aaron 
Diamond Aids Research 
Center (New York, NY)  
5,932,702 Human G-protein coupled receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Human Gene Sciences 
(Rockville, MD); Takeda 
(Osaka, JP)  
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Soluble 7-transmembrane domain 
G-protein-coupled receptor 
compositions and methods METHOD Downstream Biological 
The Board of Trustees of 
the Leland Stanford 
Junior University 
(Stanford, CA)  
5,912,335 
G-protein coupled receptor 





Isolated nucleic acid encoding G-
protein coupled receptor 





Isolated DNA encoding a novel 
human G-protein coupled receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Cambridge, MA)  
5,882,944 
Methods for G protein coupled 
receptor activity screening METHOD Downstream Biological 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA)  
5,874,252 
Splicing variant of the Epstein-Barr 
virus-induced G-protein coupled 





Human G-protein coupled receptor 
(HIBCD07) STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Takeda Chemical 
Industries, Ltd. (Osaka, 
JP)  
5,871,967 
Cloning of a novel G-Protein 





G protein coupled glutamate 
receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Zymogenetics, Inc. 
(Seattle, WA); The Board 
of Regents of the 
University of Washington 
(Seattle, WA)  
5,856,443 
Molecular cloning and expression 
of G-protein coupled receptors USE Downstream Biological Individual 
5,834,587 
G-protein coupled receptor, HLTEX 





Method of identifying ligands and 
anatgonists of G-protein coupled 
receptor METHOD Downstream Biological 
The United States of 
America as represented 
by the Secretary of the 
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(Washington, DC)  
5,763,218 
Nucleic acid encoding novel human 
G-protein coupled receptor STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Human Genome Science, 
Inc. (Rockville, MD); 
Takeda (Osaka, JP)  
5,747,267 
Method for identifying a G protein 
coupled glutamate receptor agonist 
and antagonist METHOD Downstream Biological 
Zymogenetics, Inc. 
(Seattle, WA); The Board 
of Regents of the 
University of Washington 
(Seattle, WA)  
5,739,029 
Vectors for expression of G protein 
coupled receptors in yeast STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Duke University (Durham, 
NC)  
5,721,107 
Antibodies to G protein coupled 
glutamate receptors USE Downstream Biological 
The Board of Regents of 
the University of 
Washington (Seattle, 
WA); Zymogenetics, Inc. 
(Seattle, WA)  
5,691,188 
Transformed yeast cells expressing 
heterologous G-protein coupled 
receptor USE Downstream Biological 
American Cyanamid 
Company (Madison, NJ)  
5,591,618 
G protein-coupled receptor kinase 
GRK6 STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
ICOS Corporation 
(Bothell, WA)  
5,585,476 
Molecular cloning and expression 
of G-protein coupled receptors USE Downstream Biological Individual 
5,576,210 
Mammalian/yeast hybrid G protein-
coupled receptors STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
ZymoGenetics, Inc. 
(Seattle, WA)  
5,532,157 
Host cell line LVIP2.0Zc, useful in 
assays to identify ligands and ant 
agonists of G protein-coupled 
receptors ASSAY Downstream Biological 
The United States of 
America as represented 




G protein-coupled receptor kinase 
GRK6 STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
ICOS Corporation 
(Bothell, WA)  
5,482,835 
Methods of testing in yeast cells for 
agonists and antagonists of 
mammal G-protein coupled 
receptors METHOD Downstream Biological 
Duke University (Durham, 
NC)  
5,385,831 Method for producing a mammalian METHOD Downstream Biological Zymogenetics, Inc. 
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G protein coupled glutamate 
receptor 
(Seattle, WA); The Board 
of Regents of the 
University of Washington 
(Seattle, WA)  
5,284,746 
Methods of producing hybrid G 
protein-coupled receptors METHOD Downstream Biological 
ZymoGenetics, Inc. 
(Seattle, WA)  


















Inhibitors of JAK and CDK2 protein 
kinases INH Downstream Chemical 
Vertex Pharmaceuticals 
Incorporated 
(Cambridge, MA)  
6,969,760 
Jak kinases and regulation of 
cytokine signal transduction MOD Downstream Biological 
St. Jude Children’s 
Research Hospital 
(Memphis, TN)  
6,933,300 
JAK-3 inhibitors for treating allergic 
disorders INH Downstream Chemical 
Parker Hughes Institute 
(Roseville, MN)  
6,800,649 
Method for inhibiting c-jun 
expression using JAK-3 inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical 
Parker Hughes Institute 
(St. Paul, MN) 
6,452,005 
JAK-3 inhibitors for treating allergic 
disorders INH Downstream Chemical 
Parker Hughes Institute 
(Roseville, MN)  
6,326,373 
JAK-3 inhibitors for treating allergic 
disorders INH Downstream Chemical 
Parker Hughes Institute 
(Roseville, MN)  
6,313,130 
JAK-3 inhibitors for treating allergic 
disorders INH Downstream Chemical 
Parker Hughes Institute 
(Roseville, MN)  
6,265,160 
Method of identifying inhibitors of 
the Jak-Stat signal transduction 
pathway METHOD Downstream Biological 
 Department of Health 
and (Washington, DC)  
6,210,654 
Jak kinases and regulation of 
cytokine signal transduction MOD Downstream Biological 
St. Jude Children’s 
Hospital (Memphis, TN)  
6,177,433 
JAK-3 inhibitors for treating allergic 
disorders INH Downstream Chemical 
Parker Hughes Institute 
(Roseville, MN)  
6,136,595 
Jak kinases and regulations of 
cytokine signal transduction MOD Downstream Biological 
St. Jude Children’s 
Hospital (Memphis, TN)  
6,080,748 Therapeutic use of JAK-3 inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical 
Parker Hughes Institute 
(Roseville, MN)  
6,080,747 
JAK-3 inhibitors for treating allergic 
disorders INH Downstream Chemical 
Hughes Institute 
(Roseville, MN)  
5,728,536 
Jak kinases and regulation of 
Cytokine signal transduction MOD Downstream Biological 
St. Jude Children’s 
Research Hospital 
(Memphis, TN) 


















Phosphatases which activate map 
kinase pathways ACTIVATE Downstream Biological 
Amgen Inc. (Thousand 
Oaks, CA)  
6,984,646 
Imidazopyridinones as p38 map 
kinase inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical 
Bayer Healhcare AG 
(Leverkusen, DE)  
6,979,693 
Pyrazole derivatives-p38 MAP 
kinase inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical 
Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC 
(Palo Alto, CA)  
6,962,933 
Method for inhibiting p38 MAP 
kinase or TNF-a production using a 




6,630,485 p38 map kinase inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical 
Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC 
(Palo Alto, CA)  
6,479,507 p38 MAP kinase inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical 
Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC 
(Palo Alto, CA)  
6,444,696 
Pyrazole derivatives P38 MAP 
kinase inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical 
Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC 
(Palo Alto, CA)  
6,376,527 
Pyrazole derivatives-p38 map 
kinase inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical 
Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC 
(Palo Alto, CA)  
6,316,466 
Pyrazole derivatives P-38 MAP 
kinase inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical 
Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC 
(Palo Alto, CA) 
6,316,464 P38 MAP kinase inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical 
Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC 
(Palo Alto, CA) 
6,147,107 
Specific inhibition of the P42/44 
mitogen activated protein (map) 
kinase cascade sensitizes tumor 





Antisense inhibition of MAP kinase 
kinase 6 expression INH Downstream Biological 
Isis Pharmaceuticals 
Inc. (Carlsbad, CA) 
6,566,081 
Methods of identifying a compound 
which modulates the non-
transcriptional non-map-kinase 
induced effects of steroid hormones METHOD Downstream Chemical 
The Brigham and 
Women’s Hospital, Inc. 
(Boston, MA)  
6,010,856 
Assay systems and methods for 
measuring P38 map kinase, and 
modulators thereof METHOD Downstream Biological 
The Scripps Research 
Institute (La Jolla, CA)  
6,001,580 
Method for assaying ERK2 map 
kinase METHOD Downstream Biological 
Takeda Chemical 

















Use of pheromone compounds 
having MAP kinase modulating 
activity MOD Downstream Chemical 
Darley Pharmaceuticals 
LTD (Tel Aviv, IL)  
6,537,996 Modulators of p38 MAP kinase MOD Downstream Chemical 
Iconix Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (Mountain View, 
CA)  
6,706,869 
Map kinase phosphatases and 
polynucleotides encoding them STRUCTURAL Upstream Information Wyeth (MA)  
6,566,511 MAP kinase phosphatase mutant STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Syngenta AG (Basel, 
CH)  
6,376,747 Plant-derived map kinase kinase STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Her Majesty the Queen 
in right of Canada as 
represented by the 
Minister of (CA)  
6,376,214 
DNA encoding a novel homolog of 
CSBP/p38 MAP kinase STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
SmithKline Beecham 
Corporation 
(Philadelphia, PA)  
6,190,663 Human MAP kinase homolog STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Incyte Genomics, Inc. 
(Palo Alto, CA)  
5,989,885 
Specific mutations of map kinase 4 
(MKK4) in human tumor cell lines 
identify it as a tumor suppressor in 
various types of cancer STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Myriad Genetics, Inc. 
(Salt Lake City, UT)  
5,846,778 Human map kinase homolog STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Incyte Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (Palo Alto, CA)  
5,663,313 Human map kinase homolog STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Incyte Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (Palo Alto, CA)  
6,765,128 
Method of using a pathogen-
activatable map kinase to enhance 
disease resistance in plants USE Downstream Biological 
Rutgers, The State 
University of New 
Jersey (New Brunswick, 
NJ)  
5,977,442 
Salicylic acid induced map kinase 
and its use for enhanced disease 
resistance in plants USE Downstream Biological 
Rutgers, The State 
University of New 
Jersey (New Brunswick, 
NJ)  
Appendix Table 5: Patent Analysis of the MAP Kinase Cell Signaling System 
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Methods for identifying modulators 
of NF-KB activity  METHOD Downstream Biological 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA)  
6,740,522 
Antibodies against ligand for 
receptor activator of NF-kB USE Downstream Biological 
Immunex Corporation  
(Seattle, WA) 
6,696,498 
2-cyclopenten-1-one and its 
derivatives as inhibitors of the NF-
kB factor INH Downstream Chemical 
Consiglio Nazionale 
Della Richerche (Rome, 
IT) 
6,660,268 
Proteasome regulation of NF-KB 
activity MOD Downstream Biological 
The President and 




Method of modulating NF-kB 
activity MOD Downstream Chemical 
Leo Pharma A/S 
(Ballerup, DK) 
6,545,027 
Methods of modulating NF-kB 
transcription factor MOD Downstream Chemical 
Eli Lilly and Company 
(Indianapolis, IN)  
6,410,516 
Nuclear Factors associated with 
transcriptional regulation STRUCTURAL Upstream 
Information/ 
Biological 






Whitehead Instittue for 
Biomedical Research 
(Cambridge, MA)  
6,392,100 
2-Cyclopenten-1-one as inhibitors 
of the NF-KB factor INH Downstream Chemical 
Consiglio Nazionale 
Delle Richerche (Rome, 
IT) 
6,123,943 NF-KB activity inhibitor INH Downstream Chemical 
Kaken Shoyaku Co., 
Ltd. (Tokyo, JP)  
6,509,377 
Use of a 2-hydroxy-4-
trifluoromethylbenzoic acid 
derivatives as inhibitors of the 
activation of the nuclear 
transcription factor NF-.kappa.B INH Downstream Chemical 
J. Uriach & Cia, S.A. 
(Barcelona, ES)  
6,498,147 
Suppression of nuclear factor-
.kappa.b dependent processes 
using oligonucleotides INH Downstream Biological 
The Scripps Research 
Institute (La Jolla, CA) 
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Inhibition of nuclear transcription 
factor NF-.kappa.B by caffeic acid 
phenethyl ester (CAPE), derivatives 
of CAPE, capsaicin (8-methyl-N-
vanillyl-6-nonenamide) and 





Antisense oligonucleotides directed 
against nucleic acids encoding 
NFKB transcription factor STRUCTURAL Upstream 
Information/ 
Biological 
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. 
(Nutley, NJ)  


















Assays for sensory modulators using 
a sensory cell specific phospholipase 
C METHOD Downstream Biological 
The Regents of the 
University of California 
(Oakland, CA)  
5,847,074 Phospholipase C-inhibiting peptides INH Downstream Biological 
Kyowa Hakko Kogyo 
Co., Ltd. (Tokyo, JP) 
5,677,420 Phospholipase c-inhibiting peptides INH Downstream Biological 
Kyowa Hakko Kogyo 
Co., Ltd. (Tokyo, JP) 
5,580,956 Phospholipase C-inhibiting peptides INH Downstream Biological 
Kyowa Hakko Kogyo 
Co., Ltd. (Tokyo, JP)  
5,474,921 
Expression and purification of 
phosphoinositide-specific 
phospholipase C-.gamma. METHOD Downstream Biological 
Merck & Co., Inc. 
(Rahway, NJ)  
6,235,729 Uses of phospholipase C inhibitors INH Downstream Chemical  
UAB Research 
Foundation 
(Birmingham, AL)  
5,519,163 
Inhibitors of phosphoinositide-specific 
phospholipase C INH Downstream Chemical  
Merck & Co., Inc. 
(Rahway, NJ)  
5,352,810 
Phosphatidylinositol analogues, 
inhibitors of phosphatidylinositol 
specific phospholipase C INH Downstream Chemical  
Mediolanum 
Farmaceutici S.p.A. 
(Milan, IT)  
6,958,152 Human phospholipase C delta 5 STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Merck Patent GmbH 
(Darmstadt, DE) 
6,897,056 
32544, a novel human phospholipase 
C and uses thereof STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Cambridge, MA)  
6,534,301 
16835, a novel human phospholipase 





Human phospholipase C-.alpha. and 
DNA sequence encoding the same STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Shionogi & Co., Ltd. 
(Osaka, JP); Hirano; 
Naoto (Tokyo, JP)  
5,676,946 Phospholipase C homolog STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Incyte Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (Palo Alto, CA)  
5,587,306 Phospholipase C homolog STRUCTURAL Upstream Information 
Incyte Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (Palo Alto, CA)  




APPENDIX 2:  
SAMPLE RECOMBINANT CAPITAL ALLIANCE  








Aging & Age-related Disease U BP 
Collaboration for Diabetes Research U BP 
Protein Crystallography to Advance Drug Discovery U BP 
Human Neural Crest Stem Cells in Human 
Transplantation U BP 
Beta Amyloid for Alzheimer’s U BP 
Profile Liver Progenitor Stem Cells U BP 
Infectious Disease Collaboration U BP 
Type II Diabetes Cell Biology U BP 
Peptide Chemistry U BP 
Stem Cell Clones for Gene Trap Mutations U BP 
Drug Discovery for Inflammatory Diseases U CP 
TTP Translational Technology for Drug Discovery 
Worldwide U CP 
Drug Discovery Collaboration U CP 
Discovery & Preclinical Development of New Kinase 
Inhibitors U CP 
Drug Discovery Collaboration U CP 
Drug Discovery Collaboration U CP 
Small Molecule Drug Discovery Program U CP 
Drug Discovery Collaboration U CP 
Drug Discovery Collaboration for Bone & Joint Disease U CP 
Drug Discovery Collaboration U CP 
Development of Next Generation Proteins & Peptides U IP 
Prostate Cancer Drug Target Discovery U IP 
Target Discovery for Metabolic Diseases U IP 
High-density Whole Genome Analysis U IP 
Novel Biomarkers for Lung Cancer U IP 









Cancer Biomarkers U IP 
Drug Targets for CNS Diseases U IP 
Glycomics Collaboration U IP 
Systems Biology Collaboration U IP 
Antibody Collaboration & Cross-license D BP 
Antibody Identification & Production D BP 
Oral RNA-Directed Therapeutics D BP 
Gene Therapy Alliance D BP 
MAbs for Alzheimer’s Disease D BP 
RNAi as Therapeutic Agents D BP 
Natural Compounds for Disease Prevention D BP 
Cancer MAbs Discovery & Development D BP 
MAbs for Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA) & Inflammatory 
Diseases D BP 
Sirna-027 and RNAi Products for Ophthalmology D BP 
FieldFocus Compounds Development D CP 
Selective Removal of Target Molecules from Fluid 
Mixtures D CP 
Human Response Prediction platform for Clinical Drug 
Response Prediction D CP 
Biopharmaceutical Research Services D CP 
DrugMatrix Chemogenomics system & Drug Signatures® 
Library D CP 
SoftFocus® for Hepatitis and HIV Programs D CP 
Macrozyme’s Library of Glucosylceramide Synthase 
Inhibitors D CP 
PDE10 inhibitors for Neurological & Psychiatric Disorders D CP 
Library Compounds from SoftFocus® collection D CP 
Protein Kinase C (PKC) Modulators D CP 
CRADA for Biomarkers Associated with Chemical 
Warfare Agents Exposure D IP 
siRNAs in Hearing Restoration D IP 
Proteins and Peptides Production Technology D IP-Tech 









Protein Crystallography Service Agreement D IP-Tech 
Access PharmaCarta(TM) D IP-Tech 
Crystallography Technology For Drug Discovery  D IP-Tech 
High Content and High Throughput Screening Software D IP-Tech 
Genedata Expressionist Software D IP-Tech 
Bioinformatics Software Products D IP-Tech 
Appendix Table 8: Recombinant Capital Alliance Paradigm Categorization Data 
U=Upstream, D=Downstream; BP=Biological Paradigm, CP=Chemical Paradigm,  
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Appendix Table 9: Recombinant Capital Alliance Subject Categorization Data 
BP=Biological Paradigm, CP=Chemical Paradigm, IP=Information Paradigm,  








Infectious Disease Collaboration BP Biological Information 
Angiogenesis for Cancer BP Disease 
Genomics-based Drug Discovery Collaboration  BP Drug Discovery 
Genotyping Services for SNP analysis BP Other 
Antibody Production BP Process 
Peptide Screening BP Screening 
Ex vivo Cell Therapy for Leukemia BP Therapeutic 
Transgenic Models of Alzheimer’s BP Tool 
Combinatorial Chemistry and High Throughput 
Screening CP Combinatorial Chemistry 
Small Molecule Discovery for Hepatitis  CP Drug Discovery 
Molecular In Vivo Imaging Agents for Cancer 
Detection CP Other 
Screening of Chiron Peptoids CP Screening 
M20-2 as IL-1 Inhibitor CP Therapeutic 
PharmaCarta Chemogenomics Platform CP Tool 
Human Genes Required for Malaria Infection Process IP Biological Information 
Molecular Mechanisms of Spinal Muscular Atrophy IP Disease 
Proteins and Peptides Production Technology IP Process 
Whole Genome Wide siRNA Library IP Tool 
Transcription-based Assay Technology IP-Tech Information Technology 
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Affymetrix-National Alliance for Autism Research √  √  
Agilent-Industry Open Microarray Design 
Program (TRC) √ 
 √  
Alliance for Cellular Signaling (AfCS) √ √   
Beta Cell Biology Consortium (BCBC) √ √   
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS) √ √   
Cancer Vaccine Consortium √  √  
Cell Migration Consortium √ √   
Collaborative Cross   √   
Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium √   √ 
Consortium for Functional Glycomics (CFG) √  √  
DopaNet √  √  
Functional Proteomics Consortium  √ √  √ 
HepatoSys √  √  
Human Epigenome Consortium √ √ √  
Human Genome Consortium √ √ √  
International Genomics Consortium √  √  
International HapMap Project √ √   
International Molecular Exchange Consortium √  √  
International Regulome Consortium √  √ √ 
International Rice Functional Genomics 
Consortium √ 
 √  
International Rice Genome Sequencing Project √  √  
International Sequencing Consortium √  √  
Knockout Mouse Project √ √   
MalariaGEN √ √   
MitoCheck Consortium √ √   


















Mouse Models of Human Cancers Consortium 
(MMHCC) √ 
  √ 
Nanotechnology Consortium √  √  
Novartis Institutes for Biomedical Research-
Broad Institute Alliance √ 
√ √  
Osteoarthritis Initiative √  √  
Public Population Project in Genomics √   √ 
Receptor Tyrosine Kinase (RTK) Networks 
Consortium √ 
  √ 
Research Collaboratory for Structural 
BioInformatics (RCSB) √ 
  √ 
RNAi Consortium √ √ √  
SNP Consortium √ √   
Structural Genomics Consortium √ √  √ 
SYMBIONIC √   √ 
TB Structural Genomics Consortium √ √   
The Lipid MAPS Consortium √  √  
Appendix Table 10: Data Sources for Consortium Analysis 




APPENDIX 5: CONSORTIUM SURVEY 
 
Objectives and Outcomes:  
 
1) Indicate from the list provided below the type of research generated by the consortium:  
A. Drug discovery research 
B. Drug discovery tools  
C. Preclinical research  
D. Clinical research 
E. Other: _______________________ 
 















Participants and Organization: 
 
4) Indicate who the significant participants (from a time or resource perspective) are within the research 
consortium (check all answers that are applicable):  
 
A. Academic Institutions 
B. Non-profit Research Organizations 
C. Government Laboratories 
D. Private Firms 
E. Other: _______________________ 
 
5) Indicate the geographic location of these participants:  
 
A. Within province or state only 
 Indicate province or state: _______________________ 
B. Within country only  
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 Indicate country: _______________________ 
C. International locations  
 Indicate locations for only significant participants: _______________________ 
 








D. Other: _______________________ 
 
7) What communication strategies are used by the research consortium participants (check all answers 
that are applicable)? 





F. Other: _______________________ 
 
 
Research Generation, Research Dissemination, and Rules:  
 
8.1) Are there rules associated with joining the research consortium?  
A. Yes  
B. No 
 







9.1) Are there rules associated with exiting the research consortium?  













10.1) Are there rules to determine the allocation of research-based tasks? 
A. Yes  
B. No 
 
10.2) If you answered yes to question number 10.1, describe the rules that determine how research-based 







10.3) Are there mechanisms to address non-compliance to the rules described in question number 10.1? 
A. Yes  
B. No 
 
10.4) If you answered yes to question number 10.3, describe the mechanisms that exist to address non-







11.1) Are there rules to determine how research results are disseminated within the consortium? 
A. Yes  
B. No 
 
11.2) If you answered yes to question number 11.1, describe the rules that exist to address the 









11.3) Are there rules to determine how research results are shared with the public at large? 
A. Yes  
B. No 
 
11.4) If you answered yes to question number 11.3, describe the rules that exist to address the 







11.5) Are there mechanisms to address non-compliance to the rules regarding research dissemination? 
A. Yes  
B. No 
 
11.6) If you answered yes to question number 11.5, describe the mechanisms that exist to address non-







12) What mechanisms are used to share research results with the members of the consortium and/or 
public at large (check all answers that are applicable)? 




E. Other: _______________________ 
 
13) To date, indicate what research i.e., specifically the type and number of biological components that 












External Partnerships:  
 
14) What sources of funding are used by the consortium (check all answers that are applicable)? 
A. Public grants 
B. Private grants 
C. Other: _______________________ 
 
15.1) Does the consortium have any external partnerships i.e. beyond the membership itself?  
A. Yes  
B. No 
 
15.2) If you answered yes to question 15.1, what role do these partners play with respect to conducting 








Intellectual Property and Research Usage:  
 
16.1) Are patents filed for the research generated by the consortium?  
A. Yes  
B. No  
 

















16.4) Have any patents been assigned to the research generated by the consortium?  
A. Yes  
B. No  
 

















APPENDIX 6: DESCRIPTION OF CONSORTIA 
1) Affymetrix-National Alliance for Autism Research-The National Alliance for Autism 
Research launched the NAAR Autism Genome Project to find the genes associated with 
inherited risk for Autism.  
 
2) Agilent Shared Design Microarray Initiative-The Agilent shared-design microarray 
program provides an intellectual forum for researchers to work together using custom 
microarrays and share them with the global community as needed. 
 
3) Alliance for Cellular Signaling (AfCS)-This Alliance was formed to study the 
mechanisms that cells use to communicate with each other to determine their functions 
and actions. Investigators at 21 institutions are collectively utilizing their knowledge and 
expertise to determine how cells interpret signals in a context specific manner. 
 
4) Beta Cell Biology Consortium (BCBC)-The Beta Cell Biology Consortium (BCBC) 
was formed to facilitate interdisciplinary approaches to advance an understanding of 
pancreatic islet development and function with the long-term goal of developing a cell-
based therapy for insulin delivery. 
 
5) BIOS-The Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS), is a new initiative to extend 
the concepts of Open Source to biotechnology and other forms of innovation in biology. 
 
6) Cancer Vaccine Consortium-The Sabin Vaccine Institute has organized the Cancer 
Vaccine Consortium to address the networking, clinical, and regulatory needs of 
corporations, organizations, and researchers working in cancer vaccines. The goal of the 
consortium is to accelerate the process of bringing cancer vaccines from the development 
stage to the clinic. 
 
7) Cell Migration Consortium-The Cell Migration Consortium is dedicated to accelerating 
progress in migration-related research by fostering multi-disciplinary research activities 
and producing novel reagents and information. 
 
8) Collaborative Cross- The goal of the Consortium is to promote the development of 
mouse-based resources that can be used to understand, treat, and ultimately prevent 
human diseases. 
 
9) Combinatorial Chemistry Consortium-The Accelrys Combinatorial Chemistry 
Consortium was organized with the objective to develop tools for high-throughput drug 
discovery modeling. 
 
10) Consortium for Functional Glycomics (CFG)-The Consortium for Functional 
Glycomics (CFG) was established to understand the role of carbohydrate-protein 




11) DopaNet- This network‘s goal is to investigate precisely and quantitatively all the 
aspects of neurotransmission—at the levels of the molecule, the supra-molecular 
assembly, the neuronal cell, and the neuronal network— in a specific neuronal system, 
involved in many neuropathologies, such as Parkinson‘s disease, schizophrenia and drug 
abuse. 
 
12) Functional Proteomics Consortium-The purpose of this Accelrys Consortium was to 
offer members exclusive access to the most complete collection available of protein 
sequences having assigned function. 
 
13) HepatoSys-HepatoSys focuses on a quantitative understanding of complex and dynamic 
cellular processes in detoxification, endocytosis, iron regulation, and regeneration in 
mammalian hepatocytes. 
 
14) Human Epigenome Consortium-A public/private collaboration that aims to identify and 
catalogue Methylation Variable Positions (MVPs) in the human genome with the goal of 
providing insight into the complex relationship between genetics and epigenetics that 
underlies both normal cellular homeostasis and disease states. 
 
15) Human Genome Consortium-The Human Genome Project was officially launched in 
October of 1990. The project resulted in the identification of many genes, the 
development of a physical map of the genome, and the sequencing of the 3 billion letters 
comprising the genome.  
 
16) International Genomics Consortium-The International Genomics Consortium is a non-
profit medical research organization that is building on the discoveries of the Human 
Genome Project. This first project called expO will provide biomedical investigators with 
information on which gene activities are increased or decreased in patient tumour 
samples. 
 
17) International HapMap Project-A partnership of scientists and funding agencies from 
Canada, China, Japan, Nigeria, the U.K., and the U.S. with the objective to develop a 
public resource that will enable researchers to find genes associated with human disease 
and response to pharmaceuticals. A haplotype map (sets of associated SNP alleles in a 
region of a chromosome) of the human genome—the HapMap, will describe the common 
patterns of human DNA sequence variation.  
 
18) International Molecular Exchange Consortium- The IMEx consortium is a group of 
major public interaction data providers sharing curation efforts and exchanging 
completed records on molecular interaction data, similar to successful global 
collaborations for protein and DNA sequences, as well as for macromolecular structures. 
 
19) International Regulome Consortium-This consortium is conducting what is known as 
the third generation genomics project to completely map the regulatory networks that 




20) International Rice Genome Sequencing Project and International Rice Functional 
Genomics Working Group-Public and private sector participants contributed to the 
completion of draft sequences from two rice subtypes in 2002; the rice community 
further decided that a similarly structured consortium that would facilitate research in the 
post-sequencing functional genomics era was necessary.  
 
21) International Sequencing Consortium-The International Sequencing Consortium (ISC) 
was established to provide a forum for genomic sequencing groups and their funding 
agencies to share information, coordinate research efforts, and address common issues 
raised by genomic sequencing, such as data release and data quality. 
 
22) Knockout Mouse Project-The Knockout Mouse Project is a trans-NIH initiative that 
aims to generate a comprehensive and public resource comprised of mouse embryonic 
stem (ES) cells containing a null mutation in every gene in the mouse genome. 
 
23) MalariaGEN- The aim of MalariaGEN is to bring together expert scientists to explore 
and identify critical mechanisms of protective immunity against malaria which could lead 
to successful malaria vaccine development. 
 
24) Mitocheck Consortium-MitoCheck is an integrated research project which brings 
together leading European research groups to study systematically the regulation of 
mitosis in human cells. 
 
25) Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium (MGSC)-The Mouse Genome Sequencing 
Consortium (MGSC), a public-private partnership of institutes, was modeled after the 
SNP consortium with the aim to accelerate, facilitate, and coordinate global mouse 
genomic sequencing efforts. 
 
26) Mouse Models of Human Cancers Consortium (MMHCC)-The Mouse Models of 
Human Cancers Consortium (MMHCC) is a collaborative program designed to derive 
and characterize mouse models, and to generate resources, information, and innovative 
approaches to the application of mouse models in cancer research. 
 
27) Nanotechnology Consortium- The Accelrys Nanotechnology Consortium aims to 
extend existing and create new software tools for the investigation of materials at the 
nanoscale. 
 
28) Novartis Institutes for Biomedical Research-Broad Institute Alliance-Novartis, the 
Broad Institute of MIT, and Harvard developed this joint project to decipher the genetic 
causes of type 2 diabetes. The team plans to make its findings freely available to 
scientists worldwide. 
 
29) Osteoarthritis Initiative-The Osteoarthritis Initiative (OAI) is a public-private 
partnership that brings together resources to help find biological and structural markers 




30) Public Population Project in Genomics-The Public Population Project in Genomics 
(P3G) aims to create an international consortium to foster collaboration between 
researchers in the field of population genomics with the goal of understanding the 
interaction between genes, environment, lifestyle, and disease. 
 
31) Receptor Tyrosine Kinase (RTK) Networks Consortium-The Receptor Tyrosine 
Kinase (RTK) Networks Consortium is an organization to facilitate and coordinate 
international efforts for the continued understanding of RTK signaling pathways and its 
relationship to human pathologies.  
 
32) Research Collaboratory for Structural BioInformatics (RCSB)-The Research 
Collaboratory for Structural Bioinformatics (RCSB) is a non-profit consortium dedicated 
to improving the scientific community‘s understanding of the function of biological 
systems through the study of the 3-D structure of biological macromolecules. 
 
33) RNAi Consortium-Investigators from three major pharmaceutical firms, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, Eli Lilly & Co., and Novartis AG have joined forces with the Broad Institute and 
other leading academic centres to create the RNA Interference (RNAi) Consortium. The 
major goal of the consortium is to produce a comprehensive RNAi toolkit that will enable 
researchers to specifically shut down expression of some 15,000 genes in both human and 
mouse cells, thereby enabling an understanding of their relevance to different diseases.  
 
34) SNP Consortium-The SNP Consortium Ltd. was a non-profit foundation organized for 
the purpose of providing public genomic data. Its objective was to discover up to 300,000 
SNPs distributed evenly throughout the human genome and to make the information 
related to these SNPs available to the public without intellectual property restrictions. 
 
35) Structural Genomics Consortium-This consortium includes a group of multinational 
companies together with the Wellcome Trust. This charitable organization will attempt to 
obtain X-ray structures for a broad representation across families of human proteins.  
 
36) SYMBIONIC- Symbionic is a project funded by the European Commission, with the 
aim of understanding issues related to the systems biology of the neuronal cell. 
 
37) TB Structural Genome Consortium-The TB Structural Genomics Consortium was 
formed with the goal of providing a structural basis for the development of therapeutics 
for tuberculosis. 
 
38) The Lipid MAPS Consortium-The consortium has as its goal the development of the 
Lipid Metabolites and Pathways Strategy, termed LIPID MAPS, that applies a global 
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